A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia

The attack on September 11 and the subsequent U.S. war on terrorism seemed to place the Saudi Arabia's government at the edge of a dangerous precipice. While the United States pressured the Saudi government to cooperate in the war on terrorism, Islamic opposition to the United States and its presence on Saudi soil grew. The SAIS Review invited five experts to participate in a dialogue on the internal stability of the Al-Saud regime. The five participants, Patrick Clawson, Eleanor Abdella Doumato, F. Gregory Gause, David E. Long, and Kevin Taecker, were each sent two opening questions to answer. Each participant then had a chance to read the others' responses and draft a second response, advancing the discussion by identifying answers as well as additional questions. [Begin Page 201]

 

Does government rule based on family and tribal linkages rely on a kind of national identity that can ultimately lead to a regime's downfall? Given the answer to this question, can the House of Saud, the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, withstand the domestic pressures undermining political stability in the country?

 

PATRICK CLAWSON: To Westerners, monarchy may seem like an anachronistic system destined to disappear with modernization. That is by no means an appropriate lens through which to judge the future of the Saudi ruling family. Three strong forces lend stability to the House of Saud.

First and foremost, Saudi Arabia is a profoundly religious country, and the ruling family has established a powerful religious legitimacy. Indeed, in many ways, power is shared between the royal family and the senior clergy (ulema); on some issues, the king has complete authority, though he would never dare to make a decision against the ulema on other issues, particularly on education, but even on some business matters. To be sure, the ulema can be critical of the royal family, but that in no way suggests they might want to see it overthrown. The ulema are profoundly conservative in the sense of being resistant to change, including change in the governing system. In addition, Wahhabi theology teaches that one must support, for better or for worse, the commander of the faithful, which in Saudi Arabia means the king. The general attitude among the clergy is that criticisms should be directed at each individual personally rather than fomenting unrest by undermining the royal family as a whole.

Second, the ruling family is well aware of what the future would hold were it to be overthrown. If the history of postmonarchical Iran and Iraq are anything to go by, the royal family would have to flee or be slaughtered. Even the less extreme cases of Egypt and Yemen suggest that the royal family would lose its wealth and all its social privileges. The Saudi royal family will not give up power easily. It will be prepared to use force to hold on, including physical suppression of its opponents. Underestimating its willingness to use force—or, for that matter, the willingness of any of the Arab ruling cliques to do likewise—would be a serious error.

Third, looking at the recent history of the region, middle classes have little reason to support the overthrow of the monarchy. Neither Iraq nor Iran has done so well since their monarchies were overthrown. Not only have the countries suffered, but more significantly, the professional and merchant classes have fared no better either. Indeed, it is a reasonable reading of history to suggest that the overthrow of monarchies in the Saudi neighborhood has led to bloody and terrible wars. Not only was that the experience of Iran and Iraq, but it was even the case in North Yemen, where the proclamation of which fifty thousand Egyptian troops intervened.

So there are strong reasons to expect the Saudi royal family to remain in power. And to contrast the ruling family to national identity is inappropriate. It is worth noting how hard Saudi Arabia has to work...