The Hellenic Origins of Unamuno’s Skepticism and Niebla’s Skeptical Parody of Cartesianism

This study examines some of the key references to skepticism in Unamuno’s writings as a prelude to a discussion of Niebla’s parody of Cartesianism. It argues that Niebla pays homage to many of the core principles of skepticism at the same time that it deflates the Cartesian notions of provisional doubt and objective certainty. While Miguel de Unamuno rejects skepticism’s goal of ataraxia, he finds in the skeptical tradition the tools to challenge the pretenses of dogmatic thinkers and to construct polemical stances in ways that allow him to avoid appearing dogmatic himself. Subjectivist thinkers since Montaigne have taken a marked interest in the rhetorical strategies, guiding principles, and goals of the ancient Greek skeptics. Unamuno’s assimilation of skepticism places him in close proximity to, if not squarely within, the subjectivist tradition of modern philosophy.