Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of his "Treatise." (review)

David Pears. Hume's System:An Examination ofthe First Book ofhis " Treatise." Oxford: University Press, 1990. David Hume's appeal that the Enquiries "may alone be regarded as containinghisphilosophicalsentiments andprinciples" 2 is once again denied in Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of his "Treatise,"hy David Pears. In his postscript Pears explains his neglect ofthe Enquiries: the Ught that it [Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding] does throw is softer and more diffuse, whereas the Treatise is a young man's book in which the structure of his thought emerges more starkly and with sharper outlines, (p. 199) While tracking the main themes of his rigorous treatment of Hume, I will show that the gratitude we owe Pears is qualified by some minor difficulties. In at least one case, when dealing with Hume's account ofperception, Pears ought to have consulted the softer light of the Enquiry. Pears' account of the first book of the Treatise constitutes an attempt to redress the balance upset by past Hume scholarship. He maintains that Hume's theory ofmind addresses both ofthe questions that have served as platforms for opposing interpretations of the Treatise. Some commentators have concentrated solely on Hume's theory ofidea derivation as it responds to the question, What ideas may we legitimatelyhave? Others have explored Hume's account ofthe role of ideas in thought as it responds to the question, What may we legitimately believe? When we succumb to the temptation tofavour one of these questions, we fail to appreciate the relationship between Hume's account ofmeaning and his account oftruth. The temptations are admittedlypowerful. As apsychological version ofsemantic theory, Hume's account ofmeaning is strikingly similar to that of the Logical Positiviste. But the failure of such interpretations to account for the bulk of Hume's discussion in any but dismissive ways can lead us to consider Hume's notion ofidea derivation an "inherited framework on which he constructed his naturalistic system" (Pears, 9). Pears insists that these two thrusts, meaning and truth, occupy positions of equal importance in Hume's theory. Hume answers both questions, and his answers are related. Neither a sceptical positivist nor an unqualified naturalist, Hume is something in between, a "cautious naturalist" (ibid., viii, 64). Volume XIX Number 1 227 CHRISTIAN K. CAMPOLO In his first four chapters Pears separates and exposes the two strands of Hume's theory of mind. Along the way he pauses to patch several inadequacies which his treatment reveals. He then applies this two-pronged theory to the three central problems of the Treatise: causation, personal identity, and perception. Hume himself addresses each of these problems without abandoning his deceptively simple theory ofidea derivation: all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.* If we substitute 'word' for 'idea' and 'thing' for 'impression', we arrive at a formulaverymuch like Russell's atomism. In a sense, Humeis also an atomist. The simplicity of his 'simple' perceptions is that of phenomenologicalindivisibility. YetHume's concerns are broader than Russell's. ForHume's principle accountsevenforthemeaninglessideas (images) that occur as mere data. Whatever their status, all ideas are caused by impressions of which they are exact replicas. Tidy though it may be, this theory can account neither for ideas not derived from impressions nor for the variety ofways in which ideas participate in thought. Pears suggests that Hume need not worry about impressionless ideas ifhe will both restricthis theory ofidea derivation to meaningful ideas and allow that meaningless ideas can be derived laterally from other ideas. Pears recognizes that such measures would cost Hume his atomism, while he takes it for granted that Hume's empiricism would be left intact (p. 27). But I suspect that such measures would challenge Hume's empiricism by altering the sort of simplicity exhibited by 'simple' perceptions. If simple ideas can be derived from other ideas, can the parent ideas still be phenomenologically indivisible? The other problem is more troublesome. Nothing intrinsic to an image tells us whether it is meaningful or meaningless, general or specific, a memory or a fantasy, a beliefor a conjecture. Hume's theory ofidea derivation accounts onlyforcontent...