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FUm & History, Vol. XXII, Nos. 1 & 2, February/May 19921 Introduction: The Gulf War and Television Peter C. Rollins, Guest Editor In late September, 1992, General Norman Schwarzkopf was on the interview circuit, promoting his autobiography, It Doesn't Take a Hero (1992). As part of the publicity campaign, he was interviewed by Barbara Walters of ABC's 20/20 with whom he spoke candidly about the Gulf War and television (9.25.92). Like most upper-echelon military leaders in the 1990s, Schwarzkopf had been a front line officer during the Vietnam conflict where he "learned" that unrestricted press access could be problematic in relationship to the natural impulse of any government to have its conduct of war look as positive as possible to its people. The top battlefield commander for Operation Desert Storm found what he called "press management" a daunting challenge: First statistic: at the height of the Vietnam war, the Tet offensive, the single most important battle ofthe war, there were eighty reporters in that country. In Saudi Arabia, we had 2010. Second statistic: in Vietnam, even during a major battle, the event would show up on television or the newspapers no sooner than forty-eight hours later. While other observers might question Schwarzkopfs notion of a free press, almost everyone would concur with his conclusion that the Gulf War had revolutionized relations between media and the military. General Schwarzkopf became so fed up with the inaccuracies of reporting that he ordered his staff to turn off televisions in his headquarters "because the information coming over them was inaccurate in many ways and they might become factored into decisions ~ so I just kept them off." The good General found Peter Arnett's "scoops" from baby milk factories and civilian bomb shelters to be particularly reprehensible. Like many other Americans who remembered the Hanoi visits of Harrison Salisbury, Ramsey Clark, Jane Fonda ~ not to mention the ubiquitous Peter Arnett — General Schwarzkopf had difficulty appreciating the "service" performed by CNN's reporter behind the lines: Peter C. Rollins is Regents Professor ofEnglish and American/Film Studies at Oklahoma State University and a member ofthe Editorial Board o/Film and History. He is Editorfor this issue of Film and History. 2 Peter C. Rollins People who did that in World War II went to jail afterward: Tokyo Rose, Lord Haw-Haw, Axis Sally. What they [in WWII, Vietnam, and the Gulf] were doing was they were broadcasting enemy propaganda. Do you think that the Iraqis were going to let out one story that was not in their favor? Of course, Schwarzkopf backed off his historical parallels when pressed by his famous interlocutor. Yet he was genuinely bewildered by the press attitude toward his Central Command: When they reported from Iraq, they put up a sign which said: "This information has been cleared by the Iraqi Command. . . ." And then when they reported from my headquarters, they put up a sign which said almost exactly the same thing ~ which seemed to say that we were the same thing, as ifwe were the same thing, as if they could only say what we allowed them to, which really bothered me. As a form of analysis, the retired General's insights on the military and the press did not progress much further than those of the infamous officer who opened a press briefing by saying: "Let me say up front that I don't like the press. Your presence here can't possibly do me any good, and it can hurt me and my people" (NYT 22 Jan 1992). Hopefully, this special issue of Film and History will plumb deeper. Was Vietnam Really Our First 'Television War?" Prior to January, 1991, historians had grown comfortable with the notion that Vietnam was our first "television war."1 The immediacy of network television reports from Vietnam was startling against the backdrop of World War II and Korea. Critics still haggle over the details, but television seemed to provide American citizens with indisputable visual evidence to contradict LBJ's promises of "light at the end of the tunnel." When nationwide Vietcong attacks during the Tet offensive (January-February, 1968) flashed on television, Americans compulsively backed the President...

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