The Administration's Approach

The issue of ballistic missile defense has been debated in some form since the initial deployment of long-range ballistic missiles. It now arises in a new post-Cold War context in which the mission, the threat, the technology, and the overall strategic environment are all different. In the new context, new perspectives need be applied.

Why Consider a Limited National Missile Defense?

The United States and its allies face an emerging danger posed by developments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means for their delivery in states such as North Korea and Iran. In the next decade, these countries are likely to be able to field intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that could deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against the territory of the United States.

The strategic need for defenses against these threats from ballistic missiles arises not only from the terrible cost if ever employed, but also from the global interests--and commitments--of the United States to help friends and allies defend against aggression. In Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf regions we have strong commitments, vital interests, and deployed U.S. forces. These are the same regions where potential aggressors are developing ballistic missiles with ranges sufficient to reach the United States. Without defenses, potential aggressors might think the threat of strikes against U.S. cities could coerce the United States into failing to meet its commitments.

Why Not Deterrence Alone?

We will continue to seek to deter such attacks by the prospect of a prompt and overwhelming response--and to contain and reduce the threat by diplomacy and arms control measures. An effective defense, however, would be an important complement to these efforts because it would offer the prospect not only of devastating retaliation but also of failure of the initial attack itself. An attack would be not only fated, but futile. Thus, defenses would help the United States to retain--and be seen to retain--our freedom to respond to a regional crisis because they would negate the potential of regional aggressors with small, long-range missile forces to attack the U.S. homeland as a penalty for standing by our commitments. It is unnecessary to rely exclusively on deterrence by retaliation when we have the option of an effective, affordable defense against such weapons.

The utility of defense against such states does not depend on a judgment that their leaders may be utterly indifferent to the prospect of retaliation. Rather, it is based on a recognition that leaders of these isolated states might be prepared to use WMD--and risk retaliation--in circumstances where more traditional, or at least more cautious, leaders would not. Leaders such as Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-il have established records of indifference to the suffering of their own populations and they value regime survival above all.

Indeed, far from undermining deterrence, missile defenses complement overall deterrence by enhancing the credibility of the U.S. global security commitments to allies and friends. They would reduce the chance that aggressors would miscalculate and use their missiles to threaten strikes at the United States to prevent us from meeting our commitments.

What System Are We Developing?

The initial system would consist of 100 interceptors, based in Alaska, with radar support from upgrades of existing early-warning radars and a new X-Band radar in the Aleutians. The initial system would be optimized against the North Korean threat, but it would also have some capability against attacks from other directions. To meet the possibility of an increased, and more sophisticated, threat from the Middle East, we have also considered a second phase, with approximately 100 interceptors at a second site, as well as considerably increased radar and other sensor support.

It is important to emphasize the limited nature of the mission. National missile defense (NMD) is designed to counter a few tens of reentry vehicles. The vastly larger task of defending against an attack by a major nuclear...