Abstract

While central to most aspects of early Christianity, the concept of belief has itself received little attention. In this essay, the author challenges a common distinction between belief and practice and argues that belief itself functions, not simply as a private mental act, but as a complex social performance. Recent anthropological treatments confirm what Augustine, in De utilitate credendi, suggests: believing depends crucially on some form of recognition from one's fellows. Attention to this dynamic allows for a more amplified conception of belief, which stresses the continuity between thought and action, admits of highly textured "modalities" of believing, and helps explain the behavior of multiple sides in theological debates. As a case in point, the early Pelagian controversy illustrates how agents employ various strategies of accommodation—even at the risk of appearing inconsistent or duplicitous—in order to maintain the very ground of belief, i.e., the apparent expectation of a larger body with whom one is in consensus.

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