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Book Reviews569 which is essentially the audience this book addresses and remains the strong underlying theme of the book. Houseman's book begins with a useful analysis ofthe current government system with an assessment of the problems facing the post-Soeharto state. This is followed by a fascinating study of how classical political science theories can assist in an understanding of Indonesia that would be particularly valuable to both graduate and undergraduate students studying comparative politics. Also useful is a section on suggestions regarding where to find information on contemporary events in Indonesia as well as important tips on doing field research in Indonesia. For the United States, if preventing Indonesia from becoming communist was a critical objective in the 1960s, then just as important now in an era where transnational terrorism has become a global threat, is the need to engage what now significantly is the largest democracy in the Islamic world. Crucial in that regard is the development of a new generation of Indonesianists in the United States who can facilitate such engagement, and Houseman's book would undoubtedly play its role in this quest. Leonard C Sebastian Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order. Edited by See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya. Armonk, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 264pp. This well-crafted book, presented in two parts, deals with the tension between bilateral and multilateral approaches to security in the AsiaPacific region. It is competently edited in uncomplicated prose and its chief value lies in the manner in which the editors have melded three conceptual and nine country case studies, while drawing important insights of their own. As in any edited volume, there will tend to an unevenness of quality and divergent viewpoints and analysis, and the job of editors to attain overall coherence is often an elusive task. To the great credit of the editors such unevenness has been kept at a minimum and the divergences and convergences of the various authors have provided fodder for Tan and Acharya's interesting problematizing of security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. It is also to the credit of the editors to have honestly admitted in footnote 18 of the Introduction that: "Owing to a lengthy production 570Book Reviews process in the making of this book, our contributors have not been able to account for some of the recent changes in national and regional affairs" (p. 223). It is indeed one of the occupational hazards of political scientists and security analysts that situations change so rapidly that what is analysed at any one time will within months become dated or even irrelevant. Generally speaking then, let me note here that the cases do bear the mark of essays written in 2002 when the papers were commissioned or actually written. Having said all of the above by way of a preamble, let me now get on with the review proper. The editors state the thesis of the book unambiguously on page xii. The basic point seems be that whether security arrangements are bilateral, multilateral and even unilateral is less significant than the fact that the end result is the outcome of security or regional order, viz.: "[Bjilateralism and unilateralism need not be inherently conflict causing. Rather, under certain conditions, they can be reconciled with multilateral approaches in ways that could ameliorate the security dilemma". Accordingly, the editors believe that the older concepts of collective security, collective defence and cooperative security have become unhelpful as new developments in the global and regional environment make them increasingly obsolete. Let me now turn to the authored chapters to see if there is indeed support and evidence for the editors' assertions. Ralf Emmers writes in Chapter 1 that bilateral alliances with the U.S. have underpinned the security architecture in the region but that unilateralism may even undermine the value of such arrangements in the future. He suggests further that conventional alliances are incapable of dealing with transnational terrorism. William Tow in the next chapter takes a somewhat contrarian view, arguing that bilateralism, including a version he calls "enriched" bilateralism, will remain of paramount value but may be usefully merged...

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