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Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 89-104 Hume and the Limits of Reason MICHAEL P. LYNCH In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error.1 So begins Treatise I iv 1, "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason." The rules of reason may be perfect, but we are not. From this truism Hume cultivates a notoriously obscure argument to the effect that we should never trust our reasoning. In characteristic fashion, Hume considers the argument sound but unpersuasive. He believes that no one who reflects on it will lose faith in their reason and sets out to explain why. In this essay, I am concerned to make two main points. First, the argument is more successful than often thought; and second, reflecting on Hume's explanation for its lack of force illuminates the depth of his naturalism and contains an important insight into the limits of human reason.2 Hume actually presents two distinct arguments in "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason."3 The arguments are distinct insofar as they are aimed at different conclusions; they are related in that they share a premise concerning our natural fallibility as reasoning agents. The first argument (T 181) is meant to show that any belief formed in the "demonstrative sciences"—any a priori belief about (say) mathematics—cannot be held with certainty. At best, such beliefs can be taken as probably true. This argument can be sketched as follows .4 In performing any set of calculations, no matter how simple, we are Michael P. Lynch is at the Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Mississippi, University MS 38677 USA. email: mlynch@sunset.backbone.olemiss.edu 90 Michael P. Lynch susceptible to error. This we know from past experience. We will, of course, be more confident in our conclusions if we recheck our calculations, or allow others to check them for us. But while these methods can increase the subjective probability that we are right, they can never increase it all the way to 1. For the possibility that we have made a mistake always remains. Therefore, we should never be completely certain of any of our beliefs, even of those concerning rudimentary mathematics, and hence "all knowledge degenerates into probability." Using the above line of reasoning as a stepping-stone, Hume then presents a second, more shocking argument. Here, the conclusion is a strong scepticism: reflection on our natural fallibility shows us that we shouldn't even trust our reasoning in everyday life; if we follow the argument, we will see that we actually have no justified beliefs at all. Hume thinks the arguments of each stage are epistemically related—accepting the first argument should lead one to accept the second. In this essay, I will only be concerned with the second argument. Thus, when I refer to Hume's "sceptical argument" I am to be understood as referring to the stronger, more radically sceptical hypothesis. The paper is broken into two major sections; each corresponding to a question. The first question is: What is the sceptical argument and does it work? The second is: What does Hume take the sceptical argument to show, or: what is Hume's point in raising the sceptical argument? One might expect that the answer to this second sort of question would already be contained in an answer to the first sort. But as is often the case, things aren't simple where Hume is concerned. As I've already noted in the introduction, Hume doesn't think anyone will—or can, for that matter—believe the sceptic's conclusion, even if her argument for that conclusion is sound. Therefore, in what follows, we must keep these two issues in mind; we must separate Hume's presentation and defense of the sceptical argument, and his intended use of that argument. I Suppose that upon mulling over some issue in your mind, you reach a decision, P.5 Since you have made mistakes in reasoning in the past, however, you find yourself (quite prudently perhaps) doubting P. Now according to...

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