Science and Skepticism

Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 2, November 2002, pp. 297-308 Science and Skepticism BERYL LOGAN Very little scholarly attention has been devoted to Part 1 of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.1 This lack has been addressed recently by Tweyman, who argues for the importance of this part in understanding the positions defended by the characters in the remainder of the dialogue,2 in accordance with the types that Hume discusses in part 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding3—Cleanthes is a philosophical dogmatist who requires the application of excessive skepticism by Philo to turn to the approved position of mitigated skepticism, while Demea is and remains a religious dogmatist. In the present paper I will address the question of why the Dialogues continues beyond Part 1 in the face of the statement by Philo, who is generally considered to be Hume's spokesperson in the dialogue, that the inquiry being undertaken—the investigation into the nature of the Deity —is beyond human reason. According to Philo, human reason ought not to conduct inquiries into subjects such as theology, whose objects of study are too great for, or beyond, human experience. It would seem, then, that if Philo's position is the acceptable one, the dialogue should not take place at all—determining the nature of the Deity is just not an appropriate exercise for human reason. According to Cleanthes, however, there is a parallel between theological inquiries and those of other, accepted sciences where evidence is presented and appropriate conclusions drawn in proportion to that evidence. Rejecting an equality between sciences is "a plain proof of prejudice and passion," as there is no rational basis for that rejection. Beryl Logan is at Glendon College, York University, 2275 Bayview Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, M4N 3M6, Canada, e-mail: blogan@yorku.ca 298 Beryl Logan In this paper, I will argue that the dialogue is able to continue because there are two aspects of Philo's position in Part 1 that allow Cleanthes to present his argument in spite of Philo's claim regarding the limitations of human reason. These are: one, that Philo's position does not decisively render Cleanthes' position untenable, as they are not mutually exclusive; and two, if his position is that of the Pyrrhonian or excessive skeptic, whose criticisms are often exaggerated,4 then they would not carry the force of those coming from a more moderate skeptic whose position is corrected and methodized . I will show that this is, in fact, his position. In this context, I will address Tweyman's claim in his important book that Philo is a "moderate antecedent skeptic." If Tweyman were correct that Philo is presenting a mitigated skeptical position —the position Hume regarded as valuable and reasonable5—then his objections to undertaking an investigation of the nature of the Deity would be legitimate and the dialogue would not continue.6 But it does: Pyrrhonian or excessive skepticism cannot stop the inquiry from beginning.7 In both cases, the concerns raised by the skeptic only oppose the position of Cleanthes but do not defeat it. I will first outline the types of skepticism, according to Hume, then set out the positions taken by Philo and Cleanthes in Part 1, followed by the two answers to the question, why does the dialogue continue. Part 1—Skepticism I begin with a brief synopsis of Hume's characterization of the various types of skepticism from the Enquiry which we learn from Tweyman's Skepticism and Belief aie the guide for understanding the roles of the characters in the Dialogues: excessive and moderate, antecedent and consequent skepticism. Excessive antecedent skepticism is the type demonstrated by Descartes, which "recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties" (EHU 12.3; SBN 150). Hume regards this doubt to be incurable, if it were even possible. Excessive consequent skepticism maintains the "fallaciousness of [our] mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed . Even our very senses are brought into dispute ... and the maxims of common life are subjected to the...