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CLARK S. MUENZER

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In memory of my sister, Jane Rima Mehl
*So klar beweglich bleibt das Bild der Lieben
Mit Flammenschrift ins treue Herz geschrieben.*

JEAN-LUC NANCY'S DISCUSSION of the Kantian schema in *The Ground of the Image* characterizes the European "transformation of thought" between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries as an epochal shift "from painting to the projection screen," or "from sight (*vue*) to vision," by which he means "from representation to presentation . . . , from the idea to the image, or, more precisely, from the fantasy or fantasm to the imagination."¹ Nancy's time-span, of course, precisely encompasses the historical arc of *Faust*. Consequently, his list of the transformative changes that were witnessed between Luther and Goethe could easily serve as an historical and theoretical frame for analyzing the problem of figuration in *Faust*, which similarly features the work of the imagination and thereby shifts the attention of its protagonist and spectator—in the spirit of Nancy's formulation—from "being to appearing" or from "ontology to phenomenology" (Nancy 80).

Even the casual reader of *Faust* will notice how the complex of figurative structures at work throughout Goethe's play move with compelling immediacy across the impassioned, personal investments of part one, only to re-emerge as the characteristically rarefied abstractions of part two, with its challenging allegorical and symbolic exhibitions. However, rather than valorize the poetic figure (*Bild*), in line with Emrich, within an ontological-genetic framework as a referential form that reveals origins in history,² or expose it, along with Flax, as a site of deconstructive semiosis,³ I will take my cue from Nancy in the following remarks and reframe the discussion about figuration (*Bildlichkeit*) in *Faust* by exploring the *transcendental* quality of the play's figurative processes. To initiate this kind of post-Kantian re-evaluation of the *Faust*-stage, especially in part two, as a site where the poetic figure is analyzed in terms of the inherent (*a priori*) capacity of the Goethean imagination⁴ to animate and sustain thought—despite, or perhaps, because of Faust's cognitive and moral shortfalls—I will consider (more modestly here) just a few familiar passages, largely from the first part of the work—with the exception of Faust's journey to the Mothers. After an extended reading of "Zueignung," with its "schwankende[n] Gestalten" (1),⁵ as well those sections of "Finstere Gallerie" (part two, act 1) where Goethe stages Faust's discovery of the maternal workshop of the imagination, I will return briefly to part one

to consider portions of four additional scenes, framed by these episodes, that similarly stage important moments in the overall process of figuration. These include the semiotic encounters of "Nacht," with the "reinen Zügen" (440) of the Macrocosm and the Earth Spirit's "schreckliches Gesicht" (483), as well as "Hexenküche," with its mysterious "Zauberspiegel" (2430), which captures Faust's fixated gaze onto "das schönste Bild von einem Weibe" (2436), and finally, "Wald und Höhle," where "der Vorwelt silberne Gestalten" (3238) compel his cognitive attention. By considering how the various forms of the figure operate in these scenes, I will be able to argue that already in the "small world" of part one, as Goethe's hero undertakes his erotic engagement with Gretchen, Goethe sets the stage of his tragedy to redeem the power of judgment in part two by picturing it more expansively than the fatal "gerichtet" (4611) of "Kerker" suggests,⁶ with its narrow juridical valorization of historical patriarchy. In fact, the complex called mind, where all thinking is enacted, can be saved, or "gerettet" (4611), so long as we learn the lesson of *Faust* to see the interconnected mental activities constitutive of subjectivity purely. By this I mean (in the spirit of Kant) that Goethe's work challenges the spectator to analyze the full range of our complex mental operations by judging the mind, through its Faustian figurations, in terms of the universal destiny of thinking beings to know some things about the world, to feel its pleasures and pains, and to inhabit it within a community of autonomous agents, i.e., in terms of its constitutive cognitive, aesthetic, and moral desires.

Of course, seeing the mind, enabled by its inherent power to make images (viz. the imagination), produce itself in ongoing figuration is just what "Zueignung" stages and just what emerges in the course of the more than twelve-thousand lines of *Faust* as the "condition of possibility" of thinking one's way through the work's difficult wholeness. Accordingly, in the very first line of the poem, our attention turns immediately, along with the speaker's, to those notoriously unstable, immaterial, and, therefore, elusive forms that are famously invoked as "schwankende Gestalten" (I). Subsequently, during Faust's visit to the "Realm of the Mothers," similar figures of indeterminate shape will confront the erstwhile metaphysician and lover, as he earnestly embarks on his search for Helena, antiquity's most beautiful woman. However, together with the succession of references to figurative interests in part one that I noted above, "Zueignung" can already be read as an adumbration of the increasingly self-reflexive, philosophically organized program of visual exhibition that drives the staged figurations of part two, including Faust's eventful expedition in "Finstere Gallerie" to the Mothers.

As the first of the play's three preparatory frames begins, we must ask, along with the poet, precisely what interests have been aroused by his perception of the indeterminate figural forms that are immediately acknowledged as an unmet challenge from his past:⁷ "Ihr naht euch wieder, schwankende Gestalten! / Die früh sich einst dem trüben Blick gezeigt" (1-2). Significantly, the strangely familiar figures in question,⁸ whose *wavering* contours suggest a *nascent*, or bare,⁹ discernability, are twice predicated with reflexive verbs to suggest, additionally, both agency and receptivity—effective mental dispositions that are indicative of our wavering determination between the rational faculties (understanding and reason) and the sensorium.¹⁰ But

it is also the poet's focus that wavers in his report between the perceived shapes ("schwankende Gestalten"), on the one hand, which along with his visualized memories ("die Bilder froher Tage"), are presumably caught in his *external* line-of-sight, and his own self-reflexive gaze ("Blick"), on the other, which is turbid, and so, indicative of his uncertain interior state. The first lines of Goethe's *Faust*-work thus initiate a wavering descriptive account, not so much of any real objects in the outside world, but rather of the process of figuration itself, which shapes and *subjectively* fixes the reality of perception *as thought* by projecting the objects of cognitive desire onto a dynamic mental screen. And while the *Faust*-poet had earlier failed to attain the full clarity of vision that is the hallmark of conceptual achievement, his recollection of past failure now defines the path that his prospective quest for (our specifically human) reality (as visualized thought) will take. That is to say, the approaching retinue of wavering forms, or signs (*sich zeigen*), that have reappeared to compel his attention in "Zueignung" will be gathered and become available for sustained scrutiny (*sich nahen*) in the course of his play, where they are repeatedly returned to the ground of their own presentation in the mind's shaping gaze. In one crucial sense, then, Goethe's *Faust*, as literary monument, or *Denkmal*, bears the inscription of its lyrical opening, which prescriptively "dedicates" the ensuing stage-spectacle to the presentative work of the productive imagination,¹¹ or the faculty of figuration. For the Kant-inspired poet, it seems, as well as for his tragedy about cognitive, aesthetic, and moral thinking, that faculty will become the best guide to discover the truth of the world (and of our common humanity) as the elusive truth of a certain kind of figure, or image.

The formal qualities of the truth that belongs to such a figure can be gleaned through some additional analysis of the procession ("Zug") to which "Zueignung" bears witness. As already noted, the visible contours of its constitutive figural parts, which have reappeared collectively by "throwing themselves under the glance" of the poet (*subjectio ad adspectum*), remain indeterminate. Nor does the speaker have any assurance yet that he has the power to secure, or "hold them fast," which would imply fixing the fugitive delineations by pinning them down conceptually: "Versuch' ich wohl, euch diesmal fest zu halten?/ Fühl' ich mein Herz noch jenem Wahn geneigt?" (3-4) Importantly, however, by characterizing his desire to grasp the protean forms as "Wahn"—according to Adelung, an opinion or judgment without grounds¹²—the *Faust*-poet has restricted his mental activity to the endless search for—rather than the strict determination of—the rules that have governed the emergence of the phantasmic figures from the obscure matrix of the imagination:

Ihr drängt euch zu! nun gut, so mögt ihr walten,
Wie ihr aus Dunst und Nebel um mich steigt;
Mein Busen fühlt sich jugendlich erschüttert
Vom Zauberhauch, der euren Zug umwittert. (5-8)

Whatever their empirical status, and despite their refusal of firm grounding and clear delineation (or, maybe, because of it), the compelling attraction of the vivid figural apparitions, along with their vivifying impression on the

poet, cannot be denied. Indeed, as reconfigured in his vision—which predicates the gathering shapes with a third reflexive verb (“sich drängen”)—their tableau suggests an autonomous driving mechanism, or engine. This machine has been magically animated with the breath of life, which, in turn, has endowed the apparitional collective with a formative power to pull the poet along and re-animate him in accord with its rules.¹³ And while the precise purpose of the engine cannot be determined in concepts, the vividness of its visual impression on the speaker already suggests the power to affirm and sustain the life of the autonomous mind, or the mental operations that continually reproduce the objects of perception in thought. As initially framed by “Zueignung,” then, the truth of the figure in *Faust* is intentional, or subjective, in the sense of Kant’s understanding in the Third Critique of the *subjective* necessity of reflective judgments of taste. Accordingly, we are challenged by the “lispelnd Lied” (28) in the play’s first frame to attune ourselves to the figurative exhibitions on the *Faust*-stage and to take pleasure in the life of the mind that they promote,¹⁴ as well as to revel in its internal purposiveness. But like all reflective judgments, which can be aesthetic or teleological, the figures in *Faust* fundamentally lack the rational concepts or the ideas of reason that are required by the determinant judgments of theoretical and practical reason respectively, if our perceptions are to be secured in cognition or if we are to act in accord with the moral law. As Gasché explains, “the feeling of life [that Kant attributes to judgments of taste] is a mental awareness of the full range of [the mind’s] representational faculties, more precisely, of its powers of representation as a whole” (Gasché 45). Accordingly, as the shadow-forms in the procession of “Zueignung” tug at the poet’s heart and he feels inclined (“sich neigen”) toward the imaging power (“Wahn”) that produced them, the *Faust*-stage has been opened onto the kind of “ungrounded” figurative thinking that lies within the power of reflective judgment, as analyzed in the Third Critique.

I have emphasized the vividness of the wavering forms of “Zueignung” to underscore the implication that they have made a lively visual impression on the poet. Through this impression, he feels empowered to understand their appearance in the tableau, which has been “cast under his eyes,” as the ground of the figurative process known in the rhetorical tradition as hypotyposis and re-appropriated by Kant in paragraph 59 of *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (“Dialektik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft”): “Alle Hypotypose (Darstellung, *subiectio sub adspectum*), als Versinnlichung, ist zwiefach,” Kant explains:

entweder *schematisch*, da einem Begriffe, den der Verstand faßt, die korrespondierende Anschauung *a priori* gegeben wird; oder *symbolisch*, da einem Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann, eine solche untergelegt wird, mit welcher das Verfahren der Urteilskraft demjenigen, was sie im Schematisieren beobachtet, bloß analogisch, d.i. mit ihm bloß der Regel dieses Verfahrens, nicht der Anschauung selbst, mithin bloß der Form der Reflexion, nicht dem Inhalte nach, übereinkommt (10:295).¹⁵

Gasché, to whom my reading of the poet’s vision is indebted, has summarized hypotyposis in a way that is useful for understanding the form of the figure

not just in “Zueignung,” but in the whole of *Faust*. In the Aristotelian sense of “*hypotyoun*,” understood as the “shapedness of essence” (Gasche 207), hypotyposis, according to Gasché, “is a mode of presentation that pictures things so vividly that they appear to present themselves. Hypotyposis also presents in entirety, and the moral grandeur or aesthetic spectacle that it provides is constitutive of a subjective reflection” (Gasche 209).

In the context of this traditional challenge by rhetoric to enliven figures of thought or to make them vivid, and in light of the poet’s call—articulated in the final strophe of “Zueignung” as “ein längst entwöhntes Sehnen / Nach jenem stillen ernsten Geisterreich” (26)—it would be useful to recall Kant’s analysis in paragraph 49 of *Kritik der Urteilskraft* of the primary mental capacity that constitutes genius, which he calls “Geist.” Spirit, in its aesthetic sense, according to Kant, is another word for

das belebende Prinzip im Gemüte. Dasjenige aber, wodurch dieses Prinzip die Seele belebt, der Stoff, den es dazu anwendet, ist das, was die Gemütskräfte zweckmäßig in Schwung versetzt, d.i. in ein solches Spiel, welches sich von selbst erhält und selbst die Kräfte dazu stärkt. (10:249)

As the animating force attributed to genius¹⁶ and equated by Kant with the autonomous power of mind to sustain and strengthen itself by setting its own constitutive faculties, or “Gemütskräfte” (10:249), into “swing,” or purposeful play, with each other, “Geist,” he goes on to say, is nothing other than “das Vermögen der Darstellung ästhetischer Ideen” (10:249). In other words, as we have already begun to discern in “Zueignung,” figurative presentations can be animating and self-preservative. But as Kant is also quick to explain, the “spirited” expression of aesthetic ideas, which animate and sustain the mind through their figuration, specifically features

diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. *Begriff* adäquat sein kann, die folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann. (10:249–50)

As we read such passages in Kant, we are inclined to think about the work of the imagination and the ineffable figures of thought that it produces in terms of phases, or process. For these figures to promote the life of the mind, they must themselves be spirited or vivid. They must have the capacity to set the mental faculties into reciprocal purposive play, without however allowing thought to fall under any conceptual regime. Consequently, while this kind of figure, as a representation (“*Vorstellung*”), exhibits an initial cognitive interest in the synthesis of concepts and intuitions as regulated by the determinant judgment, when the imagination stages aesthetic ideas—which by definition deny conceptual adequacy—it must redirect that interest. To do this, the imagination becomes reflexive and productive. That is to say, in staging an aesthetic idea by presenting an object of beauty (as “*Darstellung*”) for thoughtful contemplation, the productive imagination, driven by the reflective judgment, re-configures the representations given to it in the schematized figures of determinant judgments. Thus redirected, it also implicitly stages its own search for something that extends beyond any rational concept: an

ultimate, and ultimately an indeterminate, rule of synthesis. And in this, the figure of beauty, which is the object of the power of the reflective aesthetic judgment, becomes excessive. Joined to the mind in the perpetual search for a principle that is fundamentally beyond its reach, it exists within an erotically charged field, although it is precisely such excess that guarantees that the figurative thinking will never conclusively end.¹⁷

In Kant, of course, and subsequently in *Faust*, it is the judgment on beauty (especially in the human figure) that expresses the aesthetic idea most adequately and, hence, serves as an animating principle. Within "Zueignung," however, we find only a single, oblique reference to the beautiful, in the poet's painful recollection of "schöne Stunden" (15) as an unfulfilled moment from his youth. As we learn in strophe two, moreover, these beautiful hours are ascribed to memorialized images of certain formative attachments from the speaker's past that have accompanied the procession of wavering shapes from strophe one, but are also distinct from them:

Ihr bringt mit euch die Bilder froher Tage,
Und manche liebe Schatten steigen auf;
Gleich einer alten halbverklungenen Sage,
Kommt erste Lieb' und Freundschaft mit herauf;
Der Schmerz wird neu, es wiederholt die Klage
Des Lebens labyrinthisch irren Lauf,
Und nennt die Guten, die, um schöne Stunden
Vom Glück getäuscht, vor mir hinweggeschwunden. (9-16)

If the first strophe of the poet's song had begun to configure the approaching retinue in terms of his own rejuvenation and creative destiny, the second reformulates the apparitional group as a funeral cortege, including the vaguely familiar and shadowy figures that appear to have arisen from the grave like ghosts. These good, or ethically disposed people ("die Guten"), moreover, to whom the poet was once attached in love and friendship, might have joined him in a moment of aesthetic fulfillment, he suggests, had not death capriciously deprived them of their time to linger with the beautiful.¹⁸ Beauty, which in Kant's construction embodies a formal purposiveness without conceptual grounding, appears no less elusive to the *Faust*-poet and his friends, and no less fugitive, than any other sensible experience. With the configuration of "beautiful hours" as the painful memory of more fulfilling days, however, a first step has been taken toward the extensive, symbolic exhibition of beauty on the *Faust*-stage as an ineffable aesthetic idea.¹⁹

As already noted, the "Bilder froher Tage" of strophe two should not be confused with the "schwankende[n] Gestalten" of strophe one, since these phantasmic visualizations out of the poet's past have been brought along as companions in order to be re-introduced into the vision of his dedicatory poem. Such secondary "Bilder" also have their source in absence, but as the poet makes clear, their line-of-sight is retrospective. That is to say, as fully cognized experiences from an earlier time, they were initially representations ("Vorstellungen") of the productive imagination in the service of the power of the determinant judgment. But such representations can also be archived

and subsequently returned to consciousness at will as visualized memories.²⁰ To speak in the spirit of Kant's complex discussion of "Einbildungskraft" in the Third Critique, the imagination of the first strophe of "Zueignung," with its power of original presentation and its freedom from determinate rules, is both productive and reflexive, while the visualizing faculty of the second strophe, which re-shaped the poet's youthful personal associations as effigies, is reproductive and, therefore, derivative. Its figures represent what was once cognized, i.e., known, although, their introduction onto the Faust-stage (which evokes the persistence of forgotten tales) suggests that the productive imagination in its reflexive mode can also capture them as memorialized images and then re-animate them as figurative presentations (Kant's "symbolische Darstellungen").

For this to occur, the poet must return to the surging protean shapes that arose from the mist and fog and organized themselves into the procession to compel his attention in the first place. Pulled by this assemblage toward the mysterious ground of the creative process of all figuration, he feels obligated to accept its regime, without precisely knowing its governing rules. Consequently, his turn toward the wavering shapes, which he characterizes with the word "Wahn," can be understood, in the Kantian sense, as a turn toward the power to produce and linger over aesthetic ideas, such as beauty, in figures of thought. Accordingly, in my reading of "Zueignung," the "beautiful hours" that were prematurely denied to the poet and his friends reappear indirectly in the "Gesänge" of the *Faust*-poem, which will reanimate the "half-dead tones of an ancient tale," as it also must gather a new kind of audience, with a new aesthetically attuned sensibility, to complete the work of the imagination:

Sie hören nicht die folgenden Gesänge,
Die Seelen, denen ich die ersten sang;
Zerstoben ist das freundliche Gedränge,
Verklungen, ach! der erste Widerklang.
Mein Lied ertönt der unbekannten Menge,
Ihr Beifall selbst macht meinem Herzen bang,
Und was sich sonst an meinem Lied erfreuet,
Wenn es noch lebt, irrt in der Welt zerstreuet. (17–24)

In the final strophe of "Zueignung," that assemblage of song, which is further characterized as a barely discernable, or "lispelnd Lied" (28), is likened to the aeolian harp:

Und mich ergreift ein längst entwöhntes Sehnen
Nach jenem stillen ernsten Geisterreich,
Es schwebet nun in unbestimmten Tönen
Mein lispelnd Lied, der Äolsharfe gleich . . . (25–28)

The figure of the harp is significant, because it likens the work of the imagination—which the poet announces as his own bare, or essential, reality in the last two lines of "Zueignung"—to a natural instrument of mysterious tonal effects. The harp's privileged music, moreover, can be additionally linked to Kant's aesthetic idea of the beautiful by virtue of its autonomously

purposeful sound, which is constituted in indeterminate, or ungrounded, and, hence, freely floating tones.

As “Zueignung” approaches its conclusion, then, and we prepare to enter the play proper, we can assume that the tonality of the coalescing *Faust*-work will resist determinate formulation, much like the “unbestimmten Töne” of the “lispelnd Lied” (28) and the aeolian harp in its final strophe or the barely discernable forms that project images onto the screen of the poet’s mind in its first. Significantly, moreover, the gentle drift of the song is introduced as the effect of a reawakened longing within the genial poet for an animated mental realm (“Geisterreich”) that Faust will explore as the engine, or “Getreibe” (6279), of the creative mind during his journey in “Finstere Gallerie” into the matrix of all figuration (“das Reich der Mütter”). Thus revitalized in a reflexive turn toward his own capacity for mental activity, the poet can conclude his dedicatory lamentation by acknowledging an existential shudder that resembles Faust’s “Schaudern” (6272) en route to that undetermined place of pure figural determinability. From this point on, as the inspired voice of *Faust*, he can feel heartened to have abandoned a mental regime that the attribute “streng” suggests was stringent, or constraining. Through the course of his vision he has prepared himself to celebrate the autonomous imagination, or faculty of non-presence, as the source of a new inspiration:

Ein Schauer faßt mich, Träne folgt den Tränen,
Das strenge Herz es fühlt sich mild und weich;
Was ich besitze seh’ ich wie im weiten,
Und was verschwand wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten. (29–32)

It is my contention that Goethe’s play analyzes the poet’s newly proclaimed reality, which emerges under the regime of the productive imagination, by staging the poetic figure, in terms of its capacity to stimulate and sustain the expansive, pleasurable, and life-enhancing thinking of Kant’s reflective aesthetic judgments. As is also the case in Kant’s analysis of the beautiful and the sublime, moreover, the Faustian figure, as a symbolic hypotyposis, preserves the mind’s interest in its cognitive and moral destinations, while offering an alternative to the representation of perceptions that have been conceptually fixed in stringent cognition as fully determined objects of knowledge. But if the revelatory sign in *Faust*, as Flax has shown, is not fully cognizable—if it cannot offer unmediated access to the foundational logic of a meaningful world—“was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält” (382–83)—what, precisely, is the key to the epistemological secret of all those visualized objects of perception in Goethe’s work of ongoing figuration?

The terms of this question point to the tiny phallic “Schlüssel” (6259) of “Finstere Gallerie”—“Das kleine Ding!” (6259)—which swells with desire as Faust receives it from Mephistophles and sets out for the de-territorialized realm of the Mothers: “Er wächst in meiner Hand! er leuchtet, blitzt!” (6261). As his expedition begins and he embarks on his quest for Helena through the “large world” of part two, it appears that he has been erotically enabled again, as he had also been after partaking of the Witch’s distilled “spirits” in “Hexenküche” in pursuit of Gretchen. However, upon arriving in a similar

place of absolute disorientation—"Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene" (6223)—Faust will find that the cognitive gaze is no longer anchored in the pure intuitions of time and place²¹—"Um sie kein Ort noch weniger eine Zeit" (6214). Nor will the erotic charge, reconfigured as the autonomous power of light—"ein glühender Dreifuß tut dir endlich kund" (6283)—be directed any longer toward the merely physical. In Kantian terms, the images projected by the imagination from the "deepest" recesses of the creative mind—"im tieftsten, allertiefsten Grund" (6284),—are, in fact, radically disengaged from empirical experience. That is to say, within the maternal imagination, as implied by Mephistopheles' warning to Faust, the figure exists in a state of absolute isolation—"Von Einsamkeiten wirst du umhergetrieben" (6226). It is entirely fitting, therefore, that "Öd' und Einsamkeit" (6227) will now become the bare environment, or stage, where the driving mechanism within the Faustian mind makes its appearance: "Du sendest mich ins Leere / Damit ich dort so Kunst als Kraft vermehre" (6251–52). Contrary to the limited view of Goethe's materialist Devil, however, the isolation of this desolate wilderness can also become the bare place for staging certain "Geheime tiefe Wunder" (3234), as Faust himself had remarked during his "Wandel in der Öde" (3279) in the scene "Wald und Höhle." Once the figurating mind has been stripped of the corruption of sensation, its work becomes pure, in the transcendental sense of *a priori*, spontaneous, and original:

Versinke denn! Ich könnt auch sagen: steige!
 'S ist einerlei. Entfliehe dem Entstandnen,
 In der Gebilde losgebundne Räume!
 Ergötze dich am längst nicht mehr Vorhandnen,
 Wie Wolkenzüge schlingt sich das Getreibe,
 Den Schlüssel schwinge, halte sie vom Leibe. (6275–80)

By fleeing empirical reality ("dem Entstandnen") and thereby positioning himself, both *transcendentally and aesthetically*, to take pleasure ("Ergetze dich") in what is no longer present to the senses ("am längst nicht mehr Vorhandnen"), Faust discovers that his driving desire for a secure and comprehensive cognitive grasp of macrocosmic design has been re-staged as an autonomous ("schlingt sich") machine. Thus re-situated within the gears ("Getreibe") of the productive imagination ("in der Gebilde losgebundne Räume"), his erotic striving will no longer find redemption, or "Heil" (6271), in the kind of misguided idolization of semiotic materiality that was enacted in the macrocosm-scene during his short-lived attempt to reduce the informing law of the universe to the rigid outline of an empirically given geometric figure.²² To avoid the "Erstarren" (6271) of the phantasmic display, the mind must instead glance downward and into itself, where the capacity of spontaneous figuration resides.

In "Nacht," of course, we initially heard Faust reject the visual grandeur of the Sign of the Macrocosm with the well-known words, "Welch Schauspiel! Aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!" (454). If developed through an analysis of *Faust* as a transcendental staging of the process of figuration, however, a supplementary reading of these words seems possible. As the tightly constructed diagram in Faust's codex, of course, that sign is, in fact, dead. But his

subsequent verbal reconstruction of macrocosmic design as an emerging pattern of dynamic wholeness—"Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt" (447)—along with his description of its motion as "Schwingen" (451) and his culminating reference to its mediating capacity as tonal harmony—"Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen / Harmonisch all das All durchklingen" (452-53)—combine to suggest that the "Schauspiel" Faust has beheld could also involve something more than mere spectacle and superficial play. In fact, if enlivened by spirit and reworked by the productive imagination through the process of aesthetic figuration, the undefined principle of macrocosmic design shares an important attribute with the principle of genius. Accordingly, the sign in Faust's book, with its pleasurable effect on his gaze and its enhancement of his feeling of life, could become the ground of a reflexive mental operation that Kant calls aesthetic. "Ha! welche Wonne fließt in diesem Blick / Auf einmal mir durch alle meine Sinnen," Faust proclaims. "Ich fühle junges, heil'ges Lebensglück / Neuglühend mir durch Nerv' und Adern rinnen" (430-33). That is to say, the informing *design* of macrocosmic display in "Nacht" can also be viewed as the first staging in Goethe's play of the informing principle of Kantian genius—"was die Gemütskräfte zweckmäßig in Schwung versetzt, d.i. in ein solches Spiel, welches sich von selbst erhält und selbst die Kräfte dazu stärkt" (10:249). Rather than take Faust's exclamation "*ein Schauspiel* nur" to mean, at face value, "just a spectacle," therefore, we might read it as "*ein Schauspiel* nur," (454, emphasis added) meaning "just one of a number of ways to contemplate play." In this sense, we can further reformulate the conventional reading of Faust's misguided challenge in "Nacht" to determine the grounding principle of the world in cognition—"Daß ich erkenne was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält" (383-84)—as the challenge of the reflective aesthetic judgment in Kant's Third Critique. What "holds the world together from within" are not the stringent concepts of the determinant judgment, but the privileged powers of mind ("Gemütskräfte") that swing into reciprocal aesthetic play within the workshop of the productive imagination under the more forgiving supervision of the reflective judgment of taste. The task for Faust and the theatrical spectator alike, it appears, will be to engage the kind of symbolic seeing that the frustrated scholar first expected to set into motion upon opening the codex, but that he ironically fails to engage fully until his physical blinding in act 5.

In this regard, Mephistopheles' final words of warning to Faust on his way to the Mothers, which explain what he can expect to learn on his journey, are also instructive for us. For they offer a veiled reference to the promise of macrocosmic revelation, now reformulated in the spirit of "Zueignung" (and Kant) as the "Gestaltung, Umgestaltung, / Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung" (6287-88). Furthermore, the nod that they give to the ungrounded play of the faculties confirms that the home of the transcendental imagination, where the schematized figures of nature are reviewed and symbolically re-shaped by the maternal deities, is "governed" by an aesthetically informed purposiveness, or design, which lacks all determining rules. Accordingly, Faust is curiously instructed upon first receiving the "phallic" key from Mephistopheles to use it as a protective device: "Den Schlüssel schwinde, halte sie vom Leibe!" (6280) If he brandishes it as he makes his way through the teeming place,

he will presumably preserve the activity of the throng of figures and their floating retinue of pure images by preventing any corrupting contact with his body. "Schwung," in its Kantian usage, thus continues near the start of part two to be ironically suggestive of the aesthetic play of all of the faculties in reciprocal determination, as they harmoniously sustain the life of the mind. How appropriate, therefore, to find the final stage direction for Faust, who grabs the key on his way to the Mothers and feels newly invigorated, read "begeistert" (6281).

Of course, just a few lines earlier, the befuddled professor had already exclaimed in a similar gesture toward the rejuvenating distillation of part one, "Hier wittert's nach der Hexenküche" (6229). Apparently, the *Faust*-stage has continued to focus our attention onto the infernal and inscrutable workshop of the imagination, where according to Mephistopheles, "höheres Geheimnis" (6212) awaits his companion. Significantly, moreover, Mephistopheles directs Faust to "der Gebilde losgebundene Räume" (6278), which suggests that the regime of figuration is located in a floating, or an ungrounded place. Not surprisingly, however, understanding the work of the figurating mind will require our looking past Goethe's materialist Devil to that place in Kant's philosophy where the obscure rule of the imagination first appeared to supervise a similarly arcane technology, or "verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele" (3:190).²³ As Kant argues in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ("Transzendente Deduktion B"), the productive imagination, which has been my focus of attention in this discussion, is that form of sensibility²⁴ that accomplishes synthesis *without* the presence of objects.²⁵ Such "figürliche Synthesis" (3:148), as initially projected through Goethe's "schwankende[n] Gestalten" onto the *Faust*-stage, not only present the manifold unity of sensible intuitions, which are the pure determinations of space as outer and time as inner sense; it subsequently applies the categories to these perceptions with the aid of a technology that Kant calls the "schema." I have tried to frame the issue of figuration in *Faust* from the ground of such "figurative synthesis," which proceeds with the work of either schematic or symbolic hypotyposis unencumbered by empirical objects.²⁶ In fact, the machinery of the imagination in *Faust*, as adumbrated in "Zueignung" and staged in "Finstere Gallerie," envisions a response to the "Zwei Seelen" challenge that resembles Kant's response to the conundrum of applying the categories of the understanding to sensibility in the First Critique²⁷ and that of schematizing without concepts in the Third. In both instances, Kant struggles to identify a third term of mediation for the pure concepts of the understanding and their relevant categories—which are intellectual—and the synthesized intuitions, or appearances—which are sensible.²⁸ In the spirit of what Goethe called the "Abenteuer der Vernunft"²⁹ of the old man from Königsberg, then, what Faust can "see" in the pleasing "Schein" (6285) of the glowing tripod are not the archetypes of all life-forms, but the driving mechanism (*Getriebe*) of the genial mind, which surrounds itself with figures reflected in its own distinct light. The maternal divinities, Faust hears, are "umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur" (6289). But unlike the statue of the goddess in *Iphigenie auf Tauris*,³⁰ which becomes the focus of a nearly tragic mis-reading,

their “Bilder” are not iconic likenesses. Instead, and more like the regulating imprint of the gods on the priestess’ mind—what Iphigenie invokes as “euer Bild in meiner Seele” (1717)—they are governing “figures,” or Kant-like “Schemen” (6290). Curiously, moreover, such schematic “inscriptions” are all that the otherwise “blind” Mothers can actually see: “Sie sehn Dich nicht, denn Schemen sehn sie nur” (6290). In this obscure light, then, we seem challenged to ask how we, too, might “envision” the schematized figures of Goethe’s *Faust*-work—blinded, like the productive (female) imagination of this episode, to the world of things and their idolized embodiments, just as Faust will be blinded in death in order to free him for the redemptive vision of the final scene.³¹

To follow the arc in *Faust* from the cognitive bravado of phantasmic display, as staged in “Nacht,” through the self-reflexive play of the imagination, as staged in “Finstere Gallerie,” I have suggested that we must rethink its various forms of figuration by considering the work of the imagination—in terms of Kant’s figurative synthesis—in its productive mode. Like Faust as he prepares for his encounter with the ideal form of human beauty in the realm of the Mothers, we must explore “the ground of the image,”³² where the imagination moves beyond the derivative work of “representation” (“Vorstellung”) toward spontaneous “presentation,” or “Darstellung.” As I have already pointed out, it is through “Darstellung” that the Kantian schema, in the absence of determinate concepts, is reconfigured in the Third Critique as symbolic exhibition. In this context, the figuring mind in *Faust* moves away from the misguided desire of “Nacht” to depict, or present, and conclusively to judge the “all” of the world without considering the limits imposed on cognition by the power of determinant judgment toward an awareness of the kind of expansive thinking that is driven by the power of reflective judgment. Ultimately, this awareness acknowledges that certain ideas, including those of the beautiful and the sublime, preclude conceptual determination and, therefore, engage the imagination with a different kind of work. Such aesthetic work does not simply abandon the schematized categories of the First Critique, however. Instead, driven by the absence of any determining rule, the imagination here reconfigures the schematized representations through the process of symbolic hypotyposis. Accordingly, in the second part of *Faust*, even the allegories are self-reflexive, and a pervasive irony continually returns the staged figures—including the major characters in the play—to the original site of their emergence in the poet’s mind.

Nancy characterizes one of the shifts in European thought between the Renaissance and the nineteenth century as a movement from the “image as lie” to the “truth as image” (Nancy 80). His “truth as image,” I want to suggest, captures as well as any phrase can what becomes of the revelatory sign in *Faust*, which following the semiotic failures of “Nacht,” goes on to stage the eternally striving figures of our individual and collective imaginations as the self-reflexive signifying event of perpetual figuration. As the Chorus Mysticus proclaims in “Bergschluchten,” which like “Hexenküche” and the “Reich der Mütter,” is another, maternal, chaotic, and erotically charged place of creative renewal,³³ the redeeming moment in *Faust* lies with the image. The Faustian figure, it seems, like the symbol in paragraph 59 of the Third Critique, which

indirectly presents the rule of reflection with the help of analogies" (10:295–96), can meet the Lord's challenge to the mediating angels in the "Prolog im Himmel" to secure the fugitive world of process and appearance in the aesthetic configuration of the beautiful earth:

Doch ihr, die echten Göttersöhne,
 Erfreut euch der lebendig reichen Schöne!
 Das Werdende, das ewig wirkt und lebt,
 Umfass' euch mit der Liebe holden Schranken,
 Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,
 Befestiget mit dauernden Gedanken! (344–49)

In this context, the "truth of the image" in "Bergschluchten" is the truth of the perpetual symbolic exhibition, or staging, of the life of the mind as it is perpetually renewed and sustained in aesthetic contemplation:

Alles Vergängliche
 Ist nur ein Gleichnis;
 Das Unzulängliche
 Hier wird's Ereignis;
 Das Unbeschreibliche
 Hier ist es getan . . . (12104–9)

In the indirect light of the Faustian "Gleichnis," then, it is not the "Presence of the Sign" that should occupy our attention in exploring the "ground" of the Faustian figure—as the title to Flax's essay suggests—but its symbolic "presentation" as a process of ceaseless pulsation between the systolic and diastolic poles of "Bildung" and "Umbildung" respectively. To achieve this difficult perspective of the figure as the vivifying *process* of figuration, I will return now to the "gerichtet"/"gerettet" problem of "Kerker" by way of a few additional comments about Faust's encounter with the revelatory signs in "Nacht," the appearance of Helena in the magic mirror of "Hexenküche," and the projection of the wonders of creation onto the "silver" screen of the hapless lover's mind in "Wald und Höhle."

I have suggested that when Faust turns, as disgruntled scholar, to the pictorial delineation of the macrocosm, he is *cognitively* driven to understand "was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält" (382–83). Upon gazing at the sign, he feels all his senses re-animated and magically connected through his body to both the godhead and the All of Creation. But his longing to "know" ("erkennen") the unifying law of cosmic wholeness cannot be satisfied conceptually, so he reaches the crushing and misguided conclusion that the pictorial display of cosmic design can only be only phantasmic. If the sensible world stands in a meaningful relation to some divine logic, Faust initially lacks the tools to make that connection or to pursue it in a less direct way, and so he turns from the geometric figure and conjures the "Zeichen des Erdgeistes."

While the "Zeichen des Makrokosmos," as a *geometric figure*, is a spatial form and so recalls Kant's ground of pure intuition in "outer sense," the second of the revelatory signs in "Nacht" coalesces out of flames in front of Faust's eyes as a *human figure* that addresses him face to face. Furthermore,

as a verbal sign, the Earth Spirit is characterized through a series of temporally charged figures—including “Geburt und Grab” (504), “wechselnd Weben” (506), “glühend Leben” (507), and “Webstuhl der Zeit” (508)—to situate it, in opposition to the geometric figure, alongside Kant’s inner sense, or time, as the second of the forms of intuition. Yet despite these differences, the pictorial and the verbal signs in “Nacht” share important similarities. Firstly, as stagings of space and time, the two pure forms constitutive of Kantian intuition, they facilitate the appearance of the unified manifolds of sensibility, which are synthesized by the imagination and then applied to the understanding as schematized categories. Secondly, both of the stagings move Faust to believe momentarily that he has direct cognitive access to their regimes. Thus, in the failed encounter with the macrocosm, “die wirkende Natur” deceptively promises to reveal the conceptual ground of macrocosmic connectivity in the pure outlines of the geometric figure—“in diesen reinen Zügen” (440)—which would then mediate between heaven and earth in a spatial representation of universal harmony.³⁴ Likewise, with Faust’s subsequent turn to the “Erdegeist,” we see the creative-destructive process of life coalesce in its temporal entirety as a “[s]chreckliches Gesicht” (482): an overwhelming human figure or vision that the scholar would grasp, schematically again, as a determination of time. The schematized category of substance, according to the First Critique, is “die Beharrlichkeit des Realen in der Zeit,” or the representation of the very ground of time, “welches also bleibt, indem alles andre wechselt” (3:191).

Space and time, then, as well as the power to mediate the concepts and categories of the understanding with sensible intuitions, link these otherwise divergent mechanisms of the synthesizing imagination. But Faust’s striking failure to appreciate the ground of each figure as a vital part of his own mental activity ultimately produces the disappointment that these semiotic encounters entail. With the scenes “Hexenküche” and “Wald und Höhle,” however, we find a different Faust emerging. More self-reflective than in “Nacht,” he has begun to look deeply into himself, and so has also begun to appreciate that what actually holds things together from within—“was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält” (383)—might not refer to the world of objects and their fugitive appearances, but rather to the figurating mind, where according to Kant, the arcane art of schematizing connections lies buried. It is significant, therefore, that shortly after entering the “Witch’s Kitchen”—a place, as subsequently noted by Faust, that resembles the matrix of all figuration in “Finstere Gallerie”—Goethe’s protagonist, “welcher diese Zeit über vor einem Spiegel gestanden, sich ihm bald genähert, bald sich von ihm entfernt hat,” finds himself entirely absorbed in a mysterious “Zauberspiegel” (2430).³⁵ According to the stage direction (introducing the speech of 2428ff.), Faust moves closer to the mirror and then further from it in an apparently futile attempt to bring the image reflected on its silver surface into sharper focus. In this context, we could certainly understand his question—“Was seh’ ich?” (2429)—in a double sense. Faust is firstly amazed by the ideal of beauty that has been aesthetically staged in the divine image of a reclining Helen of Troy, whose presumably naked figure he envisions as the “Inbegriff von allen Himmeln” (2439); but he must also be amazed that

the mirror's surface does not reflect the surface's own figure. The truth of the figure in the magic mirror, in fact, lies in its bifocal capacity to project the reciprocal play of both of these images at once, as Goethe's stage direction suggests. That is to say, Faust cannot gaze at the most beautiful woman of all time, as an aesthetic idea, without also turning reflexively, to his own capacity of productive imagination, which has exhibited that image on the screen of his mind.

Looking back from this "ocular" event³⁶ to the encounters with the macrocosm and the Earth Spirit in "Nacht" and forward to "Wald und Höhle"—where Faust thanks the Spirit for the purifying light of the moon and its illumination of the earth's "geheime tiefe Wunder" (3234) as "der Vorwelt silberne Gestalten" (3238)—we can appreciate (in Kantian terms again, of course) how he has begun to change as he prepares to focus his erotic longing onto Gretchen. Firstly, because his mental image of Helena in the magic mirror—as both "Leib" (2439) and "Inbegriff" (2440)—combines the sensible with the intellectual, it suggests that the Faustian imagination can produce a schematized concept. But as an expressly aesthetic idea—"das *schönste* Bild von einem Weibe" (2436, emphasis added)—the informing rule of Helena *qua* figure, in line with the Third Critique, is also a purposiveness without definite purpose. In other words, with respect to the faculty of judgment, which in its determinant form subsumes appearances under rules with the aid of schematized concepts or categories, the lack of defined purpose in the case of Helena's idealized beauty suggests that its alternative regime must rely on the "reflexive Urteilskraft," which according to Kant engages symbolic rather than schematic exhibitions ("Darstellungen") in organizing its regime of indirect, analogical thinking. And in this context, while the schematized staging of macrocosmic plenitude and harmony eludes Faust's cognitive grasp in the play's first failure of the determinant judgment—as does the categorical staging of the "permanence of the real in time" in its second—when reconstituted in the workshop of the imagination, these failures can open the cognizing mind onto its capacity to redeem itself aesthetically by staging the *ineffable* idea as a symbolic renewal of the *unreachable* rule of the "bestimmende Urteilskraft." Kant's "reflexive Urteilskraft," we should recall, cannot subsume the particular under the universal, because the latter is not given, and must, therefore be found. In this regard, it becomes the redemptive engine of Faustian striving, which Goethe's stages in part two as the symbolic exhibition of schematized concepts, or allegories. When condemned, or "gerichtet" by the "bestimmende Urteilskraft" in "Kerker," its rule of law is executed and the individual—here Gretchen—is annihilated. Under the regime of the "reflective aesthetic judgment," however, the particular—like the Gretchen in part two—is saved, or "gerettet," so long as the universal remains a unspecified principle that fully engages the figurating mind as it symbolically reaches toward its own super-sensible destination in thought. Goethe designates this governing ground of the endless process of figuration, which enlists Gretchen to save Faust's "Unsterbliches," or "entelechy," "Das Ewig-Weibliche" (12110).

NOTES

1. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Ground of the Image*, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Fordham UP, 2005) 80.

2. Wilhelm Emrich, *Die Symbolik von Faust II: Sinn und Vorformen*, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Athenäum, 1957) 32–43.

3. Neil M. Flax, “The Presence of the Sign in Goethe’s *Faust*,” *Publications of the Modern Language Society* 98.2 (1983): 183–203, here 190–92.

4. Shu Ching Ho has treated the Goethean imagination in relation to a range of philosophical discussions from Aristotle through Kant in *Über die Einbildungskraft bei Goethe: System und Systemlosigkeit* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1998) 15–70. For a nuanced political reading of figuration in Goethe, see Fritz Breithaupt, *Jenseits der Bilder: Goethes Politik der Wahrnehmung* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2000), especially 55–95, where Breithaupt discusses Goethean mediation and the phenomenality of beauty, and 189–214, where a detailed reading of Helena’s appearance in *Faust* is offered.

5. All Goethe-citations will be made according to volume and page number of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche*, eds. Hendrik Birus, Dieter Borchmeyer et al. 40 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1987–2000), abbreviated FA. *Faust* and *Iphigenie auf Tauris* will be cited according to this edition by reference to the line number.

6. I will focus on “Urteilkraft,” largely in its reflective aesthetic form, but in the spirit of Rodolphe Gasché, *The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003) 1–12, I understand the power of judgment in Kant’s Third Critique broadly, as both para-epistemic and para-ethical. My suggestion that the narrow judgment condemning Gretchen in “Kerker” is gendered “male” must be seen against the female gendering of judgment’s recuperative aesthetic modality engaged in the journey to the Mothers and celebrated as the figurative process of “das Ewig-Weibliche” in the final scene.

7. See Ilse Graham, “Ihr naht euch wieder, schwankende Gestalten,” in her *Goethe: Portrait of the Artist* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977) 351–72.

8. Like Freud’s “Unheimliche,” Goethe’s “schwankende Gestalten” present themselves to the poet as a strangely familiar, eventful, unresolved challenge from the past that has unexpectedly resurfaced to confront the conscious mind.

9. See Gasché’s discussion of the qualifier “bloß” in Kant, who repeatedly uses it—especially when elaborating reflective judgment as “a mere subjective principle”—to suggest the distillation of something to its pure essentials (Gasché 21–23). The rejuvenating spirits that the hero drinks in “Hexenküche” offer one example of this kind of distilled product in *Faust*.

10. Faust’s speech about his two, competing mental dispositions best captures this condition in part one: “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust, / Die eine will sich von der andern trennen; / Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust, / Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen; / Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust / Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen. / O gibt es Geister in der Luft, / Die zwischen Erd’ und Himmel herrschend weben, / So steigt nieder aus dem goldnen Duft / Und führt mich weg, zu neuem, buntem Leben!” (1112–21). In part two (“Bergschluchten”) the construction of our dual mental destiny is more complex. The “more complete angels” feel repulsed by Faust’s earthly remains and call for his purification. The task of distilling Faust’s essence can only be executed by “eternal love,” however. That is to say, there

is something erotic and supersensible about the process that can exhibit the full range of our capacity as thinking beings: "Die vollenderten Engel. Uns bleibt ein Erdenrest / Zu tragen peinlich, / Und wär er von Asbest / Er ist nicht reinlich. / Wenn starke Geisteskraft / Die Elemente / An sich herangerafft, / Kein Engel trennte / Geeinte Zwienatur / Der innigen Beiden, / Die ewige Liebe nur / Vermags zu scheiden." (11954-65)

11. Kant is not always consistent in his terminology, but the distinctions he draws between presentation ("Darstellung") and representation ("Vorstellung") have historical and theoretical significance. I have benefited from the detailed treatments of this issue in Gasché, as well as from discussions in Breithaupt and She Ching Ho. See also Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the "Critique of Judgment"* (Chicago and London: The U of Chicago P, 1990); Martha B. Helfer, *The Retreat of Representation: The Concept of "Darstellung" in German Critical Discourse* (Albany: State U of New York P, 1996) 1-75; and Helmut J. Scheider, Ralf Simon, and Thomas Wirtz, eds., *Bildersturm und Bilderflut um 1800: Zur schwierigen Frage der Anschaulichkeit der Moderne* (Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag, 2001). See here especially Schneider's "Vorwort" 1-17 and Ulrich Gaier's "Denken als Bildprozeß: Vorstellungsart und Denkbild um 1800" 19-51.

12. Christoph Adelung, *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, mit beständiger Vergleichung der übrigen Mundarten, besonders aber der Oberdeutschen, Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Ausgabe* (Leipzig: Johann Immanuel Breitkopf und Compagnie, 1793) 4:1342.

13. This inherent capacity to regulate the process of figuration, i.e., to pull the figurating mind along, connects the magical train of forms ("Zug") in "Zueignung" to the famously obscure last verb in *Faust*, "hinzuziehen," which predicates the "Ewig-Weibliche."

14. Gasché 44.

15. I will cite Kant by volume and page number according to *Werkausgabe in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977).

16. The word means spirit, or enlivening mind. According to Kant, the genius is by nature attuned to the fundamental role of the autonomous imagination ("Einbildungskraft") in the subjective "Belebung der Erkenntniskräfte" 10:253. I am arguing that this role is also integral to the process of figuration in Goethe's *Faust*, which frequently features nature spirits (*Geister*) to effect figural mediations of the rational faculties and sense. In the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1783; 1787), Kant calls this kind of intervention in thought by the productive imagination "figurative" 3:148: "Diese *Synthesis* des Mannigfaltigen der sinnlichen Anschauung, die *a priori* möglich und notwendig ist, kann *figürlich* (*synthesis speciosa*) genannt werden, zum Unterschiede von derjenigen, welche in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen einer Anschauung überhaupt in der bloßen Kategorie gedacht würde, und Verstandesverbindung (*synthesis intellectualis*) heißt; beide sind *transzendental*, nicht bloß weil sie selbst *a priori* vorgehen, sondern auch die Möglichkeit anderer Erkenntnis *a priori* gründen . . ." 3:131.

17. Kant's definition of the aesthetic idea resembles Goethe's famous characterization of the symbolic process, which he recorded in a notebook in 1807, just one year before the publication of the completed first part of *Faust*: "Die Symbolik verwandelt die Erscheinung in Idee, die Idee in ein Bild und so daß die Idee im Bild immer unendlich wirksam und unerreichbar bleibt, und selbst in allen Sprachen ausgesprochen doch unaussprechlich bliebe" FA 13:207. Together with his contrastive characterization of the allegorical figure as a process grounded in governing concepts, we find an

analysis of figuration that resembles Kant's analysis of schematic and symbolic hypotyposes respectively. Ferdinand Weinhandl already noted this kind of resemblance with reference to the two kinds of judgment that produce schematic and symbolic figures respectively. See his *Die Metaphysik Goethes* (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1932) 167, "Der Goethesche Gegensatz von Symbol und Allegorie [. . .] deckt sich in dieser Hinsicht mit dem Kantischen Gegensatz von reflektierender und bestimmender Urteilskraft"; also "Die bestimmende Urteilskraft ist im Besitz des Allgemeinen, von dem sie ausgeht, um zum Besondern in der Anwendung herabzusteigen. Dem entspricht der Goethesche Begriff der Allegorie. Die reflektierende Urteilskraft ist nur im Besitz des Besondern, von dem sie ausgeht, um das unbekannte, höhere Allgemeine zu suchen" (Weinhandl 272).

18. Kant suggests that aesthetic judgments of the beautiful require the mind to linger in contemplative repose, thereby sacrificing chronology to a new kind of time that he calls repetition: "Wir *weilen* bei der Betrachtung des Schönen, weil diese Betrachtung sich selbst stärkt und reproduziert: welches derjenigen Verweilung analogisch (aber doch mit ihr nicht einerlei) ist, da ein Reiz in der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes die Aufmerksamkeit wiederholentlich erweckt, wobei das Gemüt passiv ist" 10:138. When seen in this light, Faust's famous characterization for Mephistopheles of his own restless striving ironically misses the aesthetic ground of his ultimate redemption in the final act of the play: "Werd ich zum Augenblicke sagen: / Verweile doch! du bist so schön! / Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen, / Dann will ich gern zugrunde gehn! / Dann mag die Totenglocke schallen, / Dann bist du meines Dienstes frei, / Die Uhr mag stehn, der Zeiger fallen, / Es sei die Zeit für mich vorbei!" (1699–1706).

19. For more on Kant's aesthetic idea, symbolic hypotyposis, and the role of beauty in *Faust*, see above and Gasché (n. 6) 155–78 and 202–18, as well as Ulrich Gaier's contribution in the current volume of the *Goethe Yearbook*.

20. For a brief discussion of memory ("Gedächtnis") in Kant see his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798; 1800), ¶31 12:485–90.

21. According to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ("Transzendente Ästhetik"), time as inner and space as outer sense, are the two pure forms of intuition that—with the assistance of the schematizing imagination—synthesize sensible perceptions and the concepts of the understanding in all acts of cognition.

22. In the Schematism Chapter of the "Transcendental Analytic" 3:187–94, Kant distinguishes the picture ("Bild") of an actual dog or triangle from the concept of each. From a transcendental perspective, a specific dog or a specific triangle can be pictured in a representation only by the activity of the transcendental imagination that Kant calls schematization. The transcendental schema represents the rule that mediates intuited objects and their concepts in cognition. Kant uses the words "Vorstellung" and "vorstellen" when describing this process of figuration in the First Critique. When discussing "Hypotypose" in the Third Critique, however, he switches, perhaps significantly, to "Darstellung(en)," which he further defines as "*subjectio ad adspectum*" and "*exhibitiones*" 10:295–96.

23. Goethe's Kant-studies, which he began in the early 1790's, parallel his renewed work on *Faust* immediately after his return from Italy, as well as his experimental work on optical and botanical phenomena during the same period. The secondary literature on Goethe and Kant is substantial. Among the traditional treatments that have been useful to me, in addition to Weinhandl, are Karl Vorländer, "Goethe und Kant," *Kant—Schiller—Goethe: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 2nd rev. ed. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923) 121–299; Gabriele Rabel, *Goethe und Kant*. (Vienna: Selbstverlag,

1927); and Ernst Cassirer, "Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy," *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963) 61–98. More recent contributions were pioneered by the late Géza von Molnár, both in his *Goethes Kantstudien* (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1994), which reproduces and provides a commentary on the annotated pages of Goethe's personal copies of the first and third critiques, as well as in a series of articles including "Conceptual Affinities Between Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and Goethe's *Faust*," *Lessing Yearbook* 14 (1982): 23–41 and, more recently, "Hidden in Plain View: Another Look at Goethe's *Faust*," *Goethe Yearbook* 11 (2002): 33–76. Recent German critics have focused most of their attention on Goethe's reception of Kant's third critique. See in this connection Jost Schieren, *Anschauende Urteilskraft. Methodische und philosophische Grundlagen von Goethes naturwissenschaftlichem Erkennen* (Düsseldorf and Bonn: Parerga, 1998) 29–80; Horst Folkers, "Ein Tag im Leben Goethes und sein Wort zur neueren Philosophie," *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts* (1998): 36–67; and Ursula Schuh, "Die Sinne tragen nicht" *Goethes Kritik der Wahrnehmung als Antwort auf virtuelle Welten* (Berlin: Mayer, 1999). Finally, Nicholas Boyle discusses Goethe's Kant reception in the poem "Vermächtnis" in "Kantian and Other Elements in Goethe's 'Vermächtnis,'" *Modern Language Review* 73 (1978): 532–49.

24. The other is "Sinn."

25. "Sinn" requires their presence.

26. Gasché (n. 6) 208–16.

27. See Makkreel (n. 11) 12ff. and 29ff.

28. "Nun ist klar, daß es ein *Drittes* geben müsse, was einerseits mit der *Kategorie*, andererseits mit der Erscheinung in Gleichartigkeit stehen muß, und die Anwendung der ersteren auf die letzte möglich macht. Diese vermittelnde Vorstellung muß rein (ohne alles Empirische) und doch einerseits *intellektuell*, andererseits *sinnlich* sein. Eine solche ist das transzendente *Schema*" 3:187–88.

29. See "Anschauende Urteilskraft" FA 24:448.

30. Breithaupt (n. 4), whose readings engage Kant, offers an extensive analysis of figuration in *Iphigénie* in connection with the emergence of the modern subject. Goethe's play establishes the duplicity of the genial subject, whom the figure constantly eludes, and its incapacity for political action 19–53.

31. Nancy understands blindness as the ground of the truthful image. In Heidegger's death mask, he suggests, "the divine power of an intuition that would be creative of the unity of its sensibility is supplemented . . . by a lack of vision that joins the sensible manifold in or to a unity by default, a blind, non-creative unity, but one that "with its empty gaze, gives rise to the possibility of the image" (Nancy 93). The emptiness of this kind of blind vision is reminiscent of the "Leere" that inhabits the maternal workshop of the imagination in "Finstere Gallerie."

32. This is the title to Nancy's book.

33. See Benjamin Bennett, *Goethe's Theory of Poetry: "Faust" and the Regeneration of Language* (Ithaca and New York: Cornell UP, 1986) 305–29, where the chaos of "Bergschluchten" is linked to love with reference to Dante's *Inferno* 315–16.

34. According to Kant, the transcendental schema serves a mediating function that links the categories to appearances. It must therefore be a pure representation ("Vorstellung") that is both intellectual and sensible 3:187–88.

35. See Franz Koch, *Goethe und Plotin* (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung J.J. Weber, 1925) 83–127, for a discussion of the creative mirror ("Der schaffende Spiegel"). Among many other texts, Koch discusses Goethe's *Faust* in the context of his life-

long development as an aesthetic thinker whose Roman collaboration with K.P. Moritz initiated his appropriation of this ancient motif as a figure for the creative mind.

36. The culminating event of figuration that the Chorus Mysticus celebrates in the play's final word is called an "Ereignis" (12007). This choice of word, with its etymological connection to the eye, offers a final figure for the visual processes that drive the work.