Dialectic of Love. Platonism in Schiller's Aesthetics (review)

Goethe Yearbook 425 alone in hoping to find in Schiller a real-life Marquis Posa, were dissatisfied with Schiller's treatise in the Horen, mainly because he consigned to the distant future what they demanded at once, namely, the realization of the ideals of the Enlightenment.The Prince's condescending remarks about Schiller's philosophical qualifications become easier to understand when we know their political background. As for Schiller, he liked political zealots even less in 1795 than he had in 1788, and Schings suggests persuasively (215, n. 20) that, when Schiller denounced such people in the essay Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, it was Baggesen that he had in his sights. In view of the controversy set off by Daniel Wilson's recent study of Goethe's relations with the Illuminati, it is worth noting in conclusion that, though Schings avoids all overt bias in his discussion of the order, the prevailing tone of his book is one of sympathy with Schiller for taking the stand he did, and his view of Wilson's book is correspondingly negative. Those readers who will be satisfied by nothing but outright support of the Illuminati (and of the French Revolution) may well be disappointed both in Schiller and in Schings's treatment of him. I would argue here that Schiller deserves a good deal of credit for his alertness, evident throughout his works, to the difference between praiseworthy ideals and the perilous processes by which such ideals are translated into reality. A reading of the Briefe über Don Karlos leaves us in no doubt that Schiller was a shrewd judge of character and motive. If, on the basis of his psychological insight, he consistently opted to steer clear of the Illuminati, we should respect this as a considered decision on the basis of experience. Whether we ultimately agree with him or not, we should resist the temptation to dismiss his stance on the basis of an ideological litmus test. Queen's University David Pugh Pugh, David, Dialectic of Love. Platonism in Schiller's Aesthetics . Montreal, Kingston, Buffalo, London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996 (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, Vol. 22). There is no question that Pugh's study displays considerable erudition about the Platonic tradition in Western intellectual history . Likewise, there is no question that Platonic ideas were in the air at the time Schiller was writing. It is also highly likely that Schiller 426 Book Reviews may have been working with Platonic paradigms whether or not he was fully conscious of doing so. And it is also true that Schiller contributed to debates that had been ongoing since the advent of Greek civilization, though, to be sure, he was clearly aware of the differences between ancient and modern times and the role of art, a point the author does not underscore. In general, Pugh attempts to persuade the reader that Platonic ideas did, in fact, impact and shape Schiller's aesthetics and poetry. Since he offers a rather sophisticated model with which to argue his case, it is with that model that I would like to begin my discussion. Pugh attributes to Schiller the development of what he terms a dual-form theory, which is based, largely, on the Kallias-Briefe.Briefly, the fusion of chorismos [separation, or the state in which matter is subjugated to form] and methexis [unity, or participation, in which the ideal that results from the subjugation of matter to form is presented as a means of mediation between the extremes of form and matter] into an ideal is achieved by way of an illusion, which is beautiful appearance. But, for Pugh, this illusion of the reconciliation of form and matter is not accomplished in reality. Hence, Schiller's ideal is simply an illusion that masks reason's subjection of nature. "The middle realm ... in which reason and nature coexist in a happy symbiosis turns out to be a conjuring trick" analogous to "the complete subjugation of one partner to the other" (150). This startling conclusion is based on the assumption that Schiller simply adopted the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter, which Schiller is said to have...