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LightInfantryLessonsfromAmerica? JohannEwald'sExperiencesinthe AmericanRevolutionaryWaras DepictedinhisAbhandlungüberden KleinenKrieg(1785) ROBERTA.SELIG ixeflectinguponhisexperiencesinlightinfantryunitsduringthecam- paignsof1792to1796,twenty-two-year-oldGeorgWilhelmFreiherrvon Valentinifeltobliged"toadmitthatinallcasesofclosecontactwiththe enemytheHessianofficersknewmorethanours....Wheneveraquick decisionhadtobemade,onecouldnoticeacertaininsightintheartof fightingwhichthesebravemenhadacquiredinadifferentpartofthe world,"America.1Writtenin1797,wellbeforethedebacleatJenaand Auerstädt,suchanassessmentbyaPrussianJägerofficerraisesanumberofimportantquestions .WhatwasitthatdistinguishedtheHessian officersfromthePrussians,thelong-timemodelforEuropeanarmies? HadthePrussianswordbecomebluntduringthelongyearsofpeace aftertheSilesianwarswhiletheHessianshadgainedvaluableexperience intheNewWorld?WeretheHessiansjustmoreexperienced,moredeter- minedofficers,ordidtheyusemoreefficient"American"modelsintheir "artoffighting"?Ifso,whatwerethosemethods;whatweretheybased on;andhowdidtheydifferfromEuropeanlightinfantrywarfareasit haddevelopedduringtheeighteenthcentury?DrawingontheHessian jäger-captainJohannEwald'sAbhandlungüberdenKleinenKrieg,this essaywillanalyseEwald'sAmericanexperiencesandassessthoseofhis recommendationsforlightinfantryreformswhichhepredicatedonhis Americanexperience.2 Ill 112 / SELIG BornonMarch30,1744inCassel,JohannEwaldjoinedtheHessian RegimentGilsain1760asacadetandwaspromotedtoensignin1761for hisbravery.By1766hewasasecondlieutenantintheHessianguards.In 1770,afterthelossofaneyeinaduel,hewasbrieflysenttotheColle- giumCarolinuminCasseltostudymilitaryscience.Promotedtocaptain in1774,hewastransferredtotheLeibjägerCorps.In1776hewas commandingofficerofoneofthetwoHessianJägercompaniesdis- patchedtotheAmericancolonies.Therehefoughtbravelyenoughto earntheorderpourlavertumilitaire,ararehonorforacaptainwithno nobleancestry.Followingthereductionofthejägercorpsin1784,he wasreassignedtotheRegimentvonDittfurthandimmediatelybegan writinghisAbhandlungüberdenKleinenKriegwhichwaspublishedin 1785.3 Thebookwassuccessfulandquicklybecameaclassic.4Inareviewfor theJenaerAllgemeineLiteraturZeitung,GerhardvonScharnhorst,him- selftheauthorofawidely-readtextonlightinfantry,wrotethatit "containsquiteusefulrulesfortheserviceoflighttroops."Hepointed out,however,that"thosewhoknowJenny[sic]andGrandmaisonwill notfindanythingexactlynewinit."5Yettwenty-fiveyearsafterits publication,CarlvonClausewitz,inhis1810-1811Vorlesungenüberden KleinenKrieg,stillrecommendedittohisstudents,asdidHansDavid LudwigvonYorkinhis1811InstructionenfürdieLeichtenTruppen.*In lightofScharnhorst'searlierassessment,suchrecommendationsseem surprising.Ifviewedassimplyanothermanualforlightinfantrywar- fare,Ewald's1785bookstoodattheendofalongtraditionwhichhad beguninthe1730s.BythetimeofScharnhorst'sreview,dozensoftitles hadbeenpublishedonthesubject.7Ewald'sgoal,however,wasmore ambitious;hetriedtocombinetheCentralEuropeantraditionoflight infantry,representedbytheHessianJägerCorps,withhisownAmerican experiences. InAmerica,theHessianyagerfoundatestinggroundforlightinfantry tacticsastheyknewthemfromEurope.Europeanlightinfantrywarfare hadbeendefinedbytheMaréchaldeSaxeasearlyas1732asawar wagedbysmalldetachmentsengagedinpatrols,ambushes,reconnais- sance,foraging,theprotectionofthemainarmyfromsurpriseattacks andthelike.Lecturingonthetopicin1810,Clausewitzstilldefined irregularwarasthe"useofsmallbodiesoftroopsinthefield.Engage- mentsof20,50,100or300to400menbelong,iftheyarenotpartofa largeraction,inlittlewar."8Theirmainpurposewastogatherinforma- tionandtoharasstheenemy.ThuskleinerKriegwasclearlyunderstood ashavingonlyasupportivefunctionwithinthegeneralcontextofwar. JohannEwaldandtheAmericanRevolutionaryWar/113 Theactionsofsmallbodiesoftroopswereclearlysupplementaltothose ofthemainarmy. Littlewarwascontinuouswar.If,toparaphraseClausewitz,tactics aretheartofleadingtroopsinbattle,thenstrategyisthescienceofusing battlesinthegeneralcontextofwar.Since"thestrategyoflittlewaris partofthetactics,andsincethetacticsoflittlewarquitecertainlyhave tobeapartoftacticsasawhole,thenalloflittlewarispartoftactics,"9 thatis,troopsinaction.Thiscouldonlybeachievedthroughreliable, mobile,andindependentunitsledbyhighly-trainedandmotivatedoffi- cers. Truelightinfantryunits,incontrasttotherag-tagirregularforcesof thearmiesofabsolutistEurope,needednotonlytalentedofficers,but reliabletroopsaswell.Therankandfilehadtobeable,andtrustworthy enoughtoactindependently.Lighttroopswerenotboundtofortified locationsorpredeterminedpositionsinbattle,butwereusedwherever needed.Theyhadtoadaptquicklytoanygivenenvironment,sustain themselvesalmostanywhere,andoperaterapidlyandclandestinely.This kindofwarfareplacedthehighestdemandsonofficer,subalternand individualsoldier.Fightingaloneorinsmallgroups,ultimatelyeach combatantcouldonlydependuponhimselfandhisownskillsforsurvival .Blinddrillandfearofpunishmentwereuselessinstrumentsinthis kindofwarwhichdemandedindividualinitiativeonthepartofthe soldierandtrustintheabilitiesoftheofficer."Littlewar"wasdeter- mined"morebyacertaincraftsmanship,thedevelopmentandpractice ofthenaturalaptitudes[ofthesoldier],whileinbigwarmorescientific ...viewsprevail,"wroteClausewitzin1810.10Intheeighteenthcentury thesearchforthesoldierwhocombinedthese"naturalaptitudes"with thenecessaryreliabilityandindependenceculminatedinthejäger. Hessianjägerofficersdrewonalongtraditioninlightinfantrywar- fare.Asearlyas1631,LandgrafWilliamVhadraisedthreecompanies ofjägerfromthehuntingpersonnelofhisstate.Thequalificationsfor serviceinthesecompanies,whichwereunderthecommandofthechief forestersoftherespectivehuntingdistrictsoftheLandgraviate,were marksmanship,familiaritywithnature,andagoodreputation.Dressed ingreen,their"workingclothes,"equippedwithriflesanddaggers,the jägerweretoprotectregulartroopsfromsurpriseattacks,serveastheir guides,reconnoitre,layambushesandharasstheenemyineverypossible way.Highlyreliablebecauseoftheirbackgroundasstateemployees,and usedtoperformingpolicedutiestokeeppoachersatbay,theyquickly tookonadditionalfunctionsasmilitarypolicetopreventdesertions.At war'sendin1648,thecompaniesweredissolvedandthejägerreturnedto theircivilianpositions." 114 / SELIG Accuratemarksmanshipwasahallmarkofthejäger.Inthecourseof theseventeenthcenturyseveralGermanandnon-Germanstatestook advantageoftheprogressmadeinthemanufactureofprecisiongunsand introducedthemintotheirarmedforces.Originallydesignedforhunting purposes,therifleswereaccurateatadistanceof200pacesormore, whichmorethanmadeupfortheslownessanddifficultyofhandling them.12In1684Hessiamustered200mountedjägerand200menon foot,equippedwithPfürschbüchsen(huntingrifles)andagaincom- mandedbythechiefforesters.TheywereknownastheJägerzuPferd, BauerorFörsterCompaniesvonSobieski/Sobiewalski.DuringtheWar oftheLeagueofAugsburg,theHessianJäger-Corps,composedofone companyonfootandonemounted,tookpartinthesiegeofNamurin 1695.TheywerewithdrawnafterthebreakbetweenKasselandtheCircle oftheUpperRhinein1696.13 TheoutbreakoftheSilesianWarin1740witnessedtheintroductionof jägertroopsaspermanentfeaturesinthearmiesofEurope.Theyproved theirworthagainduringtheSevenYearsWar.InFebruaryof1758,the Hessianjägerwerereconstitutedtwocompaniesstrong.ByJanuaryof 1759,thecorpshadexpandedtofourcompaniesonfoot.InDecember of1759twocompaniesofmountedjägerwereadded,bringingthe strengthoftheJägerCorpstosome600men.14Atthesametimeefforts wereunderwaytointegratethejägerconceptintolineregiments. TheestablishmentoftheChasseursd'ArméeunderMajorJohann GottliebRailinthespringof1762showedHessiaagainintheforefront ofmilitarydevelopments.TheChasseursd'Arméewerecomposedofthe eliteoftheHessianlineregiments.Theywerenowconcentratedinspe- cialunitsandtrainedbythejägerintheartoflightinfantrywarfare: aimedfireandfightinginopenorder.Thisrepresentedacrucialstepin thedevelopmenttowardpermanentelitelightinfantryunitsandtheir subsequentintegrationintothestandingarmy.TheChasseursd'Armée notonlysolvedtheproblemofalimitedsupplyofhuntersandtheneed forthemtoreturntoforestworkattheendofthewar,butalsothatof disciplineandreliability,uponwhichsomuchofthesuccessoflight infantryrested.15 In1763budgetaryconsiderationsforcedLandgrafFredericktodisbandtheChasseursd 'Arméeaswellasalljägerunits,keepingonlyacore ofonecaptain,twonon-commissionedofficersandtwelvemenathis courtinKasselunderthenameofLeibJägerCompanie.Then,in Decemberof1773,LieutenantColonelBoutonDesGranges,command- ingofficerofthenewlyestablishedPrussianFeldjägerbataillon,received 400TalertorecruitHessianjägerveteranswhomFredericktheGreat consideredtobethebest.16Fearingthelossofsomeofhismostvaluable JohannEwaldandtheAmericanRevolutionaryWar/115 soldiers,theHessianLandgraforderedanexpansionoftheLeibJäger Companie,whosecommandingofficer,asofMarch4,1774wasCaptain JohannEwald.OnApril22,1774,theHessianWarMinistryorderedthe augmentationoftheJägerVolontairsintoacompanyof102men.Atthe outbreakoftheAmericanRevolutionaryWarin1776,thiseliteunit withintheHessianinfantryhadreachedaneffectivestrengthof71offi- cersandmen.17 InAmerica,thejägerparticipatedinawarthatwasatoncefamiliar andnewtothem.Theyengagedinwaragainstarmedcivilians,an"irreg- ular"warwagedbyregularsagainsttrueirregulars.Itwasawarofsmall detachmentsagainstthemale—andfemale—adultpopulationofwhole counties,aswellasagainstregulartroops.Theexperiencesofthiswar formanintegralpartofJohannEwald'sAbhandlung.1* Nonetheless,Ewaldbelievedthatwarwasanaffairofthemilitary. AlthoughfilteredthroughhisAmericanexperiences,thetechnical aspectsoflittlewarinhisbookarebasedonmilitarytraditions.Drawing ontwenty-fouryearsofmilitaryservice,Ewaldwantedtowriteamanual for"theleaderofalightcorpsoradetachmentwhichiscomposedof cavalryandinfantry."19 Inthefirstthreesectionsofhisbook,Ewalddiscussedrecruitment, equipmentandtrainingoflightinfantry.Onthebasisofhisexperiences inAmerica,"wherewholeregimentshadtobetakenoutofthearmyto doservice"aslightinfantry,hecametotheconclusionthatlargenum- bersofsoldierstrainedtofightthiswaywereindispensableforavictori- ouswar.Lightinfantrytrainingprovidedthebestschoolforfuture generals,sinceinthatkindofwaranofficer"hastodoonasmallscale whatageneraldoesonalargescale."20Thusitsofficercorpsshouldbe composed"ofthemostagile,skillfulandbravest"menavailable.Similar totheChasseursd'Armée,therankandfileshould,ifatallpossible,be recruitedfromamongthebestofthelineregiments,notthedregsof societygiventodeserting,lootingandplundering.Basedonhisexperi- encesinAmerica,Ewaldpreferredthemtobebetweensixteenandeigh- teenyearsold,andneveroverthirty.Hisrecommendationanticipates modernarmiesbutwasatoddswiththethinkingofhisday.Absolutist rulerspreferredoldersoldiers,trainedtoperfection,whosehomewas theirregiment.They"wereconsideredinherentlysuperiortoyoung ones."21TheagestructureofEuropeanstandingarmiesreflectedthis thinking.In1783theaverageageofthegrenadiersofthePrussianregi- mentHackewas38.9years,thatofprivates32.8years,whichwould havemademostoftheregimenttoooldforEwald'scorps. Ewaldconsidereditoftheutmostimportancethatlighttroopsshould beledwiththestrictestdisciplinetoconstrainthevillains"whounmerci- 116 / SELIG fullytormentthelocalswhoareinnocentofthewar."Donotcompro- miseinpunishmentsaswellasinrewards,Ewaldargued,but"showthe soldierthatyoulovehimandtakecareofhim."Thepurposeofthis radicaldeparturefromcontemporarypracticewasobvious."Oncethe officer...hasgainedthetrustofthecommonsoldierhecancertainly countonhiminallcaseswhatsoever."22 Thesamestrictdisciplineshouldapplytotheofficersofalightinfan- trycorps.Thisledalmostinevitablytoablurringofthedistinctions betweentheranks,somethingEwaldhadexperiencedintheAmerican war.Muchashemayhaveregrettedthefactthattheageofgentlemanly warfaremightbeover,heacceptedthechangesthatthismeantintheway oflifeoftheofficer.ThroughoutthebookEwaldventedhisanger, thoughguardedly,overhowhisandhistroops'effortswerehamperedby traditionsandprejudice."Itisnotmyintentiontoinsultanyone,"he wrote,"otherwiseIcouldlistanynumberofexamplesofcarelessness andnegligence"whichcosttheBritishdearly.Ewaldwantedtorestrict thenumberofhorsesandservantsforofficersandtoreplacebread rationswithZwieback:"DuringtheAmericanwarwereceivedZwieback foryearsinsteadofbread,andonceoursoldierswerefinallyusedtoit, theypreferredittobread."23 Ajägerofficer,Ewaldbelieved,hadtoleadbyexample.Histraining, behavior,equipmentandhabitsmustnotbedifferentfromthatofhis troopsifhedidnotwanttoendangerthewholecorps.Inanotheraffront tospecialofficerprivileges,Ewaldwantedtoforbidafternoonfun-rides fortheofficersandneverletthem,ortheirservants,roamthecountry- sideduringthedaytimewheretheywouldruntheriskofbeingcaptured bytheenemy.Suchjoyridesgaveawaythelocationofthecorpsandleft itwithoutleadershipincaseofasurpriseattack:"DuringtheAmerican warIsawquiteafewcorpswherenomorethanthreeofficerswerein campduringtheafternoons."DuringthecampaigninSouthCarolina, theservantofanofficerinColonelAbercrombie'sCorpswascaptured bytheAmericanswhiletryingtobuybread.HeinformedtheAmericans ofaplannedraidwhichhadtobecancelled.But"whatwasevenmore surprisingwasthefactthatneithertheofficernortheservantwere punishedforthis."24Changeslikethesewerecertainlyeasierforthe bourgeoisEwaldtoacceptthanforthenobleBritishofficer.Oneofthe reasonsforthedefeatoftheBritish,inEwald'sopinion,wasthatthe Britishofficerwasnotwillingtoadapthiswayoflifeorhisstyleof fightingtothenewenvironment. BasedonhisexperiencesinAmerica,Ewaldrecommendedlightcorps ofabout1,000menstrong.Ifitweresmaller,thelossesincurredthrough almostconstantaction,anddesertion,wouldsoonrenderituseless.He JohannEwaldandtheAmericanRevolutionaryWar/117 hadseenthathappen"alltoooftenwiththeBritish,whoselightcorps wererarelystrongerthanafewhundredmen."Thefootcomponentof Ewald'scorpswouldbecomposedoftwocompaniesofjäger(4officers, 16non-commissionedofficers,151men),whowouldbe"trainedhunts- men,goodmarksmenandyoung,"equippedwithrifles,daggerand40 roundsofammunition,andtwocompaniesoffusiliersatthesame strengthbutequippedwithmusketsandbayonets.Hereagaintheexperi- encesofthewarinAmericashowtheirinfluence.Ewaldcombinedriflemenandfusiliersintoonecorpsmostlybecausehisj ägerdidnothave bayonets,whichleftthemopentoinfantrycharges.Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe,withwhomEwaldhadoftencooperated,insistedthathismen rushuponriflemen:"therewaslittledangerfromtroopswhowerewith- outbajonets[sic]andwhoseobjectitwastofireasingleshotwith effect."25 TothesetwocompaniesonfootEwaldwouldaddtwoescadronsof cavalry,consistingof5officers,16non-commissionedofficersand152 meneach.Atleast25ofthemshouldbegoodshots,equippedwithrifles. UntiltheAmericanRevolution,partsofthejägertroopshadalways beenmounted,sincethisprovidedthenecessaryspeedandmobility.But theyhadnotfoughtonhorseback.Theadditionofamountedsegment ofgoodshotsshowstheinfluenceonEwald'sthinkingofthevastnessof theAmericantheatreofwarwhichwaslargerthananythinghehadever experienced.A14-manadministrationwouldbringthetotalstrengthof thecorpsto1,044men.Themilitarytrainingwouldbeconcentrated aroundtheuseofaimedfireandfightingaladébandande,whichis "wheretherealstrength"oflightinfantrylay.HereagainEwaldsuccess- fullycombinedHessianyagertraditionswithhisexperiencesintheAmer- ican War.26 Beginninginthefourthsection,theAbhandlungturnedintoamanual ofirregularwarfare,yetEwaldhastenedtoaddthathisrules"aremore assumptionsthanfixedprinciples,becauseoneisalwaysdependentupon circumstanceswhichonecanneverpredictinwar."27Ewald'stheoryof lightinfantrywarfarerestedonfiveprinciples:(1)attackisthebest defense;(2)knowtheareayouoperatein;(3)useyourspeedandmobil- itytocreateanelementofsurprise...

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