The UN 2001 Conference: A Useful Step Forward?

At the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms a large majority of states would almost certainly have supported a stronger and more comprehensive international Program of Action (PoA) than the one to which the conference parties finally agreed. ¹ But a potentially dominant coalition never properly mobilized. Moreover, the parties' strong desire for consensus allowed a cluster of states--most notably the Arab League, the United States, and China--to block several important commitments.

In light of this somewhat weak PoA, the value of the conference is open to debate. Was it worth all the effort? The 2001 UN Conference negotiating process reveals that complexity of issues to be addressed, and the resulting PoA reveals that key issues, such as controlling arms transfers and arms marking and tracing, require follow-up negotiation. Nevertheless, the Conference established important international principles and standards, providing a basis on which we can build. By organizing and fractionalizing the agenda for action, it focuses attention on areas for cooperative action as well as for further negotiation.

The Challenges of Developing an International Regime to Tackle Small Arms Proliferation

The challenges of controlling small arms holdings and flows are similar to those for all types of conventional arms. Basic international norms establish that states have a right to maintain conventional armed forces to defend themselves, and can decide for themselves what number and which types of weapons they require for this purpose. Arms control treaties, whereby states agree to specific limits on their military forces in the interest of their overall security, have proved immensely difficult to negotiate even at a regional level. At an international level, it has so far been impossible to go beyond limited confidence-building transparency agreements such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms, or modest multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. The only exception is for the special category of inhumane conventional arms, including anti-personnel landmines, for which wide disapproval has led to a complete ban. Such a ban is not on the agenda for small arms, which are not only standard equipment for all armed forces but are also widely and legally held by police, border guards, and many civilians.

In this context, it was always ambitious to hope that the UN 2001 Conference could establish an effective global regime to prevent and reduce small arms proliferation. A more realistic objective would have been to establish an international framework agreement that works toward addressing the complex issues of small arms proliferation.

The "framework agreement" approach to developing sustained international cooperation on complex global issues now has a substantial track record. In such agreements, interested parties establish a basic framework of accepted international norms, procedures, rules, institutions, and programs to facilitate further cooperation and to provide a basis for subsequent negotiations. In the case of small arms, an international framework agreement would first aim to establish key norms and principles relating to the manufacture, holdings, and flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Then the parties would create follow-up mechanisms and measures through which these norms could be elaborated and implemented.

The complexity and multidimensional nature of the small arms issue provides further evidence of the necessity for a framework agreement approach. The trafficking in SALW encompasses: authorised arms production and transfers amongst states; irresponsible or uncontrolled transfers to regions of tension or conflict; illicit transfers, possession, and use of arms by criminal networks, terrorists, warlords, and brutal governments; weapons collection and control in post-conflict peace-building processes; losses from insecure or inadequate management of weapons by armed forces; and the problems of violence and insecurity often associated with excessive availability of guns to ordinary civilians.

The nature and diversity of these issues means that it is not realistic to address them all in one arms control treaty. Rather, a more flexible international program of action--one that involves a combination of coordination, promotion of best practice, practical international programs, and binding...