Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia

In Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatment of strategy, On War, he makes clear that war is never an autonomous activity, that it finds meaning only as an instrument for reaching political goals--hence his famous dictum "war is the continuation of politics by other means." In an age of frequent calls for humanitarian military interventions, it is clear from the case study of Somalia that Clausewitz's insight holds true for humanitarian crises that are caused by war as well. Such crises, unlike those caused by natural disasters, cannot be isolated from the prevailing political-military situation. Intervening militarily in such a crisis with "purely humanitarian" goals can be perilous in that such goals frequently cannot be reached without altering the political conditions that caused the crisis.

In 1992, when the United States decided to intervene militarily in Somalia, U.S. decision-makers faced such a crisis. The goal of Operation Restore Hope was to put an end to famine in Somalia, but that famine was largely the result of fighting among various clan-based militias. Decision-makers should have realized from the outset that in order to end the starvation it would be necessary to strike a blow to the power of the warlords and their militias as well as to aid the development of some sort of civilian political structures that would encourage an alternative to the politics of the gun. In short, U.S. military action should have been dictated by a definitive set of political goals.

Once the strategic goals of the operation had been specified in political terms--the establishment of stability that warlords no longer could threaten--operations and tactics consistent with the overall goals could have been formulated. A realistic assessment of the resources and time required to reach the operation's aims could have been made. Armed with this assessment, decision-makers could have decided whether they still wished to go ahead with the mission.

Decision-makers instead viewed the crisis in Somalia as purely humanitarian in nature. This was a fundamental strategic error caused by their backgrounds and by the process through which the decision to intervene in Somalia was made within the U.S. government, especially within the U.S. military. Strategic misjudgment led in turn to a series of operational decisions that, while understandable from a purely military or purely humanitarian point of view, aggravated rather than improved the political situation in Somalia. When military intervention ultimately faltered, it left behind both a series of questionable "lessons" and a paralysis within the Clinton administration when faced with later decisions on humanitarian intervention.

Background to the Intervention

In January 1991, the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu found itself in the line of fire between Somali President Siad Barre's troops and armed opponents. ¹ As fighting increased, U.S. Marines and Navy SEALS evacuated the embassy staff and a large number of foreigners. Following their overthrow the president, rebel factions fell to sporadic, sometimes heavy, internecine fighting. Having narrowly avoided a loss of American lives during the evacuation of the Mogadishu embassy, the U.S. government was not inclined to risk them anew through an on-the-ground presence in such an anarchic environment. For the next eighteen months, the U.S. government "covered" Somalia by means of a Nairobi-based Foreign Service Officer, a so-called "Somalia watcher," and one U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor. I was the Somalia watcher.

In the summer of 1992, a famine, caused in part by continued fighting and lawlessness, sharply worsened in southern Somalia. News of the deteriorating conditions reached Washington through diplomatic reporting from the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, through reports by non-governmental agencies active in Somalia, and increasingly by newspaper and television journalists reporting from the south of the country. Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) visited the country, reported their observations, and urged U.S. action. In...