The Reluctant Mediator

Today, more than at any time previously, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires active mediation. Two years of ceaseless violence have shown that Israelis and Palestinians cannot peacefully manage their conflicting interests. The escalating violence in the Middle East threatens not only regional stability but also other U.S. interests. The conflict fuels protests, demonstrations, and anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the Arab world. The situation also distracts the attention of senior U.S. decisionmakers who would otherwise focus more heavily on key foreign policy priorities—such as the broader war on terrorism and the campaign against Iraq.

The last two-and-a-half years have shown that U.S. involvement is necessary but not sufficient to contain the viciousness of the conflict. When Washington abstains from negotiations, powerful centrifugal forces jeopardize broader U.S. interests and demand immediate attention. U.S. involvement alone, however, is not enough. The failure of Camp David II in July 2000 revealed that, even when fully involved, the United States cannot single-handedly coax the two parties toward peace. Other outside parties, including the Europeans, Saudis, and Egyptians, have leverage that they must bring to bear.

Although the need for outside intervention is apparent, the barriers to finding a solution are rising. Trust between Palestinians and Israelis has eroded. Sixteen percent of Palestinians support Hamas, a fundamentalist organization that supports an extensive network of social services and is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. ¹ This support has increased by nearly 50 percent from the pre-Camp David II period. Islamic groups in general receive a total of 25 percent of the population's support. In May 2002, 52 percent of Palestinians supported suicide bombings, a decrease from 58 percent in December 2001.Three years earlier, 39 percent had strongly opposed these actions. ² Israeli support for violent action against Palestinians has jumped as well. After the Passover bombing in March 2002, 71 percent of Israelis supported their government's intense military operation in the West Bank.

The Bush administration seems finally to have recognized that U.S.-led international involvement is necessary. After the administration's initial aversion to intervention, it now "stands ready" to work "intensively" toward resolving the conflict. ³ Still missing, however, is the game plan. President George W. Bush's speech on June 24, 2002, did not lay out a course of action for moving from the current situation to the articulated goals of establishing a Palestinian state. The president called for reform of Palestinian institutions without articulating how that could be accomplished. No inducements were proffered to facilitate its outcome.

Similarly, no reference was made to the proposed international summit or to the all-important quartet—a group comprising the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), Russia, and the United States. ⁴ The administration would be wise to reconsider the role of the quartet and support Secretary of State Colin Powell's efforts to mobilize it because its use is the only way to lock in the international support necessary to resolve the conflict.

More than Just the United States

Recent U.S. administrations have tried to distance themselves at one time or another from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with little success. President George H. W. Bush's secretary of state, James Baker, offered the White House telephone number to both parties in the conflict, chiding, "When you're serious about peace, call us." President Bill Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, echoed, "I will come back [to the Middle East] whenever the leaders have made hard decisions, but I am not going to come back here to tread water." The current Bush team entered office determined to avoid involvement.

The current president shunned a mediating role largely because of Clinton's unsuccessful legacy. If Clinton, with his intimate knowledge of the issues, his carefully crafted personal relationships, and his seemingly special interest in the region, could not steer the parties toward resolution, Bush seemed unlikely to achieve any better. The administration tirelessly tried to keep the...