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  • Transformational Change and the Future of the Chinese Military
  • Daniel Ginsberg (bio)

One of the most pressing questions in international security affairs is whether China will have the military capability to challenge the United States’ military dominance in Asia. To this question, many scholars have answered that at best such capability is decades away. A recent assessment released by a United States Department of Defense think tank, for example, concludes that in 1996 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is “probably two decades away from challenging or holding its own against a modern military force.” 1 Another analysis in a set of articles that reviews the state of the Chinese military concludes that the Chinese air force will have to wait until 2010 to effectively operate airborne early warning and aerial refueling aircraft, two systems critical to successful power projection capabilities. 2 The bottom line of these assessments is that China will remain little threat to the United States for years to come because China has neither the technical prowess nor the resources to successfully develop, manufacture, or operate weapons systems necessary to project military power outside its borders.

At the same time, scholars and policy makers in the realm of international security have concerned themselves with the future of warfare. Military strategists have recently engaged a dialogue on the implications of precision attack capability and technological [End Page 153] advances resulting from the private and commercial sectors, as well as the spread of this technology and other military-related technologies across the globe. Some have argued that the upshot of these dynamics in military-technical affairs will be another military revolution, a radical change in the conduct and character of warfare. Such a change, they argue, not only alters the way military forces carry out missions and engage other forces, but also has a significant impact on the international system. To provide evidence of this phenomenon, military revolution proponents point to the occurrences of military revolutions in history; one scholar has identified at least eight military revolutions since the fifteenth century. 3

Given the widespread acceptance of these two issues in the study of international security, it seems prudent to investigate the relationship between the future of Chinese military capabilities and this putative military revolution. As such, this essay has two objectives. One goal is to assess the adequacy of the recent predications of the future of Chinese military capabilities. Have they taken into account the concept of military revolution? Specifically, have they countenanced the idea that the measures of military effectiveness may change and, therefore, the systems that China once may have sought may become irrelevant to the application of force? Another goal, closely related to the first, is to question how well China may be positioned to participate in the emerging revolution, if it is indeed happening. To what extent will the international situation in Asia provide an incentive for China to seek this new form of military capability? What is the impact of China’s impressive economic growth and the changing pattern of civil-military relations on that potential endeavor? Answers to such questions not only provide insights to the changing political-military situation in Asia, but also could contribute to the debate over the shape and scope of United States defense spending.

This essay argues that sinologists and international security specialists have utilized an incomplete analysis in their predictions of China’s future military capabilities. The application of the concept of a revolution in military affairs leads to a different analysis, which may suggest that China’s rise to power militarily may occur sooner and in a different form than originally thought. An investigation of this thesis comes in several parts. Part I reviews the concept of military revolution.In addition to a definition of the [End Page 154] concept and an account of arguments for an emerging transformation of warfare, the section also speculates on the nature of warfare in the future and underscores that countries other than the United States may participate in a new system of warfare. Part II provides an overview of some of the predictions about the future of the PLA and maintains that, to a great extent, scholars...

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