Abstract

This article analyzes the Aswan Dam decision in terms of the interaction between individual perceptions and institutional priorities in the formulation of US foreign policy. The conceptual framework is drawn from the work of Richard Cottam and Richard Herrmann. After a background discussion of the history of both the Eisenhower and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser Administrations, the article presents an analysis of the Eisenhower Administration's deliberations regarding the Aswan Dam decision. This analysis shows that US decision-makers interpreted Egypt and Nasser's actions according to a set of pre-established perceptions which clearly resulted in policies that contradicted the best interests of the US.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1940-3461
Print ISSN
0026-3141
Pages
pp. 84-102
Launched on MUSE
2010-01-23
Open Access
No
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