Tehran's Tocsin

America's prospective development and implementation of a national missile defense system will provide countries targeted by the system intriguing diplomatic and military opportunities. This is especially true for Iran, one country that would be "targeted." Throughout Iran, a tocsin has sounded in response to the perceived threat of NMD.

Should Iran, regarded as one of the countries intent on developing a long-range missile and nonconventional capability, worry about this new U.S. initiative? If so, how might Iran react to the U.S. defense shield, if at all? At first glance, one may be forgiven for assuming that the two countries are already so far apart politically and geographically that such a deployment will not affect their rather strained bilateral relations. But Iran watchers will testify that Tehran actually does note, quite carefully and more systematically than most people care to know, what the United States does and what it says it is going to do in its foreign and strategic policies. The NMD then is likely to be of interest to Iran.

In the short term, Iran's response is likely to be heavy on rhetoric and light on concrete action. Although the rhetorical exchange between the two sides is unlikely to affect the slow pace of progress in bilateral relations, Tehran will probably use the NMD as a perfect opportunity to enhance its political-military relations with China, Russia, and North Korea. Short of political posturing, however, Tehran has no concrete military alternatives to explore as countermeasures.

Before embarking on an analysis of possible Iranian responses to the U.S. NMD deployment, it is appropriate to consider the basis of Iran's outlook toward the United States. It is true that the Islamic elite as a whole has little love for the U.S. way of life. Their responses thus far to U.S. actions, however, have been based less on ideological grounds and more on pragmatic and realistic calculations about the balance of power between the two at any one time. Iran has based much of its strategy toward the United States in political terms, not unlike other actors in the international system. Iran's pragmatic calculations toward the United States are driven by a widely shared perception.

Iran holds an almost paranoid and conspiratorial view of the United State's role and actions in the Middle East and sees almost every U.S. initiative as a direct or indirect assault on Iran's regional interests. Since the Cold War, the United States has been in strategic competition with Iran and is the main challenger in the Middle East and the Transcaspian region north of Iran. The view that the United States is Iran's main regional rival is shared by both the political elite and large sections of the military establishment.

For an oil-rich country like Iran, sitting in the middle of the two strategically important oil zones of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin, America's words and deeds, particularly in the defense and security realms, matter a great deal to those who will inform Tehran's strategic thinking.

NMD and Iran's Foreign and Defense Policy

Iran can explore several responses through its foreign policy. It can intensify its extremely slick charm offensive, by making noises of compromise on the status of the three islands in dispute with the United Arab Emirates, and effectively remove itself as a threat from the calculations of its Gulf Arab neighbors. In this way, Iran would politically remove one of the key rationales for the continuing U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and force the United States to rethink its Gulf Arab allies. Removing U.S. military forces from the region, of course, will be seen by the more forward-looking groups in Tehran as a way of reducing U.S. attention on Iran and as a way of minimizing the dangers of NMD emboldening the Pentagon to plan direct action against Tehran. Yet, these actions...