Continuity, Consciousness, and Identity in Hume's Philosophy

Continuity, Consciousness, and Identity in Hume's Philosophy Keith E. Yandell Preface The intellectual context for this essay is provided by these remarks from David Hume's A Treatise ofHuman Nature: Concerningperceptions: The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the firstfoundation ofall ourconclusions— no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions.1 (Strictly, Humean perceptions not being propositional, presumably what commands our assent and is foundational is that these perceptions exist and that they have the qualities that they appear to have.) Concerningindividuation: Thus the principle ofindividuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptednessofany object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and without being oblig'd to form the idea of multiplicity or number. (T 201) Concerning perceptions and objects: Tis certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence. (T 206) 2 Concerning self-awareness: Tis evident, that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, theirideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person. But every thing, that strikes upon us with vivacity, and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a manner, into our consideration, and becomes present to the Volume XVIII Number 2 255 KEITH E. YANDELL mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when itis once present, it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other objects. (T 339) In ways that will be explored here, these passages exhibit contrary tendenciesin Hume's thought that drove him to despair ofreachinghis goal ofofferinga"theoryoftheintellectual world ... [that] wou'dbefree from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give ofthe material world" (T 633). These contrary tendencies he found he could neither renounce nor reconcile and so he was led to "plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding" (T 636). If our world is as Hume thought it, it contains nothing enduring and non-composite. Yet common sense speaks otherwise regarding both material objects and human minds. As natural beliefs, the belief that there are mind-independent enduring material things and the beUef that there are enduring minds are found in all of us, Hume included. This Hume not only admitted, but insisted on; see his remarks above, Concerningperceptions andobjects. Butfor Hume such behefs arise from neither sensory nor introspective experience nor reason, but from imagination, and their source is neither direct acquaintance with mind or material objects nor experiential evidence in their favour nor any necessity that reason might discern in their existence. Their origin lies in perceptions and propensities that combine to elicit them without providing evidence on their behalf. All of this is controversial, but it is not here that Hume's perplexities lie. They concern what for Hume is the deeper matter of how to put together into one explanatory theory all of the desired Humean elements. They reflect, not so much beliefin minds or things, butthetheoryin termsofwhichbeliefinmindsand thingsisexplicated. The ontology of the theory allows only for perceptions. Perceptions include impressions, and "all impressions are internal and perishing existences" (T 194), and ideas, which are their equally fleeting copies. What Hume says regarding impressions of touch—that they "change every moment upon us" (T 231)—holds without exception in the world of perceptions. Nor have any perceptions any real connections among themselves. In ways to be explored, however, this ontology, restricted to atomistic perceptions, raises perplexing problems when it is used as a basis for explaining our natural beliefs. Our focus here will not be on the details ofthat explanation but on its essentia] elements, and even then we shall focus on beliefin material...