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Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 (2002) 186-188



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Book Review

Rhetoric as Currency:
Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Great Depression


Rhetoric as Currency: Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Great Depression . By Davis W. Houck. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001; pp. x + 226. $39.95.

Albeit catchy, the book is misnamed. Its scope and focus are primarily on Hoover and Roosevelt and their speeches; on economics, especially in the introduction and conclusion but less and unevenly so in the other chapters; and certainly not on currency as one normally understands that word—the term "rhetorical currency" is listed once in the index and "currency" not at all. The title could excise "currency" and substitute "health metaphors," for much of the book discusses how both speakers used health metaphors to resolve the Depression.

Chapter 1, the introduction, is devoted to economics and, to a lesser degree, its relationship to rhetoric. Houck holds that "thoughts, beliefs, and emotions constitute and create our economic realities" (4), which is accomplished through persuasive discourse. Curiously, this book is not situated in the so-called rhetorical presidency or in any other rhetorical theories, classical or otherwise, but is conceived best as a "journey" (11) through texts. Although the author discusses who helped write the speeches, he is not particularly interested in how many drafts ensued or who made what emendations or how the addresses were organized. Except for metaphors, Houck also omits a discussion of oratorical style.

In chapter 2, which spans 1929-30, Houck catalogues Hoover's many mistakes in managing the art of rhetoric. He demonstrates that Hoover did not initially react rhetorically to the Depression (27-29), but he does not suggest how Hoover might have done so. When Hoover did finally speak, Houck travels the well-worn road of castigating Hoover's maladroit rhetoric in the early days of the Depression. But Houck's journey might have included some rhetorical revisionism on how Hoover [End Page 186] should have recast his rhetoric. Indeed, Houck's findings seem internally contradictory with regard to the early Depression, for he admits that "Hoover's actions had saved the day" (38) and that Hoover's pledges from business, "coupled with his anti-rhetoric, appeared to be working" (39).

Chapter 3 continues the problems of treating Hoover's economic rhetoric in 1931-32. On the one hand, Houck correctly notes that Hoover should have used the radio, rather than the press, to address the nation directly (68), and that Hoover overused "silence" (86). Yet he observes that during this period Hoover legislatively accomplished about what Franklin Delano Roosevelt did in his first 100 days (83). This fact is telling, for Houck quotes an exasperated Nation magazine that Hoover's appeals to confidence had to be "based on something" (85), but then Houck concludes that "by emphasizing action and devaluing words, Hoover effectively undermined his own position" (85). How can one impute Hoover's rhetoric when it helped obtain the success of his "unparalleled flurry of legislation" (83)?

When Houck turns to FDR, economic rhetoric takes a back seat to health and bodily metaphors, as the titles of chapters 4 and 5, respectively, suggest: "A Satisfactory Embodiment" and "Making House Calls." Although many critics journeyed down the Rooseveltian path before him, Houck does make several findings worth mentioning. He holds that FDR's February 2, 1932, address to the New York Grange should be counted as the opening campaign speech, and not the "Forgotten Man" speech that Samuel Rosenman designated as the campaign opener (113). He reads FDR's acceptance speech anew in metaphorical, bodily terms—but he cites no contemporaries who received Roosevelt's rhetoric in that manner—so read and judge for oneself whether Houck plumbed FDR's address (126-28). The details on the Democratic National Committee's "Speaker's Kit," which was designed to counter Republican charges that FDR was unfit to govern, is noteworthy (145-46).

Houck's heavy hand, which fell mercilessly on hapless Hoover, seems eased on Roosevelt and his rhetoric in the 1932 campaign. He notes (120) that...

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