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Hume Studies Volume XIX, Number 2, November 1993, pp. 301-316 The Nature of Humean Animals ANTONY E. PITSON Hume's account of the similarities and differences between ourselves and animals seems of obvious importance for understanding his general philosophical position. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that Hume's remarks about animals have not received greater attention.1 My principal interest in what follows is with the differences that Hume finds between ourselves and animals, and his explanation of those differences.2 We shall see that these differences converge on the difference in moral status between humans and animals; and in considering what Hume has to say about the latter, we will encounter important questions about the nature of his account of virtue and vice. I shall also wish to emphasise, however, Hume's recognition of the fundamental similarities and continuities between human and animal nature; for this represents a philosophical revolution in which the view of man as a unique creation in God's image is replaced with that of man as a natural object differing only in degree from other animals.3 Human and Animal Minds There is, according to Hume, a close resemblance between the "anatomy" of human and animal minds, just as there are obvious physiological similarities between men and animals (T 325). Any differences between our mental capacities and those of animals are, it appears, ones of degree only: "Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason" as we do, albeit in Antony E. Pitson is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, e mail: aepl@forth.stirling.ac.uk 302 Antony E. Pitson a "more imperfect manner" ("Of the Immortality of the Soul," 592). There are, in fact, two such differences which Hume evidently regards as being of special importance. The first is our superiority in knowledge and understanding (T 326). "Men are superior to beasts," Hume says, "principally by the superiority of their reason" (T 610). If it is true that one person may obviously surpass another in the ability to reason, it appears also to be true that people collectively surpass animals in this respect (EHU 107n). Indeed, the differences that Hume finds here appear quite striking, for he reminds us of our ability to carry our thoughts beyond our immediate situation to remote places and times, and to theorise about our experience ("Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," 82). By comparison, animals appear to be without curiosity or insight and to be confined in their thoughts to the things around them, though they not only acquire beliefs from experience but also by means of prudence and intelligence act directly on the natural world ("Of Suicide," 582). Hume is anxious to stress, however, that we should not think of ourselves as having been especially favoured by virtue of our superior reason; for we find that our reason is proportionate both to our wants and to our period of existence ("Of the Immortality of the Soul," 593). There is, in other words, a natural explanation for the difference in reasoning powers between ourselves and animals—that nature provides us with the intelligence required to meet our needs ("The Stoic," 147)—which would make Hume's position fully consistent with an evolutionary account of the development of such powers.4 The other especially important point of difference between ourselves and animals lies in the area of the passions. Like us, animals are motivated to obtain pleasure and to avoid pain (T 176); they are, accordingly, liable also to experience the same sorts of passion and emotion—both "indirect," as in the case of pride and humility (T II i 12) and love and hatred (T II ii 12), and "direct ," as in the case of fear and grief (T, 398). To this extent, animals will also be susceptible to the same mechanism for the communication of passions— namely sympathy, whose force is observable throughout the whole animal creation (T 363). Similarly, volition, as the immediate effect of pleasure and pain, is something we share in common with animals (T 448). Yet in spite of all this there is the crucial difference that, compared with us...

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