Humean Self-Consciousness Explained

Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 1, April 1998, pp. 95-129 Humean Self-Consciousness Explained GORDON PARK STEVENSON Although Hume makes numerous allusions to consciousness throughout both the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, he only once characterizes consciousness explicitly. His somewhat elliptical characterization occurs in a passage from the Appendix to the Treatise, wherein he boasts: Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that persona] identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. (T 635)1 There are some fertile claims contained in this short passage, but unfortunately, Hume doesn't adequately develop them. In general, as a number of commentators have noted,2 Hume consistently neglects to explicate the relationship between consciousness, perception, and the self within his writings, and accordingly, both the Treatise and the first Enquiry lack the treatment of self-consciousness that his overall psychological theory appears to require. As James Noxon puts it, Hume takes "no notice of the self-consciousness upon which he constantly relies until he arrives at Book II."3 Furthermore, it should be noted that the species of self-consciousness of which Hume finally comes to "take notice" in Book II itself does not seem identical to the species of self-consciousness upon which he so "constantly" relies in Book I. Thus, there lurks an intimidating explanatory gap in Hume's Gordon Park Stevenson is at the Department of Philosophy, Box U-54, University of Connecticut, Storrs CT 06269 USA. 96 Gordon Park Stevenson system which commentators have yet to bridge. In what follows, I try to bridge this gap by showing how Hume's accounts of reflexion, perception, and the self can be interpreted and conjoined in such a manner as to reveal a view of self-consciousness largely compatible with Hume's overall psychological project. In attempting such a task, I take my cue—and inspiration—from Hume himself, and particularly from his suggestion at T 635 that "consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception," and that "personal identity arises from consciousness." The ensuing pages comprise an attempt to understand more fully what Hume could mean by these pithy remarks. I will argue that, contra those who suggest that Humean self-consciousness should be equated with the mental act of being aware of some "idea of the self," Humean self-consciousness should rather be identified with the feeling of personal identity, or more accurately, with the phenomenological feelings of vivacity and facility (felt ease of transition) as they are associated intentionally with the constituent perceptions of the successive bundles that characterize the Humean self or mind. In other words, I intend to show how self-consciousness for Hume can be said to arise from consciousness simpliciter. To accomplish this end I first will need to spend some time—the entire first half of the paper—considering Hume's account of consciousness itself. By developing a Humean account of consciousness as a species of reflexion, and by arguing at length that the phenomenological feelings of vivacity and facility that figure so prominently within Hume's psychology can both be characterized as impressions of reflexion, I will ultimately try to show how Humean self-consciousness—qua the feeling of personal identity—can properly be said to arise from such impressions of reflexion, or to "arise from consciousness" as Hume so aptly puts it at T 635. In the final section of the paper, a tentative effort is made to reconcile the view of self-consciousness presented in Book II of the Treatise (self-consciousness "as it regards our passions") with the form of self-consciousness (self-consciousness "as it regards our thought") targeted in Book I. I. Consciousness as "Nothing But a Reflected Thought or Perception" A. Consciousness in the Plural, and The Consciousness Question Broached. Hume's identification of consciousness with a "reflected" thought or perception immediately presents an interpretive dilemma regarding the temporality of consciousness: is it the case that consciousness for Hume is an abiding, unitary feature of the mind—consciousness in the singular—or rather, that there are simply successions of transitory consciousnesses— consciousness in the plural...