Flourishing, Praxis, and Charm

Ethics and the Environment, 4(1)101-106 © 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. ISSN: 1085-6633 All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. chris j. cuomo | Flourishing, Praxis, and Charm Anthony Weston (1992) has argued that during the "originary stages" when cultural values are undergoing dramatic, expansive shifts, proponents of change ought to encourage and accommodate a proliferation of innovative moral concepts , practices, and principles. Since our explicit articulations of the connections among feminist, postcolonial, and environmentalist ethics and politics involves a relatively new philosophical project, conversations about which concepts are helpful in negotiating social /ecological problems and loyalties are invaluable. I thank my generous friends and colleagues for their careful attention to my attempt to contribute to this project. I address their comments here in hopes that a multiplicity of approaches to ecological feminism will help us develop useful theories and practices of resistance to oppressions. First, I should clarify some aspects of the view that I put forth in Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing (1998). Although I find flourishing and dynamic charm to be concepts that capture some of what is distinct about the positive goals of ecological feminist ethics, neither concept is meant to describe an ultimate standard of appeal. As I argue in the book, no one concept can do that much work. On my view, aiming toward flourishing does not rule out considering rights, care, or virtue as fundamental to moral life. In fact, I hold that many different values and drives shape moral life, and that there are a number of legitimate ways to answer ethical questions. What I am after with flourishing and dynamic charm is to evoke of the sense of values that positively ground ecological feminism. This descriptive project involves analyzing the views of ecofeminists and ecological feminists and uncovering what is unique about their approaches regarding the value of various forms and aggregates of human and nonhuman life. Like Naomi Zack, I am committed to the view that because selves are social and Direct all correspondence to: Chris J. Cuomo, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati , OH 45221-0374; E-mail: cuomocj@email.uc.edu 101 102 ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT Vol. 4, No. 1,1999 ecological, there is not always a sharp distinction between instrumental and noninstrumental value: "Since nonhuman communities and entities are necessarily, intrinsically bound up with human life and interests, the well-being of nature is implied, to at least a minimal degree, in human flourishing .. . Ethics that begin with flourishing capture the sense in which instrumental and noninstrumental value are often enmeshed" (Cuomo, 1998, pp. 63-64). I believe that moral value is relational, and therefore eschew language (so ubiquitous in environmental ethics) that describes moral value as "inherent," or "intrinsic." In the book, I took this relationality to be something in which only living beings and systems participate. Although I have not yet worked out the details of what exactly it would mean, I have since been persuaded that nonliving beings and systems can also have dynamic charm. Although Lorraine Code (1991) takes issue with the label I chose to characterize her work, it was her endorsement in Who Can She Know of "theorists who start with community and interdependence," rather than atomistic, independent individuals that led me to find her work so useful in my own discussion of what it means to be an ecological self. I find her social epistemology akin to the work of other critical proponents of feminist social ontologies and epistemologies, such as Marilyn Friedman (1989, 1995) and Maria Lugones (1991, 1994). Several panelists raise crucial questions about the traditions in relation to and upon which we build feminist theory and praxis. Naomi Zack finds that I failed to adequately acknowledge the existence of indigenous traditions. Because there is a tendency among white environmentalists to romanticize and appropriate Native American philosophies, I believe it is important to refrain from casting indigenous traditions as a (unified, mythic) model for ecofeminism (Cuomo, 1998, pp. 13-14). Nonetheless, I certainly do not argue (or think) that ecological feminism is the only alternative to logics of domination. I share what I take to be Naomi Zack's underlying concern...