The Chinese PLA's Perception of an Invasion of Taiwan (review)

Reviews 597 to a discussion ofdie options available to countries seeking a fair yet realistic balance in their policies toward Taiwan and China. Martin L. Lasater Atlantic Council of die United States Martin L. Lasater is a seniorfellow in theAtlantic and Pacific Program at the Atlantic Council ofthe United States and a specialist in Sino-American relations. S Peter Kien-hong Yu, editor. The Chinese PLA's Perception ofan Invasion of Taiwan. New York: Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1997. x, 295 pp. Paperback $30.00, isbn 0-965432-5. The Chinese PLA's Perception ofan Invasion ofTaiwan was written to assess the question "What if?" following provocative missile tests conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) close to Taiwan's shores in 1995 and 1996. During the last missile tests (which employed live warheads), diere was talk among Chinese leaders about an invasion of Taiwan and even mention of the use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan and/or the United States. The Taiwan Strait, as a result, moved suddenly up from one of the two or three most serious "flash points" (an area where a major war involving outside powers might start) to number one or two (the other area being the Korean peninsula). The editor's central thesis in this book is that if the Chinese Communist Party (where political power resides in the PRC) can neither command die PLA to attack Taiwan nor restrain it from attacking, then the "gun will control the party." Yu, in fact, sees this as a central problem in China, describing the relationship between the Party and die military as a dialectical one. Given the fact that there was a succession struggle in China at the time ofthe missile tests and that the military may have ordered at least one of the tests in 1995 when Beijing's top civilian leader and heir apparent Jiang Zemin was out of the country, one must assume that such a problem exists and that indeed there is a contest over decision -making authority between China's civilian and military leaders regarding how to handle the "Taiwan issue." y mversityyu> m ^ introductory chapter, asserts that competition between civilian and military leaders has existed for years and constitutes a permanent problem in China. Yet, he also contends that leaders who have leaned too far toward die gun have been quite consistently embarrassed, disgraced, or even forced from office. ofHawai'i Press 598 China Review International: Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1998 Therefore, because Party leaders must rely on the gun, yet cannot go too far, the civilian-military relationship is an unstable (or dialectical) one. Further proofof how serious the Taiwan situation was is this: move diis situation from internal PRC politics to Beijing's relationship with Taiwan and consider the past history of foreign-policy decision making by Chinese leaders and their enchantment with deception as a policy (à la Sun Tzu), and the scenarios for conflict become dangerous as well as intriguing. The chain of events might be as follows: Beijing (the civilian leadership) delineates circumstances that would provoke it to order an invasion ofTaiwan (which it has reiterated many times). The military gives its interpretations in terms ofan invasion plan. Taipei makes statements and/or takes actions to test Beijing's resolve. Beijing escalates the war of words, and Taiwan's opposition politicians reply in even more provocative tones. Not attacking means a major loss of face. Regarding the specific matter of a PLA invasion ofTaiwan, the questions to be addressed are: What are the PLA's capabilities? What are its plans? Will it use deceptive tactics? How do PLA and Party decision makers interact? Will a conflict compel decision makers to use deception, thereby exacerbating the sensitive set of relations that involves the United States? Chapter 1 is a theoretical essay by Steven Chan on strategic deception. Chan concludes that China, like most other countries, is not likely to try to deceive other countries because Beijing generally wants to build confidence and avoid misunderstanding. Still, Chan says, the possibility of it engaging in deception warrants analysis and concern. In another very substantive chapter, Edward and June Dreyer, two experts on the...