Abstract

The recent veneration of the Iraq sanctions program as having prevented Saddam Husayn from obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) obscures important lessons regarding the program’s political failures. Through an examination of factors such as Iraq’s rationing system and flaws in the sanctions’ design, this article shows how the imposition of sanctions strengthened rather than weakened Husayn’s government. An analysis of the case of Iraq also may provide insights on how other governments have been able to survive lengthy international sanctions or trade embargos.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1940-3461
Print ISSN
0026-3141
Pages
pp. 253-268
Launched on MUSE
2010-05-16
Open Access
No
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