Themes in Hume: The Self, the Will, Religion (review)

Hume Studies Volume 27, Number 2, November 2001, pp. 337-341 Book Reviews TERENCE PENELHUM. Themes in Hume: The Self, the Will, Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. xix + 294. ISBN 0-19-823989-3, cloth, $55.00. The thirteen essays (three of which appear in print for the first time) that constitute this volume clearly show that for over four decades Terence Penelhum has been among the most perceptive writers on Hume. Although he carefully spells out the historical context of Hume's discussions in a number of these essays, Penelhum's metier is not identifying antecedents or targets, but instead analyzing with clarity Hume's views and revealing their interconnections and defects. In doing this, Penelhum succeeds not only in drawing out the implications of Hume's philosophy but also in displaying its richness. As its title indicates, the work focuses on three areas in Hume's writings: (1) his discussion of the self and personal identity, (2) his views on moral psychology and freedom of the will, and (3) his treatment of religious belief. Because Penelhum's views on these matters have not been static, one virtue of this collection is that the reader can follow the evolution of his thoughts about Hume. In particular, each of the new essays, "Hume, Identity and Selfhood" (chapter 6), "Hume and the Freedom of the Will" (chapter 8), and "Religion in the Enquiry and After" (chapter 11), serves both as a summary of Penelhum's current thinking on the topic and a commentary on his previous work. Volume 27, Number 2, November 2001 338 Book Reviews Penelhum's general view of Hume is fairly standard if not entirely uncontroversial. He takes Hume to be a systematic philosopher in the Socratic tradition, who seeks self-knowledge through the construction of a science of human nature; in effect he suggests that Hume's primary aim is psychological not philosophical (179). However, he is not doctrinaire about Hume's ultimate philosophical goal in this volume. It is the specific manifestations in, for example, Hume's skepticism, the reversal of the usual philosophical roles of reason and passion, and the denial of a particular sort of self, personal identity and freedom, that interest Penelhum, and on which he has provocative and often compelling things to say. After an initial chapter that provides a general overview of Hume's philosophy , the first section of the work begins with Penelhum's seminal 1955 article, "Hume on Personal Identity." In this article he argues that Hume's critique of the common person's practice of ascribing identity to changing things, including the mind, is itself mistaken. Penelhum believes that whether or not the identity of something is compatible with change depends on the kind of thing it is, not on the concepts of sameness and identity. He also disagrees with Hume in holding that the common person is aware of change in some instances in which identity is ascribed. In the succeeding four chapters he modifies this position only slightly (113), and proceeds, in chapters 4 and 5, to explore the relation of Hume's account of personal identity to his discussion of the passions in Book II of the Treatise of Human Nature, and, in chapter 6, to his expressed dissatisfaction in the work's Appendix. He also responds to critics of his interpretation and Hume's account. In the third chapter, "Hume's Theory of the Self Revisited," Penelhum offers arguments against those who think that Hume is not criticizing the common ascription of identity but rather accepting a weaker sort of identity, "imperfect identity ," as well as those who think Hume's account presupposes the very unity of mind he is attacking. According to Penelhum the former cannot account for Hume's claim in his discussion of personal identity, as well as in his discussion of the continued and distinct existence of objects, that we confuse identity or sameness with closely resembling objects (48, cf. 109). Interestingly , he also considers the "logical construction" analysis of the concept of a mind anachronistic and non-Humean, since it de-psychologizes Hume's position and fails to capture what he takes to be the common man's...