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SAIS Review 20.2 (2000) 255-259



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Review Essay

A Stroll Down La Avenida Kennedy

Russell Crandall

Politics and Personalities

The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Revolution in Latin America, by Stephen G. Rabe. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 257 pp. $39.95.

Anyone who spends enough time in Latin America, whether it is in one of its sprawling metropolises or isolated rural areas, is likely to come across some sort of tribute to John F. Kennedy. Indeed, the Avenida Kennedy is a staple of Latin American cities, and households both rich and poor still proudly hang a portrait of the American president on their walls. This fact might logically lead the casual observer to believe that Kennedy's policies toward Latin America were motivated by altruism and respect, thus making them a dramatic departure from the tendency toward heavy-handed or "big stick" methods that have characterized U.S. policy toward Latin America since the late nineteenth century. This notion of an exceptional brand of policies toward Latin America is bolstered by Kennedy's association with the Alliance for Progress, an initially massive development plan inaugurated in 1961 that was committed to alleviating poverty and promoting positive social change across the Americas.

Yet, as Stephen Rabe convincingly argues in his excellent book, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Revolution in Latin America, Kennedy's altruistic departure from the more normal brand of intervention and paternalism of his predecessors definitely had its limits. In fact, Rabe's strongest [End Page 255] conclusion is that, when push came to shove, Kennedy's overriding concern was that of the anti-communist crusade and not the economic and social transformation that is inextricably associated with his still powerful legacy in Latin America. Rabe's study of Kennedy's often paradoxical Latin America policies is lucid, succinct, and extremely well researched. Its depth of analysis sets it apart from other treatments of Kennedy's foreign policy, especially because most of these works do not focus specifically on his actions in Latin America. The book's only serious weakness is the almost complete reliance on U.S. primary and secondary materials; his analysis and conclusions would have stood on firmer ground if corroborated by Latin American sources. That said, Rabe's work will no doubt become a standard on this era in hemispheric relations.

Kennedy's new course in U.S. hemispheric policy was clearly motivated by the stunning and relatively easy success of Fidel Castro's overthrow of Cuba's strongman Fulgencio Bautista in 1959. In the lead-up to the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the United States had chosen to overlook Bautista's despotism primarily because he was considered a reliable ally in the Caribbean. When Bautista was overthrown by a young revolutionary who enjoyed widespread support from the Cuban people, Kennedy concluded that only by promoting social change and economic development could the United States ensure that other Latin American nations not go down the same path as Cuba. The first step in this new strategy was thus to end the incestuous relationships that the United States had maintained with brutal yet anti-communist dictators. These erstwhile "allies" were now seen as the very sorts of regimes whose tyrannical rule actually helped pave the way for communist takeover. U.S. efforts in 1961 to undermine the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic were the first manifestations of this new policy.

Like Bautista in Cuba, the United States had tolerated Trujillo's iron rule since the dictator could always be counted on to support the United States' position in any international incident. Yet, influenced by recent events in Cuba, Kennedy's support for Trujillo dwindled, and he subsequently ordered the CIA to actively work to overthrow Trujillo. On March 30, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by opposition leaders who used CIA-supplied pistols to carry out the operation.

Rabe believes that there can be no doubt that the Kennedy Administration orchestrated Trujillo's downfall not because it was overly concerned with the lack of...

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