The Line: Combat in Korea, January–February 1951 (review)

This book is the first in a projected three-volume study of U.S. combat operations in the Korean War "at the lowest levels: battalion, company, platoon, squad, and individual soldiers" (p. vii). It focuses on arguably the most critical juncture in the conflict when United Nations forces in early 1951 halted a Chinese offensive that might have forced total evacuation. Former U.S. Army Colonel William T. Bowers reprints excerpts from copies of interviews with participants housed at the U.S. Army Center of Military History that U.S. Army historians conducted within hours or days after combat action. Although he supplements these firsthand accounts with information from unit historical files at the National Archives, his other bibliographic references do not extend much beyond official U.S. military histories and the secondary works of Roy E. Appleman and Allan R. Millett.

In the first of ten chapters, Bowers skillfully summarizes military circumstances in Korea just before and battlefield developments during the first six months of the war. He then presents eyewitness accounts often of the same events "set of by brief remarks in italics to set the stage and link the interviews together" (p. ix). Bloody fighting at Wonju receives attention in three chapters, with coverage shifting to seizure of Hill 312 and then to Twin Tunnels. Two chapters discuss Operation Roundup in early February before moving on to the Chinese assault on Chip'yong. Unlike most other recollections, significant analysis in the final chapter explains how Task Force Crombez's relief of the embattled 23rd U.S. Infantry provides an example of "an ideal job for a reinforced tank battalion with armored infantry in support" (pp. 284-285). In his conclusion, Bowers attributes the success of UN forces in regaining the initiative to strong leadership and airpower.

Detailed and at times tedious descriptions of terrain and troop movement dominate most entries, but anecdotes regularly add interest and insight. Among many remarks about the extreme cold, one soldier reported on the success of his commander's order to urinate on frozen rifles to make most of them operative. More dramatic are the accounts of U.S. soldiers using pistols, bayonets, and bare hands in face-to-face combat. "The fighting was so close" at Wonju, First Lieutenant Jerrell F. Wilson recalled, "that the next morning in one foxhole you would find one of ours, and in the next you would find one of theirs" (p. 51). Bowers acknowledges conflicting details in multiple reports of several acts of incredible heroism. For example, First Lieutenant Robert M. McGovern of the 5th Cavalry Regiment charged a Chinese machine gun nest alone when his comrades refused to attack. Firing his pistol and throwing grenades after his rife was shot away, McGovern's death just short of his target enraged his men, who rallied to seize Hill 312.

Nearly all of more than forty photographs are of battle sites and soldiers. A glossary defines symbols used for terrain and military units in "rough sketches drawn by soldiers" (p. xi), comprising most of more than thirty maps. They provide context for understanding frequently voiced fears of Chinese forces moving around the flank of UN forces to cut supplies and inflict major losses. Left unexplained are comments about weapons not firing and grenades not exploding, as well as self-inflicted wounds and desertions. One reason for poor morale was the unhappy consequences documented here of mistaking Korean enemies for allies. First Lieutenant George W. Gardner points to another with his remark that South Korean "troops were only in the way; they would not fight" (p. 205). Bowers rightly argues that U.S. soldiers relied "on common sense, dedication, determination, courage, and heroism" to overcome not just these frustrations, but far more serious handicaps to prevail over "a skillful and powerful enemy" (p. 39).