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The Washington Quarterly 24.3 (2001) 145-153



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Balance from Beyond the Sea

Michael Stürmer


What kind of a world does the United States wish to have? People in Washington ask that question continuously. The answer has always been, instinctively, that the best of all possible worlds would be one that resembles God's own country. On close inspection, however, a world full of Americas and Americans would detract from the uniqueness of the United States. The world would also have plenty of strong egos, full-throttle consumption, and an excess of Manifest Destiny--perhaps somewhat less than paradise-on-Earth. U.S. narcissism has always been coupled with incredulity over the existence of countries that do not wish to be like the United States.

With the arrival of a new administration in Washington's hallowed halls, the rest of the world asks more pertinent questions: what U.S. policies are desirable and how can the world affect them? Because Washington habitually does not pay excessive attention to non-U.S. desires anyway, contradictory and self-serving as they must surely be, the chances of their wishes being granted may be as unlikely as finding a genie in a bottle. For, inside the Beltway, there are no genies, and beyond the shores of North America, there are not too many deserving recipients of three wishes. Nevertheless, formulating reasonable expectations may be more than just another exercise in academic futility, as it helps identify roles and responsibilities between the United States and other countries, those that are friendlier as well as more dependent.

Present at the Creation

Germany has been lucky; the genie granted most of its wishes about the United States. Germany is, and has been for the best part of the last five decades, [End Page 145] the focus of U.S. attention on the European continent. Germany was the chief prize of the Cold War since the first Berlin crisis in 1948-1949, the locus of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) deployment from 1979 to 1987, a reluctant "partner in leadership" (Bush pere) in 1989, the economic heavyweight among the European Union (EU), and the central country for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) stabilizing role in Europe and beyond.

For a united Germany, even more than for the divided Germany of the Cold War, the United States' most important function is as the balancer from beyond the sea--not only in terms of residual Russian nuclear potential but, even more important, in terms of the collective psyche of European countries. With the United States continuing to be a "European power," as Richard Holbrooke has stated, all the imbalances, uncertainties, and nightmares of Europe are manageable. Without the United States, the ghosts from the past would unpleasantly appear, enhanced by the fact that Germany is, by far, the largest economic player in Europe.

Today's Europe did not invent itself out of enlightened self-interest after the catastrophies of, as French president-in-exile Charles de Gaulle proclaimed in 1944, "la guerre de trente ans de notre siecle" (the thirty-years war of our century). Europe was created by the enlightened self-interest of the United States, a process that did not begin with NATO in 1949 but with the decision for "Europe first" in 1941. The creation continued at Bretton Woods in the fall of 1944, when the United States designed a global economic system based on the strength of the U.S. economy and the U.S. dollar. At a fixed exchange rate to bullion gold, U.S. currency became the anchor for the devastated currencies of Europe, including the deutschmark introduced in 1948. This grand design combined immediate U.S. interests with broader global interests. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up, together with the World Bank. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was designed to coordinate the rebuilding of liberal economies throughout Europe. In 1998, Josef Joffe identified the rationale of the U.S. role with the principle that "great powers remain great if they promote their own interests by serving those of others."

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