Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (review)

Book Reviews Terrorism and Violence in SoutheastAsia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Edited by Paul J. Smith. Armonk, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe 2005. Softcover: 262 pp. This edited volume adds to the post 9/11 glut of books on terrorism without offering significant new insights on the problem as it relates to Southeast Asia. It falls also between two stools: readers interested in the details of groups like Jemaah Islamiyah or the Abu Sayyaf Group will find better, more accurate, and more up-to-date information from other sources, including from some of the same contributors to this book, and readers interested in the strategy and tactics of counterterrorism will find the Southeast Asia material thin. The volume is divided into three sections: the first two cover transnational and regional perspectives on terrorism in Southeast Asia, while the third examines the enabling environment that facilitates terrorist activities. The first section is the weakest, in part because of odd interpretations or factual errors that appear — errors which the authors would probably not make if they were writing their chapters today. Chalk, for example, writes, "It is still not clear [...] whether the real masterminds behind the Bali attacks were renegade elements within the armed forces (rather than JI) seeking to institute a strategy of tension in order to bolster the military's declining grip on political power in Jakarta". He cites interviews in Sydney and Canberra as his source, but it is hard to believe, given all the evidence emerging from the trials of the Bali bombers, that the military-as-mastermind theory is credible. He also says that "Currently, there is no conclusive 146 Book Reviews147 evidence to support the U.S. assertion that the ASG is actively associated either with Al-Qaeda or JI", whereas hard evidence of JIASG cooperation did become available after some arrests off the coast of Malaysia in late 2003. Analyses that might have been stateof -the-art at the time they were written lose much of their value after a one or two-year wait. The same problem of outdated information bedevils other chapters. Abuza refers to Al-Qaeda as JI's "parent organization", whereas there is strong evidence to show that JI grew out of a rupture within the Indonesian Dami Islam movement and is very much an independent organization, even if some of its members had close working relationships with men like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Thayer, in an otherwise useful critique of some of the sensationalist assessments of Al-Qaeda's penetration of Southeast Asia, writes that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir "has no reported direct links with Al-Qaeda or bin Laden" whereas information coming out ofmore recent interrogations and trials suggests a stronger personal connection. Abuza suggests that the now-defunct Laskar Jihad organization received covert assistance from Al-Qaeda (p. 55), that its disbanding was a "PR tactic" and that Laskar Jihad and Al-Qaeda share a similar worldview (p. 56). Studies published in 2004 showed that a major ideological gulf separates the leadership of the two organizations, and the disbanding was the result of serious internal rifts. Some of the useful information in the chapter is undermined by mistakes that a good fact-checker could have picked up. The Jakarta mall bombing was in August 2001, not July 2000; the bombing of a train station in YaIa was April 2001, not 2000. Laskar Jundullah was not a paramilitary arm of JI — none of its members were part of the JI organization. The ferocity of fighting in the Moluccas was not due primarily to "a shared sense [with bin Laden] that never could the radical Muslims allow an Islamic state to be broken up" (p. 54). The objective ofthe book, says the editor, is "to provide the critical knowledge necessary for effective policy responses". But when the information itself is problematic, the value to policy-makers plummets. The book is best when not focusing on extremist movements per se. Anthony Smith has a balanced chapter on the political context in Indonesia, stressing that "Indonesia's Muslims do not, by and large, constitute a fertile landscape for even mild versions of Islamist governance, let alone violent theocratic movements...