Abstract

The question that these two books explore is whether the fundamental framing of the issue of justice by Rawls is flawed. Cohen suggests that Rawls's theory of justice concedes too much to the capitalist ethic to be ultimately serviceable as the basis for a more egalitarian society. Sen's disagreement with Rawls is more a methodological one: he argues that the hypothesis of an "original position" takes too little account of value differences in the world and of the different views of justice to which different peoples might agree. Deeply as both authors admire Rawls as a philosopher and a person, they each argue for a significant move away from his theory. Cohen's disagreement derives from his own commitment to equality; he seeks to rescue the egalitarian commitment implicit in Rawls's own position. Sen's disagreement derives from his commitment to the diversity of values. He prefers the evaluation of what actually happens to the search for perfectly just arrangements and institutions.

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