Abstract

Hume's theory of justice, intricately linked to his account of moral development, is at once simplistic and mysterious, combining familiar conventionalist elements with perplexing, complicated elements of his rich moral psychology. These dimensions of his theory make interpreting it no easy task, although many have tried. Emerging from these many different attempts is a picture of Hume as defending an account of justice according to which justice consists of expedient rules designed to advance one's self-interest. The mistake of this view, I argue, lies in its narrow focus on the material rather than psychological effects of the conventions of justice. My goal here is to isolate the psychological effects of the rules of justice by analyzing the psychological transformation of the parties who morally commit to justice.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1947-9921
Print ISSN
0319-7336
Pages
pp. 253-276
Launched on MUSE
2011-01-26
Open Access
No
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