The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (review)

Thomas begins with the premise that Clausewitz was wrong in claiming that war inevitably heads toward totality. The Ethics of Destruction proposes that moral principles limiting the use of force can become embedded in international norms, eventually to be incorporated into the structure of the international system as interests restraining even the most powerful nations. The author begins by defining norms and explaining how dominant schools of thought on international relations do not adequately account for ethical considerations. After establishing the theoretical framework for his study, Thomas examines how norms emerge and constrain international actors, as well as relate to international law. He illustrates his concepts with two case studies, one dealing with international disavowal of the assassination of foreign leaders and the other a more extensive examination of the development of expectations for high-precision and low-collateral damage in aerial bombardment. To overcome the methodological challenges of determining the existence of a norm and its causal effect, he applies two strategies. He analyzes the historical record to explain the decisions that led states to adhere to norms restricting their use of force, and also uses counterfactual reasoning to discount alternative explanations.

Thomas (an assistant professor of political science) is obviously well versed in his field, and his theoretical discussions provide a plausible basis for his arguments. His examination of the historical issues surrounding assassination is persuasive and thorough, as well as timely, considering the recent debates about killing terrorists. However, he does not do as well dealing with the development of bombing practices. Instead of investing the time to master the extensive literature dealing with the subject, he primarily relies on a few journal articles, along with books by fellow political scientists like Robert Pape, whose Bombing to Win (Ithaca, 1996) is another work featuring provocative conclusions based on much flawed historical analysis. Consequently Thomas overgeneralizes about air campaigns, completely misrepresents Korean air operations, and ignores or underestimates the influence of such key operational leaders as Carl Spaatz, Curtis LeMay, Arthur Harris, Otto P. Weyland, Douglas MacArthur, and Wesley Clark in shaping bombing practices in wartime. A more detailed examination of the historical record would reveal that their attitudes, along with military requirements, doctrine, and technology, were more important than international norms in determining the course of military actions.

Thomas recognizes some of the limitations of his approach, conceding that his model works best to explain the actions only of the United States and a few Western democracies. Norms against attacks on civilians did not seem operative for Soviet actions in Chechnya or the Iran-Iraq War, for example. Nonetheless, The Ethics of Destruction deserves consideration by anyone examining international mechanisms to limit wars.