The New Normalcy

The future has far too much imagination. To face it, fragments of the past are used as flashlights for the unpredictable events that loom ahead. Once in a while, however, the batteries run out and the observer is left in the dark. A decade ago, the fall of the Soviet empire was said to be one such moment. That claim was exaggerated. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet collapse had often been envisioned as part of the future. Sadly, believing it unthinkable said more about us than about our then-adversary.

When friends abroad were invited to outline their preferences of the U.S. role in the world for the coming years in The Washington Quarterly's "Through the Looking Glass" section last summer, they provided a surprisingly coherent vision--a vision that conveyed more about their respective national or regional perspectives than about the United States and its own aspirations. That all found the United States to be at least "first among equals" was hardly surprising. Yet, some praised its "unconditional viability" as a "virtual buffer state" in areas of regional conflicts, while others complained of the "unbearable lightness" of a leadership that places "too much emphasis on threat perception" and expects too many "quick results that will not be delivered." With most foreign observers, if not all, in agreement that "competition as equals is out of the question," a competition seemed to ensue for privileged status. Thus, regional viceroys or even "global partners" were identified to balance a dangerous unilateralist temptation--a tendency "to confuse briefings for consultation." ¹

Most foreign observers of U.S. policies in the world, critics and well-wishers alike, understood clearly that, at their best, U.S. policies are "honest" (meaning the United States is an "honest broker") but not disinterested. Call it "unconditional primacy" and pray for it to be prudent, attentive, watchful, flexible, sensitive, and more. Otherwise, rejoice that if "what is right is in U.S. interests," what is good for the United States will be right for the world (or at least, according to Barry Rubin, for the Middle East)--even if occasionally "less is more" (or at least, added Dmitri Trenin, for Russia). In either case, there could be no escape from, or for, the last great power left standing at the end of the twentieth century and thus bound to lead at the start of the twenty-first century. In the absence of any credible counterweight among those who view such sustained U.S. leadership "with either ambivalence or outright disdain," the few available counterparts could only aspire to small, supportive roles. Thus, "interpreters of the Asian mind" and "special allies" in Europe that "appreciate U.S. purposes and power" could be "forces for stability in world politics."

When "Through the Looking Glass" was written, the events of September 11 had not yet occurred--nor could they be anticipated, as they were truly unprecedented. Now, the future seems to have been fundamentally altered, but the nature of these alterations is not yet clear. A year after the departure of President Bill Clinton, a new normalcy belies the best that was expected of the past decade and the worst that was anticipated for the new one.

False Starts and New Beginnings

Even under conditions of constitutional normalcy, which were lacking in November 2000, presidential transitions are moments of enthralling chaos and flawed certainties, as the nation's agenda forces a new president away from his campaign rhetoric and even, on occasion, his personal convictions. Especially in the context of foreign and security policy, patterns of change and continuity ignore the electoral calendar, and predictions made during such transitions are, therefore, often misleading. Indeed, despite a combative rhetoric of dissent, continuity from one president to the next is usually the norm; significant changes are most likely to occur within each presidential administration.

In other words, every president becomes what he did not want to be. Since 1945, the pattern has periodically repeated. President Harry Truman initially had limited postwar...