The Russian Oligarchs and the Press Boris Nemtsov, Former First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia

Mr. Kalb:

In your opinion, is there freedom of the press in Russia today?

Mr. Nemtsov:

I think there is much freedom of the press, maybe more than in the United States. There are not only liberal viewpoints on Russia’s television programs, but also anti-Semitic, fascist, and nationalist viewpoints. Russia has a huge number of independent, private newspapers and I don’t know how many TV programs and channels—not only at the national level, but at the regional level too. When I was governor in Nizhni Novgorod [Gorki] ten new private TV channels appeared during my term. Ten, in one region.

But I had a dream: to support private initiative not only at the regional level, but in the villages also. People are more interested in what happened to their neighbors’ cows than with what happened at the Kremlin. In Nizhni, we had an experiment with a village press. Unfortunately, there is not enough private money to support it.

K:

Where did the money come from?

N:

It depends. Sometimes, the business community invested money. Sometimes, unfortunately, the administration had to support it. The regional TV in Nizhni is totally private. We have only two channels: one at the federal level, which produces programs for regions, and the other is the so-called Oblast television. In the other regions, there is not as much freedom. Some governors try to control everything. But the national press is quite independent.

K:

When it’s independent, who supports the press? Where does the press get the money to print, to pay reporters, to distribute the newspapers?

N:

There are several types of independent press. The first type is the press which belongs to big, competitive monopolies—that is, the media groups. We have four such groups. The first belongs to Boris Berezovsky, who controls the first channel, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novo Izvestia, and, in some respects, TV 6. The second is Vladimir Gusinsky with the Media Most group, who controls NTV and Independent TV, a nationwide private network. He controls the Segodnya newspaper, Itogi journal, and Nova Gazeta. The third is the Gazprom media group. They control 30 percent of NTV—that’s why they have a relationship with Gusinski—but they have no management control, only the shareholder stake, 30 percent.

K:

Thirty percent of the profit?

N:

No. Since the August crisis, there has been no profit. They have 30 percent of the shares, and that’s why sometimes NTV defends Gazprom against the government, against Nemtsov.

The fourth group belongs to [Moscow mayor] Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov has Center TV and a lot of Moscow newspapers, but Gazprom has a lot, too, like Rabochaya Tribuna and Trud. Luzhkov also controls Moskovsky Komsomolets and Komsomolskaya Pravda and many regional newspapers and television stations. He wants to promote his presidential campaign with control of the regional press. Moreover, there is the empire of Vladimir Potanin and the Oneximbank group. And there are independent media—Kommersant, one of the most prominent newspapers in Russia.

As far as TV is concerned, there is one national network that is quite independent because it belongs to Berezovsky, Luzhkov, and Vagit Alekperov. This is TV 6. It is national but independent because there are a lot of struggles among the owners, so there is no efficient control of this company. It’s a rather funny story.

K:

Do these various groups—these large media groups—do they each represent a different political point of view?

N:

Well, you know, there are similarities and some differences. The similarity, unfortunately, is that most of them are internally oligarchical because they represent very powerful financial groups. Gazprom is 100 percent so. Gusinsky is less, while Potanin is not, frankly. He’s not because he is afraid of the stability of such systems. He doesn’t believe that oligarchy and capitalism are stable systems.

K:

When you say “the oligarchic system,” explain that terminology to me. What do you mean by that?

N:

Oligarchy means a market economy with very low level of competition and with higher level of concentration of financing and property.

K:

So, this is a large economic power.

N:

Yeah. This is the South Korean system, where the big monopolies control a huge amount of property and finance and so on.

K:

But do these large monopolies care who the president of Russia is?

N:

Sometimes, yes. For example, consider what happened in 1996. There was an agreement between the oligarchy and Yeltsin. Yeltsin was chosen. What choice was there? It was either Yeltsin or Genady Zuganov. This time, I think there are differences. They have their own ideas about who will be next. In 1996, it was a choice between the Communists and a market economy. Now, it is a choice of what kind of oligarchy will be in the parliament.

K:

It’s not a choice any longer, with—

N:

Forget about Communism. Communism is over.

K:

Even if Zuganov won, it’s over?

N:

Yes. Do you know why?

K:

Why?

N:

Private ownership, private business controls 70 percent of GDP. Zuganov would be a disaster from the economic point of view. But he would be representing the so-called military oligarchy group, and that’s all. They will try to support him to organize his own media, to support these capitalist cliques, but without nationalizing. I don’t believe that’s the case. That’s why the choice is different now.

K:

Is there in Russia today, among journalists, a professional ethic that means that they seek the truth and they will write the truth, no matter how negative it may be toward a single politician? Or are journalists still hooked into, and dependent upon, individual groups?

N:

Yes, I understand what you mean. Within the group, generally, it’s forbidden to criticize. If you represent the Luzhkov group, you will never publish the truth about Luzhkov. But if you represent the Berezovsky group, you can say what you want about Luzhkov.

K:

I see, but if you work for Berezovsky’s newspaper, can you criticize Berezovsky?

N:

I know a few cases of that.

K:

So, it can happen?

N:

Yes, it can happen.

K:

But it’s not the norm?

N:

No, this is unusual. This is quite an unusual occurrence. The Berezovsky empire, however, appears rather liberal, compared to Gusinsky, that is. It’s strange, but true. In the Gusinsky empire, it’s absolutely forbidden to criticize him and his Most group.

K:

Well, how can you say that it’s freedom of the press, then?

N:

There’s competition between groups. This is structural freedom. Inside one group, there is no freedom—it’s censura. But if you look at the general picture, it looks like competition. Frankly, that’s not so bad. If I am a consumer of news, what’s the problem? If I want to know several viewpoints, I will get them, without any problem.

K:

And you can buy different newspapers and read different political views.

N:

Yes, of course. And that’s enough.

K:

So long as you know which newspaper is supported by which oligarch.

N:

Yes. This is freedom. Don’t you think this is freedom?

K:

I think it is a form of freedom. What has been your personal experience, as a politician in Russia, with the press?

N:

Well, that’s interesting. When I was in Nizhni, I had a lot of contact with the press. I think that I have been even more open with the press in my job at the Kremlin, even more than officials in the United States. For example, several journalists were allowed to take part in our closed discussions.

K:

Really?

N:

Yes. Not everybody, but several.

K:

You would have to approve who came in?

N:

I invited them, as I would invite experts. If we had to make very painful decisions—for example, to increase rents in housing—I would invite them for discussions. And they would argue with me afterward in the newspapers, but that didn’t bother me. Generally, I have very good relationship with the media, but not because I bought them. No, I’ll never do that.

K:

You were accessible to them.

N:

Yes, I was open. They have been free to ask me questions and argue with me without any consequences. None whatsoever.

K:

Did you ever lie to a reporter?

N:

I prefer to keep silent. If they ask me a question and I don’t want to allow the truth to get through—

K:

You keep quiet.

N:

I sit still. No further comment. But the Moscow experience—Moscow is terrible. That was my mistake. I did not understand the level of concentration of many in power. That’s why the oligarchy organized the mass media campaign against me, when my message was that we have an oligarchy system, an inefficient economy, and this is the reason nobody pays taxes. The only chance to improve was to restructure the oligarchy in power, maybe to bankrupt them. It was my agenda, my message, for society and for Yeltsin. They were against it. They organized a very strong campaign and mobilized a huge number of public relations firms to fight me. It’s true. That’s what happened. For example, my popularity was, at the beginning, 60 percent, three times more than Zuganov. If the election had been in 1997, I would have won. Everybody knows that. But they used technology—TV technology.

K:

Continue with your experiences in Moscow. What have you learned from dealing with the press in Moscow that was different from dealing with the press in Nizhni Novgorod?

N:

Well, the Nizhni Novgorod press was quite independent, but not so powerful as to kill the power. The Moscow press represents very powerful political groups with their own economic and political interests. This is a major difference. When we wanted to take measures to ensure the transparency of a monopoly, or when we wanted to make the cash flows through the Ministry of Finance more transparent, we put pressure on certain groups. The response was an organized mass media campaign against us. This is absolutely ordinary in Russia now, but I didn’t realize that when I became first deputy prime minister. Whenever we tried to do something good for my country, they organized a very strong campaign against us. There were articles in every newspaper, as if this was terrible for Russia.

K:

The next big challenge for you is organizing a political party—a political movement—looking forward to the elections, to the Duma. How do you see the press? How would you use the press? What would you like the press to be, in this campaign?

N:

Well, the most difficult problem for us is the concerted struggle against us—you know, when somebody pays money to organize public opinion. If there is no such campaign against us, then we’ll be satisfied.

K:

You could do well?

N:

Yes.

K:

But people are actually paying journalists to write negative stories about you or about your movement?

N:

Yes, they could. They are not doing it right now, in my opinion. But they did do it when I was in office. This I know.

K:

Would a reporter be paid a lot of money to write a story against you?

N:

Yes. I don’t know how much. It may be a small sum—$100 per article—or it may be large—$1,000 per article.

K:

But they were paid something to write a political story.

N:

Of course.

K:

Well, what does that mean for you, that you will have to pay journalists to write stories?

N:

No, I have no money. And I don’t think that this is a real option.

K:

You would not like to do that?

N:

First of all, I don’t like to do that. Secondly, I don’t know how to do that. Thirdly, I believe that even when journalists are paid to write positive articles about you, they won’t necessarily continue after you stop paying them. I don’t think so. That’s why it is a foolish decision, and it appears strange. Yes, people need money, but they also have their own points of view.

K:

Thank you.