Response to Review by James J. Orr

In his review of my chapter in my edited volume, The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals (JJS, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2008), James J. Orr argues that “Hasegawa interprets ambiguous and sometime unambiguous statements in peculiarly convenient ways” (p. 527). It is important to respond to his criticism because Orr’s criticism questions the significance of the cabinet meeting on August 7 and thus goes to the heart of the contentious issue of whether dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6 directly resulted in the Japanese government’s decision to surrender.

Two issues are involved in assessing the significance of the August 7 cabinet meeting. The first issue is whether this cabinet meeting was the decisive turning point for Japan’s decision to surrender. Sadao Asada, who thinks it was, claims that “he [Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori] proposed the surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Declaration.” ¹ Similarly, Orr argues that Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu Hisatsune’s postoccupation memoir makes it clear that “there was an argument advocating the quick termination of the war by accepting the Potsdam Declaration,” and thus it is difficult for Orr to accept my conclusion that “neither the cabinet nor Tōgō himself believed that any change of policy was necessary on the afternoon of August 7” (p. 527). Orr omits, however, an important passage in my chapter that lies between my reference to Sakomizu’s statement and my conclusion: “but in view of the army’s opposition, the cabinet merely decided to send the investigation team to Hiroshima” (End of the Pacific War, p. 115). As far as the government’s position was concerned, Asada and I are in agreement here, since Asada also states: “Given the army’s intransigence, it was impossible for the cabinet to take up Togo’s proposal.” As far as the cabinet was concerned, the August 7 meeting did not make any decision to alter the previous policy, namely, to seek termination of the war through Moscow’s mediation.

The second issue is how to interpret Tōgō’s statement at the cabinet meeting. Did his statement, if not endorsed by the cabinet, nevertheless mark the departure from the previous line he had pursued? After the Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, Tōgō’s position had been to secure a peace settlement through Soviet mediation with the Potsdam terms as the starting point of negotiations. On July 27, Tōgō reported to the emperor that “since the Potsdam Proclamation [Declaration] is a broad, general statement, and it leaves room for further study of the concrete terms, we plan to find out what these concrete terms are through the Soviet Union.” ² The crucial question here is whether Tōgō, after the shock of the atomic bomb, abandoned this policy and called for surrender directly to the United States and Britain by accepting the Potsdam terms, as Asada contends. I argued in my chapter in End of the Pacific War that although the atomic bomb contributed to Tōgō’s sense of urgency to secure speedy termination of the war, the basic line for seeking the negotiated peace through Soviet mediation did not change. On August 7, the day the cabinet meeting was held, Tōgō sent an urgent telegram to Ambassador Satō Naotake in Moscow, instructing him to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov to find out the Soviet reaction to Japan’s pending request for mediation for peace. Sakomizu’s memoir cited above by Orr also stresses that the attention of the entire government was focused on the answer Satō would receive from Molotov (End of the Pacific War, p. 119). Tōgō’s alleged advocacy for surrender at the August 7 cabinet meeting did not represent a change of the previous policy. The Japanese government and Tōgō himself did not confront the issue of whether Japan should respond directly to the United States and Britain and accept surrender on the Potsdam terms until the Soviets entered the war on the morning of August 9.

In my view, Orr seems to have...