The Ethics of Friends' Relief Work in Republican Spain

The Ethics ofFriends' ReliefWork in Republican Spain Farah J. Mendlesohn* Introduction From 1936-1942 British and later American Quakers were involved in providing relief to the civilian population of Republican and Nationalist Spain, first in Spain and later in the cone«miration camps of France and North Africaand inthe resettlementprogrammes inMexico. In 1947, when Quaker reliefwork in Germany was winding down, the American Friends returned to Southern France to assist in the settlement of the remaining refugees. This paper focuses on the reliefwork with which the British and American Friends engaged in Republican Spain, between December 1936 and the fall ofBarcelona to the Nationalists in January 1939. The outbreakofthe warin Spain in 1936, althoughprincipallyaninternal conflict, signalled the finalbreakdown ofthe inter-war system ofcollective security. The earlier failure of the League of Nations either to enforce sanctions or successfully to mediate in Abyssinia had provided thejustification , behind the decision to move negotiitions on the politically delicate issue of the Spanish Civil War from the public arena of Geneva and the League to the private diplomatic circles ofLondon, Paris and the in camera Non-intervention Committee. Furthermore , as neither Italy nor Germany took part in League meetings this provider the mechanism needed to pull theminto negotiations. Inaddition, Spainheld thePresidency ofthe League ofNations Council, and although in the long term this did them little good,' it did mean that any debates on Spain in the League were vehicles for the Spanish government. The Non-intervention Committee, in contrast, excluded Spain, emphasizing the effective non-recognition ofthe Republican government implied by the arms embargo.2 Throughout the war, with the exception ofa greater willingness to provide humanitarian aid, the American government followed the lead of Great Britain. In orderto preventthe Spanish Civil Warfromescalating into aEuropean conflict(the notorious "firstcriterion"oftheNon-interventionCommittee3) it was necessary not actually to halt foreign intervention but merely to provideamechanism wherebydiplomacymightbe employed to slowdown potentiallyhostile movesbetweentheEuropeanpowers. This allowedthose who wished to intervene actively—Russia, Italy and Germany—to do so whilst Britain and France, concerned to secure their existing interests in bothzones—andinFrance'scase topreserve internal order—couldindicate *Farah J. Mendlesohn is a lecturer in Americai Studies at Middlesex University, London. She received an MA in Peace Studies from the University ofBradford and a D.Phil, in History from the University of Yo -k. Quaker History to their electorates that something was being done. Simultaneously they endeavoured to avoid internal controversy and preserve at least an outward show ofneutrality. InBritain this failed to appease many sections ofpublic opinion, particularly on the Left. The wide variety of political opinion within the British peace movement meant that active peace campaigners were as likely to campaign for intervention in Spain as not. The opposition to Non-intervention came from those on both the Right and Left ofBritish politics, many of whom saw in Spain the seeds of a future threat, either fascist or communist. Many in the British peace movement saw in Nonintervention the abdication of responsibility in matters of mediation, conciliation and an abandonment of humanitarian ethics.4 In America, however, the less left-wing peace movement was content to see some form ofneutrality preserved and was more concerned that it should be enforced, howeverpoorly, than withprotesting the partiality ofthis official neutrality in both theory and practice. Between 1936 and 1940 the British Society of Friends participated in calls for Government, Church and League-sponsored reconciliation in Spain, but in the face ofthe British andFrench Governments' unwillingness to explore public channels of debate and the deliberate marginalisation of the Spanish conflict from the rest of the "international situation", the opportunities for peace campaigning were limited and it is noticeable that inBritainthe SpanishCivilWarquicklyslipped fromtheminutes oftheFSC Peace Committee. Although the AFSC had a Peace Committee, its main concern had been consistently for peace education as this was less controversial than political campaigning might have been. In addition, whilst the AFSC did make use ofits political networks to support congressional peace initiatives, it was farless prone to putting outpublic statements and leaflets which might have brought it into conflict with large elements ofAmerican Quakerism. Spain was to remain a relatively distant issue for American Quakers who were active on a number of fronts including China...