Disillusioned NGOs Blame the United States for a Weak Agreement

At around six o'clock A.M. on July 21, 2001, six hours after the expected deadline for the conclusion of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the conference president emerged to make an announcement: the more than 140 participating states had achieved consensus and had agreed upon the wording of a final document, the Program of Action.

This suspense-laden epilogue seemed appropriate for a process that, since its inception in February 2000, had been marred by disagreements, active filibustering, and inflexibility. At stake were measures to curb the spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons, which the United Nations had identified as the weapons of choice in 46 out of 49 conflicts that erupted during the past decade. The human toll in lives and livelihoods exacted by assault rifle-toting military forces, militias, and gangs called for a commensurate global response.

The primary merit of the conference outcome resides in the fact that the dangers posed by the proliferation and abuse of small arms were put on all governments' radar screens. Indeed, the strongest legacy of this process is that, for the first time, an issue that had long been neglected and considered a minor disarmament topic has now been framed beyond the confines of arsenal reduction and destruction. Today, the debate embraces a wide spectrum of concerns, from intrastate conflict to the devastation of communities and sexual violence.The conference participants, however, produced a document, the "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects" (PoA),heavy in rhetoric,but light in actual commitments.

The document incorporates concerns relating to the human dimension of small-arms proliferation. In particular, it includes language for the protection of those most vulnerable (women and children) to arms proliferation. It includes provisions for reintegration of combatants into civil society and the destruction of surplus weapons that would otherwise continue to migrate from conflict to conflict. It fails, however, to make the connection between human rights abuses and the availability of arms, and to identify the criteria that would prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands. States also carefully trimmed all references to new infusions of funding to sustain the PoA. Moreover, calls for the negotiation of international treaties to regulate the activities of brokers and arms marking and tracing have been significantly toned down.

This political document was, however, negotiated at a level usually reserved for treaties and other legally binding agreements. A case in point: the U.S. delegation outlined and fiercely defended five so-called redlines, or thresholds, that the United States would not allow the conference to trespass. The final document, the United States insisted, should not include:

• Any definition encompassing any non-military-style weap- ons or lethal weapons of war.
• Any restriction on civilian possession of arms.
• Any clause banning transfers to non-state actors.
• Any calls for negotiations on legally binding international instruments.
• Any fixed review process.

Most participants viewed the U.S. position as strident and arrogant. In addition, the fact that redlines were presented at the very beginning of the conference created a wedge between the United States and a coalition of other states led by the European Union (EU), and contributed to the belief that the United States favored diktats, not negotiations. Critics scrutinized and compared this posturing with other U.S. unilateralist acts (e.g., the U.S. stances on the landmines treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol).

In the ensuing discussions, the United States gave way on the fifth redline in exchange for acquiescence on the second, which was most actively supported by the U.S. pro-gun lobby. Other countries resented the notion that the narrow interests of the U.S. pro-gun minority view should prevail at an international forum and supersede global concerns...