Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction (review)

Hume Studies Volume 33, Number 1, April 2007, pp. 193-195 Sophie Botros. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Pp. 253. ISBN 0-415-33180-3, Cloth, $140. Sophie Botros claims that there is a contradiction in one of Hume's famous arguments for the superiority of his sentimental conception of morality over moral rationalism. The argument, formulated in part 1 of Book 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature, and known in the recent secondary literature as the influence argument, is intended to show that "moral distinctions [are] not derived from reason" because reason is unable to account for the practicality of morality. Botros's main thesis is that the contradiction lies in the second premise of the argument. She claims that Hume gives different formulations of that premise —"no less than nine" (1) according to the author—revealing the presence of two contradictory lines in his thought on this topic. On the one hand, Hume holds that reason can, and does, influence action, though only alongside an independent desire; on the other, he holds that reason has no, and couldn't have, any motivational role: reason is a "wholly inactive" and "perfectly inert" (6) faculty. Botros aims to clarify this "universally ignored" (1) contradiction in a way which provides not only a better understanding of Hume's Treatise, but also an adequate schema to evaluate, and eventually solve, many recent meta-ethical debates on moral motivation that have the influence argument's contradiction as their main source of inspiration. I shall concentrate on those parts of the book directly dealing with Hume's work. Botros's strategy is to explore the supposed contradiction by considering the practicality argument "as if there were compressed within its apparent unitary structure" (1) two different arguments, depending on which of the contradictory readings of the second premise is assumed. She argues that locating Hume's discussion in its proper historical context, reveals that Hume had two different targets, the moral rationalists like Clarke and Cudworth and the moral sense theory defended by Francis Hutcheson. This supposedly explains the different formulations of the influence argument. Botros's hypothesis is fascinating, innovative, and she moves comfortably through history of philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaethics. But she starts from a questionable assumption, namely that there are radical differences among the formulations of the so-called second premise of the influence argument , differences so great that the only way to avoid contradiction in Hume's theory of motivation is to suppose that the influence argument is addressed to two different kinds of opponent, that is Francis Hutcheson and the moral rationalists, such as Cudworth and Clarke. However, despite all the arguments Hume Studies 194 Book Reviews Botros offers in favour of her interpretation, we have reason to be skeptical about her conclusion. Botros finds the most prominent example of the two conflicting strands in T 2.3.3. The first strand comprises two movements: first, that the "proper province" of demonstrative reason's is "the world of ideas" whereas "the will always places us in that of realities", thus demonstration and volition "seem ... to be totally removed from each other" [T 2.3.3.2]; second, that passions do not contain "any representative quality," and so cannot "be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason" [T 2.3.3.5]. Botros claims these two passages point in the same direction : passions and belief belong to totally different worlds and "between these two worlds even causal interaction seemed inconceivable" (25). This implies that beliefs cannot have any influence on our conduct. This line of argument, Botros argues, stands in direct conflict with the second strand, namely that reason can have a causal influence on action. Reason and passion contribute differently to the causal processes leading to action: reason provides information on how best to satisfy passions, which themselves determine practical ends. Although these causal contributions of the two are different, the second line of reasoning stresses, contrary to the first, that reason and desire are "equally important causal partners" (11). I find Botros's interpretation unconvincing. When Hume says in T. 2.3.3 that reason...