Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections

Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1, April 2000, pp. 41-75 Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections KEN LEVY I A recent debate concerns Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects".1 The position that he believes they do not exist in the objects has been dubbed the "standard" or "traditional" or "orthodox" or "Positivist" or "Humean" view.2 The position that he believes they do or must exist in the objects has been dubbed "Skeptical Realism" or the "New Hume."3 Given all of Hume's talk about the inconceivability of causal connections, it would be rather strange, unphilosophical, and therefore "un-Hume-like" if Hume simply assumed—without argument—that causal connections do or must exist in the objects. For why believe these inconceivable "somethings" exist if we can't even imagine what they are (or what their intrinsic nature is)? This demands an explanation.4 So either Hume assumes causal connections do or must exist in the objects, or he doesn't. If he doesn't, then the New Hume is false. If he does, then it is only reasonable to expect him to do one of two things: (1) provide explicit and unambiguous statements to the effect that he still believes that causal connections do or must exist in the objects despite his belief that we can't even conceive of them and/or Ken Levy is at Columbia University Law School, New York, USA. e-mail: KML56@columbia.edu 42 Ken Levy (2) provide textual evidence that he subscribes to a reason for believing that causal connections do or must exist in the objects despite his belief that we can't even conceive of them. Regarding (1), I hold that no passages in the Treatise of Human Nature or in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding warrant the New Hume. Nowhere does Hume unambiguously state that he believes causal connections do or must exist in the objects. I do think that there are several things Hume says that lend themselves to this interpretation—e.g., his various references to our "ignorance" of "secret," "unknown," "hidden" powers; and his point that his definitions of cause are "imperfect" and "drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause." But these and like passages do not amount to explicit and unambiguous statements that causal connections do or must exist in the objects.5 For they are still compatible with alternative interpretations, interpretations other than the New Hume.6 So we are left with (2). Does Hume give evidence that he subscribes to a reason for believing that causal connections do or must exist in the objects? I shall argue that we have good reason to think that he does not. My argument for this conclusion will proceed as follows. First, I shall explicate what I take to be the strongest, and possibly the only, plausible basis on which to infer from the constant conjunctions we observe that there are causal connections. Second, I shall argue that Hume provides no evidence that he subscribes to this basis.7 The reader should be aware that my ultimate conclusion is not that Hume is an "anti-realist" about causal connections in the objects. My paper should not necessarily be construed as an argument for the Humean interpretation of Hume (although Humeans may certainly use it to their advantage). I don't actually show or purport to show this. Nor do I think it necessarily follows from my overall argument against the New Hume. For, first, the Humean interpretation and the New Hume are not exhaustive (see note 6). So even if I did disprove the New Hume (which I don't; see below), this doesn't necessarily mean we would have to accept the Humean interpretation by default. Second, the fact that we have good reason not to subscribe to a certain position doesn't necessarily mean it is false. Indeed, in section IX, I shall argue that the New Hume is still a viable possibility if we attribute a certain other position to Hume—what I shall call "Newtonian Empiricism." But I shall also argue that this rather plausible interpretation of Hume is equally consistent with Hume...