Ethics of Scientific Research (review)

Ethics and the Environment, 4(2): 241-245 © 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. ISSN 1085-6633 All rights of reproduction In any form reserved. BOOK REVIEW Kristin ShraderFrechette Ethics of Scientific Research. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994. Pp. 243. $58.50 ISBN 0-8476-7981-0 (Hardback); $26.95 ISBN 0-8476-7981-3 (Paperback). Reviewed by: Clark Wolf, University of Georgia. Some philosophers and scientists regard courses in research ethics as a waste of time. The NSF harbors a vague hope that such courses will prevent misconduct and fraud, but one may suspect that any scientist inclined to commit research fraud is unlikely to be prevented from doing so by taking an ethics class. Sad but true, many textbooks in the area are boring: few controversial problems are presented (how many divergent views can there be about research fraud?), and when they are presented it is often implied that the solution is clear and uncontroversial. It is refreshing that the traditional paths are not taken by Kristen Shrader-Frechette in The Ethics of Scientific Research. Readers familiar with the author's other work will not be surprised to find her new book contentious, original, meticulously researched, and rigorously argued. Although it is not focused on research in the environmental sciences, it will be of special interest to readers of this journal because of the attention to environmental issues and ecological science. For many years, Shrader-Frechette has been producing much of the most solid and most carefully argued work in environmental philosophy, and it would have been remarkable if this had not been reflected in this excellent book. Shrader-Frechette argues that scientists, like all the rest of us, have wide social obligations. Although she recognizes researchers' obligation to do scrupulous and unbiased research, she argues that other obligations may be no less weighty, and that nonscientific obligations may appropriately inform the practice of scientific research. Direct all correspondence to: C. Wolf, Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-1627; E-mail: cwolf@arches.uga.edu 241 242 ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT Vol. 4, No. 2,1999 Some will find this a surprising and counterintuitive position: many scientists and writers on research ethics accept Jacques Monod's view that objectivity in the research process is the only obligation of scientists (p. 50). The motive for this minimalist view is not difficult to find: One might worry that scientists motivated by a sense of social obligation would be more likely to bias research results in favor of outcomes they regard as socially desirable. Shrader-Frechette argues that we can have it both ways: scientists should neither compromise the objectivity of their research in the name of social obligation, nor should they ignore or deny that they have such obligations . An important burden of the book is to support the claim that scientists have a general obligation to promote the public good. This obligation may sometimes be even weightier than the obligation to do scrupulous and unbiased research. Implicit in it are familiar duties not to do research that imposes unjustified risks or violates the principle of informed consent, not to convert public resources to private profit, not to jeopardize environmental welfare, and not to ignore the practical consequences and probable application of one's research. These public obligations are compatible with the additional obligation to avoid research bias. Although she does articulate these duties as a set of basic obligation-assigning principles, Shrader-Frechette scrupulously avoids giving the false impression that morality is simply rule-following, and never assumes that principles are transparent. She is careful to examine cases where principles conflict and simple answers are not available. The examples used in this book are especially instructive: In August 1986, P. C. Kangas gave a paper at a large international conference for ecologists. He argued that extinction rates due to deforestation in tropics are actually lower than others have alleged . Among other things, he is reported to have said ". . . you can deforest an area for a long time before you have a decline in species" (p. 82). Audience members "disagreed and complained that this questionable research would be used to justify more rapid and widespread deforestation" (p. 82). As...