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“Another” Patriotism in Early Shōwa Japan (1930–1945)¹

Takashi Shogimen

Patriotism is one of the most controversial concepts in the history of modern Japan. It was a key ideological concept underpinning Japan’s ultra-nationalism before and during the Second World War. Since Japan’s defeat in 1945, patriotism has been a focus of controversy. Already by 1950, the sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō (1907–88) published a short but influential book entitled *Aikokushin* (patriotism).² In the 1960s, patriotism continued to attract widespread media attention.³ Perhaps the so-called *Nihonjin-ron*, a literary genre which emphasized the singularity and uniqueness of Japanese culture, may also be seen as a disguised form of patriotic aspirations.⁴ Since the economic bubble burst in the 1990s, however, literature on patriotism has been growing at an escalated pace. The economic boom of the 1970s and 1980s defined Japan’s new identity as an economic superpower. However, the so-called “lost decade” from the early 1990s seriously under-

¹ An earlier version of this article was presented at the Asian Studies Research Seminar in the University of Otago on 10 June 2008. I am grateful to anonymous readers for this *Journal* for their constructive criticisms and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Erica Baffelli and Stephen Conway for their help during the preparation of this essay.

² Shimizu Ikutarō, *Aikokushin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950).

³ See, for instance, Mainichi Shinbunsha, ed., *Atarashii Aikokushin* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1961); Tsunoda Fusako, *Samayou Aikokushin* (Tokyo: Bungei Shujū, 1961); Tanaka Suguru, *Aikokushin no Mezame* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1962); Yomiuri Shinbun, ed., *Aikokushin ni tsuite* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1970).

⁴ A typical example of this is Isaiah Bendasan (Yamamoto Shichihei), *Nihonjin to Yudayajin* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1970).

mined Japanese identity. When national identity is in crisis, a natural response is to try to restore it. So we are currently witnessing an eruption of patriotism in public discourse.⁵ The Liberal Democratic government was indeed sensitive to the gradual loss of national identity. The recent “reform” of elementary and secondary education in Japan emphasized the love of country by underscoring the pedagogical and moral importance of the national flag and national anthem.

Interestingly, a surging interest in patriotism in Japan has coincided with the debate over patriotism in the West. From the 1990s onwards the discussion has revolved around two types of patriotism: constitutional patriotism and republican patriotism. Constitutional patriotism was most clearly conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas⁶ as loyalty to the universal principles and practices of liberal democracy and human rights, a position defended recently by Jan-Werner Müller.⁷ Republican patriotism, on the other hand, derived from historical studies of the European republican tradition. Maurizio Viroli defines republican patriotism as the loyalty of citizens to the free polity which can be ethnically and culturally diverse, thereby differentiating it from nationalism which is characterized by its concern with the unity of ethnicity and culture.⁸

While a number of Anglo-American philosophers and social scientists have participated in the debate on patriotism,⁹ it is probably not coincidental that the key proponents of patriotism in the West—Habermas and Viroli—are German and Italian respectively. The idea of patriotism evokes

⁵ The most recent literature includes: Saeki Keishi, *Nihon no Aikokushin* (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2008); Fujita Masashi, *Gakkō Kyōiku to Aikokushin* (Tokyo: Gakushū no Tomo Sha, 2008); Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Itō Shigeru, *Aikokushin wo Kangaeru* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007); Kang Sang-jung, *Aikoku no Sabō* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2006); and Oguma Eiji, *Minshu to Aikoku* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002). Two leading monthly magazines on public affairs, *Bungei Shunjū* and *Ronza*, produced a special issue on patriotism simultaneously in July, 2006.

⁶ Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), Appendix II. Cf. Attracta Ingram, “Constitutional Patriotism,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 22 (1996): 1–18.

⁷ Jan-Werner Müller, *Constitutional Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁸ Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). See also Viroli, *Republicanism*, trans. Antony Shugaar (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002).

⁹ Some communitarian philosophers have been sympathetic to patriotism. For the debate on “communitarian” patriotism and cosmopolitanism, see Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).

ambivalence and even abhorrence from Germans and Italians who have to come to terms with the “shameful” past in their recent history. Love of country is indeed controversial in light of the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and yet the need for an alternative theory of citizenship and civic allegiance has been widely recognized by these nations. In this respect, Japan is no exception. The recent revival of public debate on patriotism in Japan cannot be understood without this historical context.

One dominant feature of current Western discourses on patriotism is to dissociate patriotism from the German or the Italian past of chauvinistic and belligerent nationalism. However, the Habermasian constitutional patriotism, which is characterized by universalistic political and legal principles, has been criticized for disconnecting citizenship from the “specific historical and cultural background of the nation.”¹⁰ Constitutional patriotism indeed entails “hopes for the transcendence of existing nation-states”; however, this inclination to “world citizenship” has been criticized for seeing nation states as essentially “creatures of artifice” and overlooking the significance of “birth and inheritance” in the idea of nationhood.¹¹ Viroli’s republican patriotism, on the other hand, is an attempt to rehabilitate the republicanism of Renaissance Italy, which was, as is well known, disseminated to other parts of Western Europe as well as the New World.¹² In this sense, Viroli’s republican patriotism is historically rooted in the Italian (and the Western) political tradition. Nonetheless, Viroli’s republican patriotism has not escaped criticism for being exceedingly “rhetorical” by downplaying the chauvinistic and belligerent aspects of Renaissance republicanism.¹³ Indeed, early modern patriotism emerged in a military context: from the late Middle Ages, it was increasingly accepted that the first duty

¹⁰ Viroli, *For Love of Country*, 172.

¹¹ Margaret Canovan, “Patriotism Is Not Enough,” *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000): 413–32.

¹² The literature on the republican tradition is immense; see especially J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, eds., *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Milton and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics. Vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹³ Canovan, “Patriotism Is Not Enough,” 417.

of a patriot was to die for his country.¹⁴ The new republican discourse on patriotism has simply ignored its militaristic ancestry and underscored loyalty to the free commonwealth.

Unsurprisingly, none of the current literature on patriotism, as far as I am aware, examines patriotism in the Second World War. But were all the discourses on patriotism in Germany, Italy, and Japan immediately before and during the Second World War monolithically chauvinistic? Were there any “alternative” ideas of patriotism which opposed the mainstream conception of it? The purpose of the present paper is to answer this question in the Japanese context. The present article explores “another” idea of patriotism in wartime Japan. The patriotism I wish to highlight is what might be called prophetic patriotism, which is characterized by acts of judgment in light of Christian ideals of justice and peace. For this purpose, the present essay will discuss two Japanese Protestant Christian thinkers who lived their lives before, during, and after the Second World War: Tsukamoto Toraji (1885–1973) and Yanaihara Tadao (1893–1961).

Exploring an alternative patriotism in wartime Japan by examining Japanese Christian thinkers addresses a salient question that has been overlooked by Western scholarship: that is, the relationship between religion and patriotism. Indeed, in the European context, early modern patriotism emerged under the Christian influence; the religious sanctification of the secular body politic based on the Christian model of the *corpus mysticum* not only justified but also glorified the severing of a bodily member (i.e. the voluntary death of a patriot) from the whole body politic in order to save its life.¹⁵ In view of the religious ancestry of patriotism, what is lacking in the current debate is due attention to the religious dimensions of it; both constitutional patriotism and republican patriotism limit their loyalty to civic, and hence secular, values.

Focusing on Christian thinkers in wartime Japan also highlights an important, religious context of Japanese patriotism: State Shintō was paradigmatic to the mainstream patriotism of early Shōwa Japan.¹⁶ This is not

¹⁴ A classic study of this is Ernst Kantorowicz, “*Pro Patria Mori* in Medieval Political Thought,” *American Historical Review* 56 (1951): 472–92. A recent study is Collette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late Medieval France*, ed. Frederic L. Cheyette, trans. Susan Ross Huston (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 298–309.

¹⁵ See Kantorowicz, “*Pro Patria Mori*.”

¹⁶ On the special status of Shintō as the Japanese state’s sole religion and the “fusion” of Shintō with Japanese people and state, see Robert N. Bellah, *Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 38.

to say, however, that Japanese patriotism is rooted in the centuries-old tradition of Shintō. On the contrary, “*aikoku*,” the Japanese term for patriotism, was, as Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902) pointed out in 1891, “what Western nations call patriotism,” thus denying its Japanese origin.¹⁷ Indeed, Japanese patriotism was a by-product of the making of Japan as a modern nation state: the process in which religion played a significant role. As Maruyama Masao’s classic study has revealed,¹⁸ early Meiji political leaders recognized the essential role that religion played in the formation of nation states. They considered Christianity as the “spiritual axis” of modern Western states. Yet no traditional Japanese religion, they observed, could provide a spiritual paradigm for the making of Japan as a modern nation state. State Shintō, which is underpinned by unconditional loyalty to *Tennō* (the Japanese Emperor), was therefore invented by early Meiji political leaders as an equivalent of Christianity in the Western context.¹⁹ State Shintō was the incubator of militaristic and chauvinistic patriotism. In view of this, examining Christian forms of patriotism in the Japanese context also requires us to appreciate the distinctively religious nature of the context in which patriotism emerged and developed.

So why single out Yanaihara Tadao and Tsukamoto Toraji? In relation to patriotism, I want to emphasize that the two Christian thinkers grappled with an issue of fundamental political significance: the rise of fanatical nationalism and militarism in the 1930s and early 1940s. During this period, patriotism became a keyword in public discourse: patriotism meant dying for the national polity (*kokutai*) embodied by the Japanese Emperor.²⁰ This obviously posed a serious question of loyalty for Christians: what is the relationship between loyalty to the earthly state and faith in God? In this context, both Yanaihara and Tsukamoto addressed the problem of patriotism. They both offered their views on what it means to be a patriot. Predictably, both men answered the question from a Christian perspective. However, their distinctively religious responses to the question of patriotism were sharply contrasting. In these two men, we find two different patriotisms: Tsukamoto’s patriotism advocated an accommodation with the contemporary government, while Yanaihara’s was highly critical of it. In

¹⁷ As cited in Maruyama Masao, “Aikokushin,” in *Maruyama Masao Shū*, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 6: 77.

¹⁸ Maruyama Masao, *Nihon no Shisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), 28–31.

¹⁹ For an excellent survey of this, see Kevin M. Doak, *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

²⁰ See Doak, *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan*, esp. ch.3. However, it does not touch upon patriotism in the 1930s and 40s.

post-war scholarship in twentieth-century Japanese intellectual history, patriotism has been closely associated with militaristic nationalism. Therefore, Tsukamoto's acquiescence towards wartime government invited comments such as "because Tsukamoto's faith promotes patriotism, he often spoke of the gospel with the message that suggests adaptation to the contemporary political situation."²¹ However, Yanaihara, who clearly dissented from the Japanese government, also preached patriotism passionately; his book *The Men I Admire* (*Yo no Sonkeisuru Jinbutsu*), published in 1940, for example, discusses Jeremiah, Nichiren (1222–82; a Japanese Buddhist thinker in the Kamakura era), Abraham Lincoln, and Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933; an economist and the principal of the First High School in Tokyo which Yanaihara attended).²² The four individuals are described as passionate patriots. Yanaihara's call for "true" patriotism, however, has been overlooked by modern scholars and commentators.

Perhaps some remarks on the Christian faith to which both Yanaihara and Tsukamoto adhered may be required here. These two men were among the most influential leaders of *mukyōkai* or "churchless" Christianity in early Shōwa Japan. *Mukyōkai* Christianity, created by Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930),²³ rejected any special significance to institutional membership and sacramental ceremonies in subscribing to Christian faith. This "indigenous" Christianity was famously characterized by passionate patriotism and pacifism and an emphasis on a *Theologia Crucis* (jūjikakyō). Uchimura's death in 1930 did not signal the end of *mukyōkai* Christianity. Indeed, Uchimura left a large number of followers, many of whom estab-

²¹ Ōkawara Reizō, "Tsukamoto Toraji," in *Uchimura Kanzō wo Keishōshita Hitobito*, ed. Fujita Wakao (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1977), 2: 113.

²² *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshū*, 29 vols (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963–65) (*Yanaihara* hereafter), 24: 1–166. The sequel, *Zoku Yo no Sonkeisuru Jinbutsu*, appeared in 1947. The book discusses Isaiah, Paul, Martin Luther, Oliver Cromwell, and Uchimura Kanzō. See *Yanaihara*, 24: 167–324.

²³ On *mukyōkai* Christianity, see Carlo Caldarola, *Christianity: The Japanese Way* (Leiden: Brill, 1979); and Mark Mullins, *Christianity Made in Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998). Also Caldarola, "Pacifism among Japanese No-Church Christians," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 41 (1973): 506–519; Nobuya Bamba and John F. Howes, eds., *Pacifism in Japan: the Christian and Socialist Tradition* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978). For an overview of Uchimura's life and thought, see John F. Howes, *Japan's Modern Prophet: Uchimura Kanzō, 1861–1930* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005); and Miura Hiroshi, *The Life and Thought of Uchimura Kanzo* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997). The literature in Japanese is immense. Most of the monographs on Japanese Christianity published before 2000 are found in the bibliographical article by Terao Kazuyoshi, "Nihon Kirisutokyō Kankei Bunken Shūsei," *Nanzan Shakyō Bunka Kenkyūsho Kenkyūshobō* 11 (2001): 14–45.

lished their own groups to disseminate *mukyōkai* beliefs. Among such leaders of the “second generation,” in addition to Yanaihara and Tsukamoto, were Azegami Kenzō (1884–1938), Kurosaki Kōkichi (1886–1970), Fujii Takeshi (1888–1930), Mitani Takamasa (1889–1944), Ebara Masato (1890–1933), and Masaie Jin (1900–1985). The celebrated political philosopher Nanbara Shigeru (1889–1974)²⁴ and the influential economic historian Ōtsuka Hisao (1907–96) were also among Uchimura’s “disciples.” However, the Christians inspired by Uchimura were not monolithic in either their Christian beliefs or their political views. For example, Masaie was a proponent of the unconditional rejection of war, while Kurosaki was critical of it.²⁵ Azegami was an atomistic individualist who dissociated faith from politics,²⁶ while Nanbara may be described as a “communitarian” who emphasized the link between religion and politics.²⁷ Furthermore, all the Christians taught by Uchimura did not remain loyal to him: the lawyer Tanaka Kōtarō (1890–1974) and the philosopher and theologian Yoshimitsu Yoshihiko (1904–45) ultimately converted to Roman Catholicism.²⁸ Clearly, Uchimura’s Christianity was inherited (or rejected) in a wide range of ways.²⁹ Despite the diversity of *mukyōkai* Christianity after Uchimura’s death, however, a comparison of Yanaihara and Tsukamoto in particular makes an ideal case study not only because the two men offered sharply contrasting views of patriotism from a Christian perspective of the same ancestry, but also because, unlike other *mukyōkai* leaders of the same generation, many of whom did not live beyond 1945, they preached and published their views on politics actively during the war (and beyond).

Yanaihara remains widely known to students of Japanese history.³⁰ He started his academic career as Professor of Colonial Policy at Tokyo Impe-

²⁴ On Nanbara, see Maruyama Masao and Fukuda Kanichi, eds., *Kaisō no Nanbara Shigeru* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975); Andrew E. Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Kato Takashi, *Nanbara Shigeru: Kindai Nihon to Chishikijin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997); and Tachibana Takashi, ed., *Nanbara Shigeru no Kotoba* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2007).

²⁵ Fujita, ed., *Uchimura Kanzō wo Keishōshita Hitobito*, 2: 141.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: 92–98.

²⁷ Kato, *Nanbara Shigeru*, 108–116.

²⁸ Hanzawa Takamaro, *Kindai Nihon no Katorishizumu* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1993).

²⁹ Fujita, ed., *Uchimura Kanzō wo Keishōshita Hitobito*. Also Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan*, 261, n. 54.

³⁰ Yanaihara’s autobiographical accounts are collected in *Yanaihara*, 26: 1–250. Fujita Wakao, *Yanaihara Tadao* (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1967); and Nishimura Hideo, *Yanaihara Tadao* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan Shuppankyoku, 1975) are biographies by Yanaihara’s “disciples,” focusing on the spiritual aspect of his life. Yanaihara’s oldest son, Isaku,

rial University. One of the country's leading economists, Yanaihara was forced to resign from his chair after he published a controversial essay "Ideals of a State" in the current-affairs magazine, *Chūō Kōron*, in 1937. Subsequently, he devoted himself to Christian mission: he lectured on the Bible and preached at a number of public and private meetings. After the War, the University of Tokyo, which had purged the ultra-nationalist academics, demanded that Yanaihara return; Yanaihara was thus appointed as the Director of the Institute of Social Sciences and was later elected President of the University of Tokyo, while he continued Christian missionary activities through public addresses and by publishing his newsletters. Tsukamoto is a less well known figure in modern Japanese history.³¹ After reading law at Tokyo Imperial University, he served as a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce; however, in 1919 he chose to live as a Christian preacher. He published his own newsletter regularly and preached a Christian faith, initially inherited from Uchimura; subsequently, however, the two became estranged as their understanding of Christianity diverged. Tsukamoto had the largest number of followers among *mukyōkai* Christians after the death of Uchimura.

In what follows, I shall first examine Tsukamoto's response to the contemporary political issues and in this context I will illuminate his views on patriotism. Next I will turn to Yanaihara to do the same. My goal is two-fold: first, through this comparison the present essay will show that there was "another" patriotism in wartime Japan which combated militaristic chauvinism. Yanaihara's patriotism, which was characterized by public manifestation of an uncompromising faith in the Christian ideals of justice and peace, was the antithesis of the belligerent and ethnocentric patriotism that was promoted by the contemporary government. Second, a close analysis of Yanaihara's patriotism reveals some significant implications for the current Western debates on patriotism. The paper thus presents Yanaihara's prophetic patriotism as a viable alternative to constitutional and republican forms of patriotism.

produced a detailed (but unfinished due to the author's death) biography: Yanaihara Isaku, *Yanaihara Tadao Den* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1998). See also Nanbara Shigeru et al., ed. *Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, Gakumon, Shōgai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). For the studies of Yanaihara's academic work, see below n. 76.

³¹ Apart from Fujita, ed., *Uchimura Kanzō wo Keishōshita Hitobito*, Hakari Yoshiharu, *Mukyōkai no Tenkai* (Tokyo: Shinchi Shobō, 1989) remains the only scholarly account of Tsukamoto. The book also discusses Mitani Takamasa, Yanaihara Tadao, and Sekine Masao.

I. TSUKAMOTO TORAJI

Tsukamoto Toraji's addresses and essays are now collected in his eighteen-volume *Collected Works*.³² The first ten volumes are devoted to Tsukamoto's biblical commentaries with emphasis on the New Testament. The last eight volumes collect addresses and essays, most of the latter being published in his newsletter *Seisho Chishiki* (*The Knowledge of the Bible*). This publication, founded in 1930, had over 2,000 subscribers.

Most of Tsukamoto's comments on contemporary politics and society can be found in his short essays in *The Knowledge of the Bible*. The first decade after the launch of the newsletter coincided with the rise of militarism. September 1931 witnessed the Manchurian Incident; in 1932, the "independence" of Manchuria was declared and the liberal Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated. The following year, Japan left the League of Nations and in 1937, Japan declared war on China. In 1940 Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy and at the end of the following year, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

As the country was marching towards a total war, Tsukamoto asked himself repeatedly what witness a Christian ought to bear in this time of national crisis. His response had been constant since the early 1930s: he was determined to withdraw himself from any social movements or political activities and to retire into the private study of the Bible. In 1936, Tsukamoto wrote: "I only preach the gospels. I do not discuss diplomacy, nor do I discuss politics and economy. I only preach the gospels."³³ Tsukamoto was aware of the criticism that he "segregated himself from the reality of the time." However, Tsukamoto did not consider the exercise of this-worldly leadership to be a mission for a Christian. "Religion is religion. It is not a charitable activity or a nationalist movement. The salvation of souls is the mission of religion; this can be achieved by nothing but religion."³⁴

Tsukamoto's retreat into the private study of the Bible probably had its origin in his sudden change of heart a few years earlier. In October 1934, Tsukamoto planned to deliver a public address on the role of *mukyōkai*

³² *Tsukamoto Toraji Chosakushū*, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Seisho Chishikisha, 1978–79); *Tsukamoto Toraji Chosakushū Zoku*, 8 vols. (Tokyo: Seisho Chishikisha, 1984–86) (*Tsukamoto* hereafter). In this article I will refer to the last eight volumes only.

³³ "Watashi wa Fukuin wo Kataru," in *Tsukamoto*, 3: 374. In 1940, Tsukamoto reiterated it almost word-by-word in "Tada Fukuin wo Toku," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 33. Also "Watashi wa Seisho wo Benkyōsuru," in *Tsukamoto*, 3: 53–54.

³⁴ "Mazu Reikon Mondai kara," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 179.

Christian faith for the salvation of the nation. However, at the outset of his speech, he revealed that he had lost interest in talking about Christian faith in relation to current affairs because “in Japan today, no living truth is allowed to be mentioned publicly. If you mention it, you are in trouble. I had considered myself until yesterday as a patriotic preacher. I had hoped to save my beloved country. . . . I now realized, however, that I am not able to say what God commands me to say in the way in which Jeremiah did. . . . I have neither brave heart nor patriotism nor capability as a preacher.”³⁵ This confession was followed by a reflection on the life of Christ, which was in his view apolitical. Tsukamoto thus concludes that the destiny of his nation, or even of the world, is not his concern: “discussing government and politics is vain.”³⁶ Tsukamoto’s avoidance of political issues, however, was partly rooted in his (paradoxically) this-worldly concern with the growth of Christianity on Japanese soil: “I have things I want to say but I don’t think it is a good idea to speak up. I have no fear of losing my life but I don’t want Christianity which has grown thus far to be rooted out.”³⁷ This concern was ironically shared by other Protestants who belonged to the United Church of Christ in Japan, with whom *mukyōkai* Christians like Tsukamoto disagreed about the necessity of Christian institutions. The majority of the United Protestants rendered support to the government because they wished to protect and preserve the existing members of the Church and also to disseminate their Christianity on the conquered lands.³⁸

The reverse side of Tsukamoto’s retreat into the sphere of religion is the dearth of active engagement with public issues. For example, Tsukamoto did not hesitate to express his incomprehension at ideological slogans such as *bakkō-ichiu* (the eight corners of the universe under one roof) and the construction of *daitōa shinchitsujo* (the New Order in Great East Asia). He often wrote that because he was not a politician, he did not understand these political ideas fully. Since Tsukamoto was a man of religion, he believed he ought to devote himself to nothing other than religious missions, just as a politician should devote himself to nothing other than political affairs.

However, Tsukamoto’s self-enclosure in the religious world and his separation of politics and religion did not lead to political apathy; on the

³⁵ “Aikokusha no Kanban wo Orosu,” in *Tsukamoto*, 7: 483–85.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7: 486.

³⁷ “Aru Beikokujin tonō Taiwa,” in *Tsukamoto*, 3: 32.

³⁸ See, for example, Dōshisha Daigaku Jinbunkagaku Kenkyūsho, ed., *Senjika Teikō no Kenkyū*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1978).

contrary, many of his religious essays rendered support for the government's belligerent and imperialist policies. Discovering the origin of the *hakkō-ichiu* ideology in the ancient imperial tradition, he was proud of the traditional Japanese imperial ideals. Tsukamoto thus wondered how to fulfill such a great idea and how it relates to the Christian eschatological ideal of peace.³⁹ Likewise, Tsukamoto observed that the essence of the ideal of the New Order in Great East Asia was what Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki called "moral co-existence and co-prosperity." Thus, Tsukamoto argued that "if this war is a crusading movement to rescue the East Asian nations from Western exploitation and to restore liberty, equality and peace that have long been lost, Japan bears a duty to represent herself as the true model of the moral state."⁴⁰ In turning Japan into a "moral state" Tsukamoto found a great mission for Christians. Tsukamoto endorsed the "great ideals" of the Japanese government and sought to discern the way in which Christians could contribute to their realization.

When the war was turning against Japan after 1943, Tsukamoto increasingly stressed the importance of raising the moral standard of the nation "provided that the Great East Asian War (*dai tōa sensō*) is a moral war and a holy war."⁴¹ "Japan, which fights moral wars and desires to be the leader of a cluster of moral states in East Asia, must be invincible not only militarily but also morally."⁴² He preached that Japan's victory must not be just military but moral. Accordingly he identified the United States and Britain as military and moral/religious enemies. Tsukamoto wrote that the war made Japanese Christians realize that Japanese Christianity had been "almost Americanized"; therefore, he calls for the (Anglo-American) liberalism which poisoned Japanese Christianity to be destroyed.⁴³

In arguing so, Tsukamoto assimilated the language of the ideology that the government attempted to disseminate through various channels including mass communication and public education. "Moral wars" and "moral states" are key terms in the political lexicon used by the ideologues of Japanese imperialism. Japanese morality was in binary opposition to modern Anglo-American liberalism. Japanese imperialists such as Kōyama Iwao and Saitō Tadashi argued that "morality" consists in controlling the individual's egoistic desires which would otherwise bring about personal disas-

³⁹ "Hakkō Ichiu," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 171–73.

⁴⁰ "Saisho no Mondai," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 176.

⁴¹ "Inori to Senryoku Zōkyō," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 221. Also "Erimaki wo Otoshite," in *Tsukamoto* 4: 117.

⁴² "Futatsu no Tatakai," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 190–91.

⁴³ "Warera no Eibei Gekimetsu," in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 183.

ters and public strife.⁴⁴ At the heart of Anglo-American liberalism was licentiousness. Anglo-American political concepts such as “freedom and equality” veil a selfish pursuit of British and American interests. Japanese imperialist ideologues asserted that the ideal of the New Order in Great East Asia aimed at emancipating the nations in the Order by eradicating the Anglo-American forces of invasion and exploitation.⁴⁵ Tsukamoto assimilated the language of “moral wars” and “moral states” without scrutinizing their ideological underpinnings and instead tried to adapt himself to the political situation by enquiring into the roles Christians like himself could play towards the “victory” of such a “morality.”

As the result of his assimilation of the imperialist language, he viewed Japan’s war with China essentially as a war against the Western powers. Tsukamoto writes:

The (Japanese) imperial troops’ rapid progress in conquering major Chinese cities is naturally astonishing to the Europeans and Americans. . . . We are engaged with a war that involves the whole nation. We Christians too have to fight our wars. . . . Of course, our weapons are neither cannons nor fighters but the Bible, prayer and the love of Christ. Indeed, with these weapons, we must conquer China.⁴⁶

When he wrote this, the plain fact that Japan was engaged in a military conflict with China escaped his attention. Clearly Tsukamoto regarded Japan’s war only in the context of the opposition to “European and American civilization” and failed to observe the actual use of violence against the Chinese people. His understanding of the conflict in China was so abstract that it curiously lacked a sense of reality.

The reason why Tsukamoto responded to the “nation’s crisis (*hijōji*)” in such a way is not merely his political naïveté. Tsukamoto firmly believed that at the root of all problems, political, social, moral or otherwise, lies the problem of the soul. It is “the first problem” that needs to be tackled. “The question of the soul is the question of sins—human’s first and last problem.” From this he inferred: “all the problems will be solved by solving

⁴⁴ Eisawa Kōji, “*Daitōakyōeiken*” no *Shisō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1995), ch. 5.

⁴⁵ On wartime Japan’s attempt to eradicate Western cultural influences including “evil” Western liberalism, see Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 141–43.

⁴⁶ *Seisho Chishiki* 103.7 (1938), the reverse side of front cover, cited in Fujita, ed., *Uchimura Kanzō wo Keishōshita Hitobito*, 2: 113.

the problem of the soul.” The soul belongs to each and every individual. Hence all the problems, political, social, economic, moral or otherwise, were reduced by Tsukamoto to the problem of individual souls.⁴⁷ Tsukamoto thus demanded that his readers consider their “problem of the soul” *before* discussing public issues.⁴⁸

This reduction presupposed the continuity of “all problems” at all levels from an individual’s private sphere to the transcendental. The problem of international relations is reduced to the problem of a state; the problem of a state is reduced to the problem of a family; and the problem of a family is reduced to the problem of an individual. But since the salvation of an individual’s soul is deemed to be the radical solution for all problems, the above continuous reduction can also be reversed. The salvation of each individual soul is the salvation of a family; the salvation of families is the salvation of a state and the salvation of states is the salvation of the world, and all this leads to eternal peace in the city of God. Therefore, Tsukamoto concluded: “I hope that every one of you will not deceive yourself, stand in front of living God and solve the problem of your relationship to Him; *then, all other problems will be solved naturally*,” (italics mine).⁴⁹

This optimism determined Tsukamoto’s idea of patriotism. He argued that Christians belonged to two “cities”: one is Japan and the other is the city of God. The issue for Tsukamoto was whether the love of one “city” is identical to the love of the other. His view was that “if the love of the earthly city is deep and great, it will be perfectly identical to the love of the city of God.”⁵⁰ This conclusion was derived from his reductionism. Tsukamoto rejected the Roman Catholic view that the Church is a perfect society. Christ did not try to create a city of God on earth; his ideal was to create righteous men and women who loyally obey God. Tsukamoto’s perspective on Christian individualism which magnifies the problem of an individual’s sinfulness provides him with a paradigm to maintain that “to love one’s country is exactly the same as loving the city of God. Indeed, the better Japanese you are, the better Christian you are; and the better Christian you are, the better Japanese you are.”⁵¹ Tsukamoto’s argument is somewhat muddled here; however, the point is that his radical reduction of everything to the issue of an individual’s sin allowed him to consider all the problems

⁴⁷ “Saisho no Mondai,” in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 177.

⁴⁸ “Mazu Reikon Mondai kara,” in *Tsukamoto*, 4: 179.

⁴⁹ “Aikokusha no Kanban wo Orosu,” in *Tsukamoto*, 7: 492.

⁵⁰ “Warera no Aikoku,” in *Tsukamoto*, 7: 507.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 7: 508.

of individuals, the problems of the “this-worldly” community and the problems of the city of God to be one and the same.

Tsukamoto added that love is twofold: one is love as a natural impulse and the other is love as a duty. The former is conditioned by reciprocity while the latter is absolute. The former is self-centered while the latter is selfless. The love of country is the former, love as a natural impulse; however, as it evolves, it goes beyond the world of relativity to reach the level of absolute love.⁵² Clearly Tsukamoto’s continuous cosmology is paradigmatic to the idea of patriotism; the greatest and deepest love of country will correspond to the love of the city of God.

Tsukamoto’s patriotism was thus markedly characterized by apolitical “individualism.” He conceded that he might not be a patriot since he only preaches the gospel and does not discuss diplomacy or government. However, he writes: “If it is true to say, as the Bible states, ‘unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labor in vain. Unless the Lord guards the city, the guard keep watch in vain,’ I, too, love my country.”⁵³ Referring implicitly to the aborted *coup d’état* by young ultra-nationalists on February 26, 1936, Tsukamoto wrote about the importance of knowledge of current affairs in relation to Manchuria, China, and the United States. Nonetheless, Tsukamoto asserted that “of greater importance is to recognize one’s own sins.” Referring to James 4.1 (“Those conflicts and disputes among you, where do they come from? Do they come from your cravings that are at war within you?”), Tsukamoto attributed all the evils in individuals, societies, and states to the sins of each individual.⁵⁴ Indeed, “the sins of a country are the sins of individual countrymen. . . . Sins do not belong to a country but to its individuals.”⁵⁵ Tsukamoto’s individual reductionism prevented him from confronting specific “sins” of any human society or state; rather, he turned his attention to his own sins. Tsukamoto’s “individualism” was clearly the refuge from engagement with public, non-religious issues.

II. YANAIHARA TADAO

Like Tsukamoto, Yanaihara also published his own newsletter to promote *mukyōkai* Christianity. He launched *Tsūshin* (*Correspondence*) in 1932;

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “Watashi wa Fukuin wo Kataru,” in *Tsukamoto*, 3: 374.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3: 374–75.

⁵⁵ “Hatashite Dareno Tsumi zoya,” in *Tsukamoto*, 3: 400.

its publication was discontinued in 1937. The following year, Yanaihara launched a new monthly magazine *Kashin* (*Belief that Pleases God*), which acquired some 1,000 subscribers.⁵⁶ This publication was censored repeatedly and was banned officially in December 1944; however, Yanaihara continued printing it underground. Unlike Tsukamoto, Yanaihara refused to professionalize his Christian mission. He insisted on being a layman. His chosen profession was, as previously mentioned, research and teaching in international economics at the university. His social scientific work revolved around the critical analysis of Japanese colonial policy, which displeased those of his colleagues with a nationalist predilection. Yanaihara's literary output is immense and wide-ranging; most of it was collected and published in 29 volumes. In addition to several monographs on colonial policy, he wrote a number of books in defense of Christianity against both nationalist/Shintoist and Marxist attacks. He also produced many commentaries of the Bible and numerous polemical essays for a wider audience. Whereas Tsukamoto specialized in Christian apologetics, Yanaihara may be aptly described as a public intellectual who happened to be a Christian preacher.

For the sake of comparison, I would like to begin with an examination of Yanaihara's view on the question that absorbed Tsukamoto during the war: that is, what role a Christian should play in this time of national crisis. Yanaihara tackled the question in his public address, entitled "Is religion private or public?" at Tokyo Imperial University in 1935.⁵⁷ He argued that, from the late nineteenth century, religion has increasingly become individualistic and private. Yanaihara recognized the positive contribution of liberal individualism which defended freedom of belief from state intervention. However, he also pointed out that liberal individualism, which had a tendency to overemphasize the privacy of religious belief, separated religion from public, political issues, thereby generating political apathy among religious people. Thus nowadays many men and women of religious faith would say: "Whether society is under tyrannical rule or not is, after all, merely a business of *this* world. But *I* am redeemed."⁵⁸ Yanaihara argued that this privatization made religion powerless in terms of being "the driving force for social progress."⁵⁹

Yanaihara rejected religion's irrelevance to public issues. He asserted: "Religion is private because it is spiritual. It cannot be swayed by this-

⁵⁶ "Watashi no Ayundekita Michi," in *Yanaihara*, 26: 49.

⁵⁷ "Shūkyō wa Kojintekika Shakaitekika," in *Yanaihara*, 18: 233–40.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 18: 238.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

worldly power because it is spiritual. Precisely because of this, religion judges, but cannot be judged by, this world. Religion is the power that judges and criticizes this world.”⁶⁰ Hence, one cannot separate politics from religion so as to be apathetic toward the “contradictions of modern society.” On the contrary, contemporary issues such as unemployment and international conflicts can be viewed and judged from a religious perspective. “What is imperialism, which is the cause of wars, in the eyes of God? This is also a question of religion.”⁶¹ Yanaihara was therefore critical of the view that the role of religion in times of war is limited to consoling and aiding men and women lest they should be in despair and sorrow. The contrast with Tsukamoto’s retreat into the private study of the Bible is obvious.

Yanaihara did not merely preach this; he translated what he preached into action. His judgment on contemporary Japanese politics is succinctly and systematically expressed in his controversial 1937 essay, “Ideals of a State.” The issue of *Chūō Kōron*, a leading magazine on current affairs, which included the essay, circulated only after Yanaihara’s article was removed. Another public address of the same year at a gathering of *mukyōkai* Christians concluded with a remark: “Please let us bury this country.” This statement, which came to the attention of the Special Higher Police, triggered Yanaihara’s *de facto* expulsion from Tokyo Imperial University.

Yanaihara’s argument in “Ideals of a State” is easy to summarize. The first paragraph of the essay epitomizes his position:

When the behavior of a state is actually confused, one reflects on the ideals of the state and, when the state is actually mad, one thinks of an ideal state. This is not an escape from reality but a leap that is required to attempt to critique the reality powerfully.⁶²

Yanaihara insisted that the driving force for a critique of political reality is “ideals.” One must envisage “ideals” to criticize and guide reality and the greater the ideal is, the more powerful the critique would become. Yanaihara then asserted that the ideals of the state are justice and peace. Internally, it is social justice and externally it is international justice, which is peace.⁶³ The duties of a citizen, therefore, are not only to abide by the law of the state but also to contribute to the realization of the ideals of the state. In

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Shūkyō wa Kojintekika Shakaitekika,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 240.

⁶² “Kokka no Risō,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 623.

⁶³ Ibid., 18: 626–31.

arguing so, Yanaihara attacked the chauvinistic and belligerent policies of the Japanese government.

In this context, Yanaihara revealed his idea of patriotism: a patriot is “not someone who ingratiates himself with the policies of the powers that be but the one who loves, and is loyal to, the ideals of the state.”⁶⁴ “True patriotism does not consist in blind obedience to contemporary policies; rather, a prophet who resists blind obedience and criticizes the reality in the light of the ideals of the state is a patriot who leads the long-term policies of the state.”⁶⁵ “True patriotism is not expressed in such sentiments as ‘my country is right.’ It is what demands repentance to the nation and builds the state on the foundation of divine justice and morality. . . . Those who pray for the national interest, not for national morality, are not true patriots.”⁶⁶

Yanaihara’s patriotism is clearly loyalty to divine justice, which judges the affairs of the “this-worldly city.” He illustrates this idea of patriotism by the example of Isaiah in the Old Testament. However, his essay “Ideals of a State” does not make frequent references to Christian sources, since the article was written for the general public, not for a specifically Christian audience. Nonetheless, it is evident that the source of the “ideals” was for Yanaihara nothing but God, and the justice he had in mind was divine justice revealed in Scripture. In one of his short essays published in his newsletter *Tsūshin*, Yanaihara clearly stated that “someone who loves the justice of God is a true patriot.”⁶⁷ He also wrote elsewhere: “to love a country by means of Christianity is true patriotism.”⁶⁸ Yanaihara’s source of patriotism was undoubtedly the Old Testament, the books of Isaiah and Jeremiah in particular. His biblical commentaries emphasized the patriotic character of the prophets.⁶⁹

Yanaihara’s reading of Isaiah as a true patriot was probably inherited from his master Uchimura Kanzō. In 1909, Uchimura criticized the Japanese Christians’ partiality to the New Testament. One of the reasons why he considered the Old Testament to be equally important was that “it is indispensable in nourishing patriotism.” Uchimura wrote that Japanese Christians neglected the Old Testament because their faith was too individ-

⁶⁴ Ibid., 18: 633.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 18: 642.

⁶⁶ “Hiai no Hito,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 536–37.

⁶⁷ “Nisan no Jissai Mondai to Kirisutokyō,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 206.

⁶⁸ “Minzoku to Heiwa,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 218.

⁶⁹ See *Yanaihara*, vols. 12 and 13. Also his biography of Isaiah and Jeremiah in his two-volume *The Men I Admire*: see above n. 22.

ualistic to pay due attention to the salvation of a nation state. The Old Testament, according to him, is the book about how God saved various nations. Uchimura thus described Moses, Isaiah, and Jeremiah as the “most solemn patriots,” thereby regarding the Old Testament as the greatest source of patriotism.⁷⁰

Following his master’s view faithfully, Yanaihara argued that to love divine justice is to love an earthly state. However, he never reversed the order; he never argued that to love one’s country is to love divine justice. Love of God leads to love of country but not the other way round. The earthly state can only be judged in the light of the justice of the city of God and such critical judgment is the manifestation of true patriotism.

According to Yanaihara, the patriotic judgment of earthly powers must be concrete and specific. “When the Truth one embraces is an abstract concept, one will face no persecution—one may even acquire a share of this-worldly honor and happiness. This-worldly pleasure and theological ideas are not mutually exclusive because discussing sins in general creates no enemies.” “However,” he asserted, “the Truth is real and concrete and requires specific contents and applications. As soon as one applies the Truth to a real problem, one confronts oppression.”⁷¹ “If I point out ‘your sins’ I face your anger immediately.” Hence, “one who lives the Truth concretely bears a cross inevitably.”⁷² Thus Yanaihara’s patriotism anticipated, and indeed resulted in, persecution from this-worldly powers.

Yanaihara’s inclination towards a concrete and specific understanding of social and political phenomena urged him to put a question mark over the whole idea of the “East Asian Community” which was widely propagated as the post-Manchuria relationship between China and Japan. Yanaihara wrote that the principle that underpinned the “East Asian Community” is reportedly “cooperation, not conquest.” Yanaihara commented:

This is a conceptually correct argument (how many laudable slogans have been announced since the Manchurian Incident!); however, one must examine the following two key questions *in order to consider its practical viability*: First, is the “East Asian Commu-

⁷⁰ *Uchimura Kanzō Zenshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 16: 306–8. Also *Uchimura Kanzō Zenshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983), 29: 351–52. Compare Tsukamoto’s “individualism” and his partiality to the New Testament.

⁷¹ “Hiain no Hito,” in *Yanaihara*, 18: 538.

⁷² *Ibid.*

nity” going to open its door to the various activities of Europeans and Americans in China? Or, is it designed to form an enclosed bloc? Second, the spiritual foundations of the “East Asian Community” must consist in the genuine concord between Chinese and Japanese but what is planned for the eradication of skepticism and resentment and the generation of concord?⁷³ (emphasis mine)

Yanaihara stated elsewhere: “the meaning of words is filled by action.”⁷⁴ His pragmatic mindset prevented him from endorsing readily the government’s vision of the “*Hakkō-ichiu*” and the “Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In this respect, too, Yanaihara’s contrast with Tsukamoto is obvious: as mentioned earlier, Tsukamoto’s grasp of reality was so abstract that he failed to grasp the plain fact that the war Japan was waging at that stage was against China, not the United States or Britain, under the auspices of the construction of the “Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

Clearly, Yanaihara’s appeal to divine justice was not divorced from his empirical observations of political reality. As he recalled in later years, his “academic work and faith became one and the same” to confront reality.⁷⁵ Yanaihara’s academic research at Tokyo Imperial University, which was prematurely terminated in 1937, was devoted to the economic theory of colonialism and case studies of Japanese colonialism in Manchuria, Taiwan, and the South Pacific. Yanaihara’s critical analyses of Japanese colonial policy had revealed its economic irrationality and aggressive exploitation of the colonies.⁷⁶ In light of his academic background, it becomes clear why Yanaihara insisted on the importance of understanding ideas such as “East Asia community” and “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” *in concrete and specific terms*. However, one cannot overlook that his empirically-based critical studies of Japanese colonialism would later

⁷³ “Saimatsu Zakki,” in *Yanaihara*, 25: 621–22.

⁷⁴ Yanaihara Tadao, *Senjika Matsumoto Shinnen Kōenshū* (Tokyo: Shinchi Shobō, 1990), 17.

⁷⁵ “Watashi no Ayundekita Michi,” in *Yanaihara*, 26: 47.

⁷⁶ The first monograph on this in English is Susan C. Townsend, *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy* (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2000). See Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitude toward Colonialism,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80–127, esp., 114–18 for a critical view of Yanaihara’s work on colonial policy. Also Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 59–62; Asada Kyōji, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyūshi Ron* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1990); Yonetami Masafumi, “Yanaihara Tadao no Shokumin Shakai Seisaku Ron,” *Shisō* 945 (2003): 138–53.

take the form of public dissent by virtue of his powerful sense of public justice which was sharpened by his Christian faith. Yanaihara's attack on the government resulted from the *union* of his social scientific knowledge of political reality and his faith. Therefore, Yanaihara's patriotism may be best described as the manifestation of judgment on public issues based on both "political realism and Christian faith."⁷⁷

III. CONCLUSION

The comparison between Tsukamoto and Yanaihara's discourses on patriotism has shown that the privatization of religious faith makes it impotent in relation to earthly powers. This is precisely the point that Yanaihara criticized most severely. Indeed, judging social and political phenomena in the light of revealed truth was at the heart of Yanaihara's patriotism. However, overemphasizing the public role of religious faith is perhaps too simplistic when we examine Yanaihara's idea of patriotism. Religiously passionate engagement with public affairs alone does not characterize Yanaihara's patriotism: it was supported by his empirical analysis of social and political reality. We have seen that Yanaihara's academic work in the field of colonial policy provided him with the social scientific understanding of the Japanese government's actions that lay behind the ideological rationalization of the war in China. In this respect, too, the contrast with Tsukamoto is more than obvious: Tsukamoto's lack of engagement with public issues did not lead to apathy but rather to an uncritical assimilation of the "moralized" language of contemporary imperialist ideology. Seen in this light, Yanaihara's patriotism consists of both analytical and normative judgments: his social scientific knowledge provided him with the empirical understanding of government policy, and his faith sharpened his normative judgment. His judgment of social and political reality was not an arbitrary application of a subjective reading of revealed truth but was firmly grounded in a social scientific understanding of reality.

Yanaihara's idea of patriotism offers us four significant viewpoints for the current debate on patriotism: first, the prophetic form of patriotism such as Yanaihara's must be accompanied by a religious commitment to confront persecution. More specifically, Yanaihara's patriotic protest against Japanese imperialism was anchored in what Max Weber once called

⁷⁷ Nakamura Katsumi, *Uchimura Kanzō to Yanaihara Tadao* (Tokyo: Libro, 1981), 210–11.

the “theodicy of passion [*Theodizee des Leidens*].”⁷⁸ We have seen that despite his love of peace, which he inherited from his master Uchimura, Tsukamoto’s fear of persecution stopped him from actively opposing Japan’s wars. Yanaihara, by contrast, asserted: “I will say to my audience publicly what I believe I must for the sake of truth. Even if I will be subject to condemnation or persecution as a result of this, I will neither excuse myself nor resist.”⁷⁹ His overcoming fear would have been impossible without the powerful sense of religious duty. The role of religious faith in this respect should not be underestimated. Second, patriotism as loyalty is not enough. The loyalty to the “universal principles of liberal democracy and human rights” or the “free polity” ought to be couched in the rigorous empirical observations of political and social reality. Patriotism without this analytical judgment could easily be tamed by tyranny which is disguised in, and armed with, the language of “universal values” or “republican liberty.” The conceptualization of patriotism must be built upon a sound theory of political judgment.

Third, Yanaihara’s emphasis on Christian justice did not preclude the non-Christian Japanese past; on the contrary, he attempted to discover predecessors in Japanese history who judged this world in light of the “Truth.” In *The Men I Admire*, in which Yanaihara describes the types of individual whom he would like to see in the Japan of this time, he did not enumerate Christians alone; he included, for example, Nichiren, a Buddhist thinker of the thirteenth century. In this selection of biographical accounts, which was a disguised form of dissent, Yanaihara wrote: “Nichiren saw supreme authority in the dharma. The dharma is the truth. . . . passionate patriotism was burning in his blood. . . . He loved his country in light of the dharma; he did not love the dharma in the light of the country.”⁸⁰ His presentation of Nichiren as a patriot is strikingly similar to that of Isaiah. Yanaihara thus argued that the assertion of the superiority of the truth to earthly powers was not foreign to the Japanese intellectual tradition, thus anchoring his idea of patriotism in Japanese history.⁸¹ Yanaihara’s appeal to divine justice

⁷⁸ See especially Max Weber, *Das Antike Judentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie III* (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1921).

⁷⁹ “Ikusa no Ato,” in *Yanaihara*, 26: 104.

⁸⁰ “Yo no Sonkei suru Jinbutsu,” in *Yanaihara*, 24: 84, 90. Uchimura, too, included Nichiren in his biographical work in English, *Japan and the Japanese* (1894) (*Uchimura Kanzō Zenshū* [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982], 3: 169–297). However, Uchimura did not delineate Nichiren as a patriot.

⁸¹ Yanaihara’s presentation of Nichiren is diametrically opposed to some contemporary Buddhist interpretations of him. Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939), for example, interpreted Nichiren as an ultra-nationalist who upheld the supremacy of the national polity. On this, see Edwin B. Lee, “Nichiren and Nationalism: The Religious Patriotism of Tanaka

differed from loyalty to a set of “universal values” that are dissociated from the past of his nation. Fourth and finally, Yanaihara’s polemics illustrate that patriotism and pacifism are not mutually exclusive. Patriotism can take a variety of forms; it cannot be reduced to the glorification of dying for country. Instead, Yanaihara’s patriotism judges earthly states by virtue of the ideal of international justice, that is, peace. This is a clear antithesis not only to the militaristic nationalism of his own times but also to early modern republican patriotism, the chauvinism and belligerence of which have been downplayed by Viroli.

After the end of war, Tsukamoto continued his private study of the Bible, writing and publishing his newsletters and traveling for public speeches. Among his disciples was Sekine Masao (1912–2000), arguably the greatest expert on Old Testament studies in post-war Japan. However, Tsukamoto’s name has long sunk into oblivion beyond small circles of *mukyōkai* Christians. Yanaihara, by contrast, emerged in post-war Japan as a public intellectual who led post-war Japanese liberal democracy and pacifism and also as the leader of Japanese academism after his return to the University of Tokyo. His influence on the Japanese public, however, was exercised mainly in his capacity as President of the University of Tokyo rather than in his capacity as a Christian preacher. Half a century is about to pass since his death. Yanaihara’s work has not attracted due attention in modern scholarship on Japanese history. Today, the voice of Christians including *mukyōkai* Christians on social and political issues such as patriotism is rarely heard in the public arena. What does this mean for the future of Japanese patriotism? We have yet to find out.

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Chigaku,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 30 (1975): 19–35. Also Ruben L. Habito, “The Uses of Nichiren in Modern Japanese History,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 26 (1999): 423–39.