Index

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Supplementary Volume 33 283 Index absolute imperatives, 92 academic specializations niche-specific standards, 267 standards not comprehensible to outsiders, 275 act utilitarianism, 76–78, 179 action-guiding imperative, 91 action-guiding level, 90, 92 Adams, R.M., 46 aesthetic value, 173, 216, 238–239, 245–247, 255 agency, 41, 61, 146, 242 rational, 113–115, 153–154, 169, 219–221 agent-centred, non-moral considerations, xxv agent-neutral consequences, xxviii agential choice, 244–245, 262, xxxvii– xxxviii Allison, Henry, 10n22 altruistic desires, 212, 221, 225 altruistic generic reasons, 180 altruistic reasons, 175n4, 182 ancient moral philosophizing, 16, 231, xxv. See also ethical reflection; philosophical reflection Aristotle, 16–20 on aspiration to happiness, 10 descriptive psychology, 8 Epicurus, 20–23 model for thinking about morality, 30 moral reasons as teleological, xxiv patterns of argument in, 13 Plato, 12–16 reflective equilibrium, 11, 18, 23, 32 relation between virtue and living well, 4 Stoics, 23–28 anti-theory movement in ethics, 64, 74n23 applied ethics, 264, 269n11, 274n17, 279, xl, xxxviii aretaic question, 229 Aristotle, 7, 19–20, 24–26, 28 Nichomachean Ethics, 8, 16–17 reflective equilibrium in, 18 Arius Didymus, 24 assumption we know our interests rejected by Plato, 28 Sophists and Prichard, 28 ataraxia, 20–23 attitude’s direction and weight, 47 Audi, Robert, 39, 46, 281, xxxi, xxxv– xxxvii “coalitions of different kinds of reasons,” 240 autarkes, 16, 18 authority, 248 authoritative standard, 123 cognitive authority of reason, 220 cognitive moral authority, 199 comparative, 232 deliberative, 248, 251 normative authority, 110, 146, 201, 212, 217 practical authority of reason, 199, 220 ultimate, 233, 248–251, 253, 255, 259–261 authority of morality, 127, 199, xx, xxx– xxxii, xxxviii–xxxix personal autonomy and, 55–56 authority of practical reason, 214, 216 authority question, 39, 56, 232–233, 253–254, xiv–xxii Prichard’s views on, 34, 38 “Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals” (Darwall), 132n4 autonomy, 52–55, 126, 257 autonomy theory, 52–53 basic reasons, 176, 186 284 Reasons to be Moral Revisited beauty, proportion, truth, 12 behavioural moral skepticism, 198 being moral. See morality belief, 201, 220–221 flat out, 45–48 moral, 219 partial beliefs, 45–48, 50 Black, Sam, 281, viii, xxv, xxvi blame and blaming, 156–157, 159–160, 166–167, 169, xxxiii beyond blame, 165, 167 disadvantageous claims about people, 159–161 “grading” charges, 160 in performative mode, 167n29, 168n29 subjectivism and, 155 boundary conditions, 191–192, xxxv Bratman, Michael, 44n17, 48n26 Brink, David, 249n32 British intuitionism. See intuitionism Broome, John, “Reasons,” 181n14 Butler, Joseph, 35, 145, xvi categorical imperative, 66n8, 70, 236 choice under risk, 47n24. See also decision-making choiceworthiness, 44, 48–49, 51 Cicero, 8, 23, 26–27 circularity, problem of, 189–190, 192, 195, 265n5, 267 coalition of reasons, 39, 49, 240, 243 code of sociality, 126, 129 cognitive authority of reason, 220 cognitive moral authority, 199 cognitive moral skepticism, 198 cognitive normative authority, 198 Cohen, G.A., 181 common sense morality, 66–67, 69, 174 comparative authority, 232 completeness, 24 comprehensive cognitive skepticism, 198 comprehensive general skepticism, 198 comprehensive practical skepticism, 198 conceptual minimalism, xxxiii, xxxiv The Connection claim, 161–162, 164– 165, 167, 169 consequentialism, 34, 209, xi, xxiii consequentiality, 208n9 consequentiality relation, 207 considerations, 173 consistency requirement, 51 constitution of morality, 34, x–xiv, xxi, xxvi, xxviii, xxx constitution of right action, xxviii constitution question, x–xiv constitutive conditions and possession conditions distinction, 210–212 content of an adequate morality assumption that we know, 274–276 temporary, 276–277 content question, ix–x. See also subject matters of moral inquiry contractarian theories, 172, xi, xxix Prichard’s challenge to, 68n11 social contract, xxiiin57 “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” (Scanlon) moral importance question, 118 contributory reasons, 234, 236, 238 interactions with one another, 240 Copp, David, 52, 171, 177n8, 253, 281, viii, xxvii–xxx concept of normative ground, 255–257 E. Tifffany’s commentary on, 253–258 moon-love example, 254–255, 258 normative pluralism, 254 “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” 240n18 “The Ring of Gyges,” 240n18 cosmological theories, 8 Crisp, Roger, Reason and the Good, 181n14, 183n15 CS-moral attempts to prove, 66–68, 174 direct apprehension, 69 Dancy, Jonathan, 175n4 contributory...