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The French Colonial Legacy of the Canada–United States Border in Eastern North America, 1650–1783

PAUL A. DEMERS

Le développement des colonies européennes en Amérique du nord aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles était témoin des concours apparemment éternels de la terre, la souveraineté et le commerce. Les désaccords territoriaux nombreux, par exemple l'Acadie au Canada, ont articulé ces expressions géopolitiques contradictoires. Cet article explore l'évolution des concepts de frontière et des limites nationales, se concentrant sur les conditions qui ont incité des colonies et des états à changer les définitions territoriales au lieu d'adapter des ordres du jour complexes et décalants. Ces changements reflètent quatre étapes cruciales dans le développement des frontières politiques en Amérique du nord-est pendant ce temps: (1) action d'éviter et ajournement de la délimitation; (2) délimitation et concurrence; (3) frontières internes; et (4) formation de la frontière, ou limite, britannique de l'Amérique du nord. Ce travail fournit également une alternative aux études traditionnelles orientées vers les conflits de frontière en se concentrant sur des processus culturels et géopolitiques.

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While North American borders and frontiers have always captured the imagination of academia, popular literature, and the media, the detailed study of these landscapes has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. These studies weigh the complexities and consequences of empire by relating the spatial and cultural dimensions of individuals and regions to the larger theoretical constructs of borders, borderlands, frontiers, and transnationalism.¹ In turn, the underpinnings of such terms are challenged and refined, promoting clearer definitions and more robust understanding of the colonial experience.

Borders and frontiers have long been recognized as cauldrons of social interaction where individual, group, and imperial agenda are executed and contested on a constant and fluid basis. Thus, they serve as sensitive gauges for the nature of interaction between groups and through time. Whether it is apathy in the status quo, rigidity in policy enforcement, or adaptability in the face of changing circumstances, such conditions are most keenly observed along borders. In this case, the 1783 placement of the Canada–United States border in eastern North America was the culmination of several centuries of interaction incorporating many individuals, cultures, and empires. The French colonial legacy was a critical component of border placement, and remained so even after the Conquest of 1763. By examining these French colonial border policies, and the subsequent imperial and local reactions, we gain deeper insights into the nature of group dynamics and notions of territoriality.

This article traces the evolution of French colonial border placement in eastern North America, from disputes over Acadia and the Great Lakes, through the use of New France's relict borders in the definition of the U.S. border in 1783. The four-stage model offered here charts the changes in the structure of borders and the corresponding levels of permeability, as well as their approximate temporal associations: Stage 1: Avoiding or Deferring Placement (1630s–1713); Stage 2: Demarcation and Competition (1713–1763); Stage 3: Setting Internal Borders (1763–1774); and Stage 4: Forming the Canada–U.S. border (1779–1783). The model emphasizes increasing imperial control over the flow of people, goods, and information within territories.² This control often pitted the interests and flexibility of individuals or localities squarely against increasingly rigid imperial agendas. In the resultant political and social landscapes, participants constantly negotiated elements of their individual and collective identities.

For the purposes of this study, a border is defined as an artificial line representing the limits of a political entity's jurisdiction and sovereignty, represented

most often by fixed lines on maps. Certainly, degrees of permeability and contact along borders vary tremendously depending on the political and social circumstances. These limits are an interactive part of a governing system and may be demarcated in a variety of forms.³

Similarly, a borderland can be seen as a unique region encompassing both sides of a political border.⁴ The actual size of this region and the nature of any integration varies depending on the nature of border permeability. Ideally, the concept of borderlands can facilitate observation on both regional and national scales, revealing both regional and national interests. Raimondo Strassoldo, for example, identified several conflicting currents of thought common to border areas that included ambiguous and shifting identities, alienation from core areas, and an extreme defensive nationalism.⁵

Frontiers are transitory stages of settlement that exist at the physical (but not necessarily contiguous) edges of settlement systems, depending on links back to those systems. A frontier is usually located outside the settled, integrated region of a political unit and is an area into which expansion takes place. Frontiers are both spatially and temporally impermanent, and the new inhabitants must adapt to a variety of conditions, including the physical environment and the responses of indigenous groups and/or any other competing settlements in the area.⁶

While frontiers and borders share several features, it is crucial to differentiate between them as social processes. (1) While borders separate two or more political entities such as colonies or nation-states, frontiers are not a formal unit of political separation. Indeed, a frontier can exist entirely within a single political unit. (2) Frontiers are a gauge of the relative degree of settlement and economic exploitation in a region. Conversely, borders are often situated without regard to the nature of demographic or economic development and are not a reliable gauge of such processes. (3) Whereas frontiers are characterized by the absence or weakness of formal political structures such as clearly delineated territory, presence of authority, and sovereignty, borders are designed to impose such structures on a region. In sum, frontiers are a transitional phase of settlement and development, with few formal political structures in place. They are rarely delineated formally, especially while they are occupied. However, borders are more precisely defined and delineated in order to separate discrete political entities.

The study of colonial and international borders in North America presents several unique interpretive challenges. First of all, borders between colonies

within the same imperial system must be viewed in a different fashion from the borders that separate territories of competing imperial systems. Moreover, the mechanisms for creating and maintaining early colonies did not necessarily include borders as an essential feature of the colony itself. Most early colonies were founded by a royal charter that defined its geographical area and the economic and settlement obligations of the grantee(s). Often, the geographical description of the colonies did not contain a fixed western limit, allowing for subsequent economic exploitation and expansion. Moreover, European countries often claimed territory by virtue of exploration and settlement. As such, claims were often difficult to prove, and rival claims to an area were common.

Treaty provisions such as border placement and maintenance were often deferred or ignored totally by at least one of the parties involved. Hence, borders became transition zones of imperial influence and control, leading to the possibility of simultaneous *de jure* and *de facto* borders. Small populations and the demands of early colonial life made it extremely difficult to maintain and enforce borders in a modern sense, generally leading to high degrees of permeability along colonial borders. While borders may have been a more abstract concept in the early colonial experience, colonists, officials, and entrepreneurs developed an increasing sense of territoriality vis-à-vis the Native American presence, and economic and military incursions by foreign powers.

Stage 1: Avoidance and Deferral of Demarcation

By the 1630s, colonial conflicts requiring arbitration arose over disputed territories that were mutually claimed by right of exploration and settlement. The short-lived 1650 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Hartford contained a clause fixing a temporary border between the United Colonies of New England and New Netherland.⁷ In a similar fashion, successive treaties in the seventeenth century avoided the contentious issue of border placement for the sake of peace.

During negotiations for the 1667 Treaty of Breda, the definition of “Acadia” was called into question by both France and England as charters issued under Louis XIV and Charles II conflicted spatially.⁸ Yet, while Acadia was returned to France, it was never demarcated in the treaty. The Treaty of Breda also set the North American precedent for *status quo ante bellum*, or the return of conditions

to their prewar status. This precedent, along with increasing imperial competition, sparked numerous French claims by individuals such as René de Bréhant de Galinée and François Dollier de Casson, or René-Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle.⁹ These claims based on first exploration and Native American alliances pressed the borders of Canada throughout the Great Lakes to the Illinois and Louisiana territories.

In order to end seventeenth-century Anglo-French hostilities in the Hudson's Bay area, the 1686 Treaty of Whitehall, also known as the Treaty of American Neutrality, deferred the placement of a permanent colonial border in the area for future negotiations.¹⁰ A further proviso held that if hostilities broke out in Europe, North American colonies would not adopt a state of war with each other. Anglo-French colonial conflicts would have interfered with Louis XIV's designs on the Rhineland and Spain, and denied James II an ally in his domestic turmoil leading to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Historian Frances Davenport and others have generally dismissed this treaty as inconsequential, owing to the flood of tumultuous events such as the fall of James II and the rise of William and Mary, the rising tide of support for the Grand Alliance against France, and renewed warfare in North America and Europe in 1688–1689.¹¹ Yet as Max Savelle noted, despite its apparent failure, the Treaty of Whitehall represented a milestone whereby North American colonies were treated as a separate entity and not subject to the same rules and conventions as territories in Europe. While such neutrality agreements had been applied on a smaller scale in the Caribbean, the British and French governments extended this treaty to all possessions in North America.¹² Additional treaty prohibitions against fishing or trading in the other's territory, or interfering in Indian wars theoretically bolstered this détente.

Neutrality fit neatly into the agenda of transnational individuals such as Boston trader John Nelson and French official Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie, baron de St. Castin, stationed at Penobscot Bay. Their illicit and lucrative cross-border trade thrived with the tacit acceptance inherent in postponing border demarcation. However, such ambiguities did not suit the imperial aspirations of Governor Edmund Andros of New England or Louis de Buade (comte) de Frontenac, governor of New France. As Owen Stanwood has aptly noted, the increasing polarization of imperial agenda pressured cultural brokers such as St. Castin to curtail their cross-border activities. Conversely, he was held in contempt by

many New Englanders for his associations with the Abenaki, with Catholicism, and for his perceived compliance with French dictates.¹³ Regardless, events on both continents assured quick abrogation of the treaty and the advent of the War of the League of Augsburg, or King William's War, in 1689.

The Treaty of Ryswick, which ended King William's War in 1697, provided for the restoration of Hudson's Bay installations, *status quo ante bellum*, but again deferred border placement to a future commission on commercial affairs. Yet, this commission was never formed, and both sides retained the captured posts.¹⁴ The treaty also banned intercolonial commerce. Ironically, John Nelson of Boston had been taken prisoner by the French and subsequently was asked to act as an intermediary to raise the subject of neutrality with British officials. The French felt neutrality would increase the autonomy of individual colonies and weaken British ties with the Iroquois. In London, Nelson actually argued that neutrality would work to British advantage by virtue of its economic superiority in the fur trade. He argued that since the British traders operating in neutral territory could provide better goods and pay higher prices for pelts, Native groups would become dependent on British goods and cut alliances with the French.¹⁵

Nelson's vision of neutral territories as cosmopolitan "free-trade zones" where Europeans and Native Americans could advance their own self-interest was indeed well ahead of its time. And as such, it ran counter to the emerging trend of increasing imperial control where zones of influence were being converted to lines of enforcement. At one point in 1697, Nelson was even accused of being a French operative and arrested. On several occasions, he remarked that his vision had been "crusht between the two Crownes."¹⁶

Neutrality had been used as a bargaining chip in the imperial power play by a variety of indigenous and Euro-American ethnic groups residing in borderlands. Marginalized groups such as the Acadians incurred the wrath of both British and French officials over their neutral stance, and ultimately the refusal of many Acadians to swear loyalty oaths on several occasions.¹⁷ Neutrality had brought a degree of autonomy to these small groups, which were often derided as small republics by imperial officials. While such autonomy and independence fostered the formation of new Métis or Creole identities, it increasingly ran counter to British and imperial policies aimed at reducing self-rule in the colonies.

Stage 2: Demarcation and Competition

Following the War of the Spanish Succession, treaties signed at London in 1712 and Utrecht in 1713 detailed the French restoration of territory to Great Britain, including Hudson's Bay and the Strait, Newfoundland, and the so-called "ancient boundaries" of Acadia (figure 1).¹⁸ The British traced these limits through New Brunswick and Quebec to the St. Lawrence River, including Cape Breton and the peninsula of Nova Scotia. However, the French maintained Cape Breton, the Gulf of St. Lawrence islands, and the mainland to the Kennebec River, using the Abenaki as a buffer zone.¹⁹ Buffering strategy would become a powerful imperial tool in controlling the growth of colonial territories.

In spirit, this treaty also sought to fix a more permanent Anglo-French border through an appointed commission. In the interim, neither group was allowed to cross into the known territory of the other group.²⁰ On paper, this restriction was a significant departure from the more casual attitudes on borders established through previous treaties. Yet in practice, both the French and British ignored it. While one of the major British goals for the Treaty of Utrecht was to gain access to the interior of the continent, subsequent French policy was designed to thwart this endeavor. Success in holding the west and barring, or at least buffering against, British incursions could only be achieved through Native American support and alliances. By 1715, posts were constructed further south and west to court this allegiance through trade relations. The French hoped these relationships would form both a physical and economic barrier to British expansion.

Despite several decades of initial success, fluctuations in fur prices, trade rivalries, and land speculation all jeopardized these alliances in the 1740s. A series of incidents collectively known as the Indian Uprising of 1747, and an increasing Anglo-American fur-trading presence in the Ohio Valley seriously threatened French control.²¹ Yet, French efforts to regain the Ohio Valley were relatively successful, and the French regained control of the area by 1754.²²

These conflicts in the Great Lakes region were paralleled by a lesser-known phase of intense diplomatic negotiation pursuant to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748. The *status quo* clause relating back to Utrecht seemed ridiculous in light of the efforts of both sides to occupy the area of the western Great Lakes and beyond. Yet, the provision to set up a commission to oversee claims and fix a border seems to have been taken more seriously than in the past. A committee was appointed to look into

Figure 1. Anglo-French Land Claims, 1713.¹⁸

border issues and claims, including Nova Scotia, the St. Lawrence River, and the Ohio Valley. Comprehensive studies by historians Theodore Pease and Enid Robbie have emphasized that these negotiations were not simply a *fait accompli* superseded by the peace of 1763.²³

There were numerous claims, proposals, and counterproposals, but little consensus in actual border placement. Both sides suggested neutral buffer zones where traders would be allowed, but all forts and settlements would be abandoned. The French rejected a zone from the Appalachians to the Wabash River that threatened the posts of Duquesne, Sandoské, and Ouiatenon. Conversely, the British rejected a proposal to include Lakes Ontario and Erie and the Niagara area, as it would have sacrificed portions of New York and Iroquois territory.

Maps of North America produced in the 1740s and 1750s provided graphic depictions of these territorial aspirations and perceived borders. While many were not official government documents, they portrayed a variety of nationalistic and commercial agendas, often transmitted through period journals such as *Gentleman's Magazine* or *Royal Magazine*. Given private agendas such as land speculation, it is not surprising that the proposed buffer zones, as areas of zero growth, were typically not represented on many period maps.

While tribal identifications on maps were common, their placement took on additional importance to legitimize land claims devised through complex webs of alliances, treaties, and cessions. British maps such as the 1759 G. Rollos "Seat of War" map showed the Province of New York extending north, well beyond its charter border of the St. Lawrence, to the Ottawa River through Lake Nipissing (figure 2).²⁴ While this map referenced "Antient Outaouacs" in the region, it portrayed this area as Six Nations territory. Hence, an Iroquois label became the rationale for a British claim as per the terms of Utrecht.

Evans's 1755 *Analysis* included an instructional map outlining border areas that needed permanent settlement to bolster British claims against the French.²⁵ However, no map had more impact on border negotiations than the 1755 original and 1775 reissue of the *Map of the British Colonies in North America* by John Mitchell.²⁶ Indeed, it was not only a standard by which the Canada-U.S. border was based in 1783, but was cited in border negotiations as late as 1932.²⁷ Generations of this map bore the infamous "red line" border routes debated by the British and United States, in consultation with Spain and France.²⁸ However, the function and exact context of the "red lines" is not well known. Historians still debate exactly who marked each route, and if these marks were meant as

Figure 2. Nipissing Line Land Claim, 1759.²⁴

points of clarification, proposals, or counterproposals.²⁹ While the base maps were freely copied from many sources, notes on the legitimacy of claims and counterclaims were often included. In one case, a map by Jefferys was modified by Bellin to show the “*prétendues*” (alleged or false claims) of Britain and a description of the historic basis of French claims.³⁰

Stage 3: Setting Internal Borders

Following the Seven Years’ War, the 1763 Treaty of Paris provided at least a temporary border definition. The British defined the “ancient limits” of Canada as the area from the headwater of the St. John’s River through Lake St. Jean and Lake Nipissing, skirting the Ottawa River to Lake St. Francis near St. Regis, New York. The limit continued on the southern side of the St. Lawrence, north-east following the height of land, eventually terminating at Baie des Chaleurs and including the Gaspésie. While this southern line became the basis for the Canada-U.S. border, its configuration was a source of tension during later U.S. negotiations (figure 3).³¹

The British government also reorganized its internal colonial borders, subsequently redefining Canada. The Royal Proclamation prohibited settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains pending a solution to the problems of incursions into Native American territory. The British also wanted to channel settlers from the 13 colonies north into Canada to dilute the French-speaking Catholic population of Quebec. The Acadian expulsions were also part of this larger plan. Yet, the lure of the Ohio Valley proved too powerful as streams of English-speaking settlers illegally poured into the region.

The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix was designed in part to address these issues. The Stanwix Line situated the Ohio River as the permanent border, or at least a buffer zone, between Indian country and white settlement along the frontier of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The line angered Native American groups who lost control of strategic areas to either whites or the Iroquois, and land speculators already livid over the settlement prohibitions of 1763.

Ironically, the French definition of the “ancient boundaries” was resurrected by the British via the 1774 Quebec Act, in order to maintain Canada as a base of operations, and to court the allegiance of French Canadian elites. This act restored Canadian territory to include the rich fur-trade area from the junction

Figure 3. Treaty Border Lines, 1763–1774.³¹

of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, extending north through western Lake Superior, and bordering on the Hudson's Bay Company reserve. Acquisition of this newly opened area reduced the competition from other colonial fur-trade centers such as Albany, New York. The 13 colonies were extremely bitter about this border reconfiguration and hailed it as one of the "Intolerable Acts," compelling them into revolt.

Stage 4: Forming the Canada–United States Border: Legacy and Irony

While the ancient limits would figure prominently in these debates, the mechanics of territorial description proved to be a long and complicated process. The subject of borders with the northern British colonies had been discussed repeatedly in Congress prior to the end of the American Revolution in 1783.³² In February 1779,

a proposal was introduced for the U.S. border to run “northerly by the ancient limits of Canada, as contended for by Great Britain.”³³ It continued from Nova Scotia, along the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, to Lake Nipissing, then west to the Mississippi River. Ironically, this “Nipissing Line” was based on the 1750s British attempt to extend the border of New York, north of the St. Lawrence River into then French territory, by portraying the area as Six Nations territory. The British claimed the region, citing an article in Utrecht granting sovereignty over all Iroquois territory. However, the Nipissing Line, as an attempt to hoist Britain on its own petard, was not passed. This claim was raised again briefly in 1782 in the Continental Congress, but was abandoned once again.³⁴

Another proposal introduced by Gouverneur Morris in March 1779 depicted the border as running through former French territory along the Mississippi to the Illinois River, along Lake Michigan, to the northern shore of Lake Huron, to the French River and Lake Nipissing and the St. Lawrence.³⁵ This plan was actually an amalgam of the French definition for the southwestern ancient limits, and the 1763 British definition of the northern limits.

While French metropolitan interests discouraged further military expeditions against Canada, the Continental Congress and its commissioners in Paris continued to appeal for Canada to join the new nation. Diplomatically, commissioners such as Benjamin Franklin openly sought Canada as reparation for wartime losses and as a buffer zone for security. Congress also felt that their claim to at least a portion of the Canadian territory was strengthened by U.S. military successes in the Ohio country.³⁶ Memorials of land tenure from states such as Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, and on behalf of land speculators in the Ohio and Indiana country detailed the need for strength in negotiation and expansive border demands.³⁷ These memorials also traced the historical bases for states’ land claims and were a prelude to many U.S. interstate border controversies that would follow the demarcation of national borders.

These powerful interests began to argue for a rival configuration for the border through “the middle of the lakes.” In June 1781, Virginia wished to add a qualifying clause that the border could only be modified west from the junction of the 45th parallel and the St. Lawrence, receding south as far as the middle of Lake Ontario, the Strait of Niagara, and Lake Erie.³⁸ Any cessions south of these areas would have impeded Virginia’s massive territorial aspirations. While this amendment was voted down, it appears to be the first congressional reference to splitting the Great Lakes, and a first step in the eventual border compromise.

Figure 4. Treaty Lines, 1763–1783.⁴¹

In retrospect, the “middle of the lakes” solution was a compromise between the borderlines established by the Treaty of Paris, the 1763 Royal Proclamation, and the 1774 Quebec Act.³⁹ Regardless of later border disputes, John Jay maintained that a borderline through the middle of the lakes “would form an unmistakable line” for the future.⁴⁰

The British government felt that borders were intertwined with other issues, such as compensation for the Loyalists and mounting war debts. The consensus was that if the conflict continued, debts would grow and the United States would become only more intransigent, especially on the issue of borders. Yet, the British needed to secure eastern and southern Ontario along the St. Lawrence, and Lakes Ontario and Erie, to preserve the Loyalist communities that had flourished since the 1770s. In essence, Britain could accept the “middle of the lakes” proposal in exchange for land and compensation for the Loyalists (figure 4).⁴¹ This line was rationalized as a better compromise than the “Nipissing Line” for the Canadian fur traders whose traditional routes were not placed in U.S. territory. Yet, they complained that traffic would be diverted from Montreal to Albany as a result of this border placement.

Regardless, the 1783 Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War and contained the description of a new international border, at least in principle, between British North America and the United States. While maps such as those of Mitchell and Robert represented the state of the art in mapmaking for North America, gross inaccuracies due to the lack of detailed measurements were still present. Imprecise geographical knowledge of the region would persist until almost the middle of the nineteenth century, and spark numerous border controversies for decades. For example, the true course and the source of the Mississippi River were not discovered until the expeditions of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft in 1832.⁴²

The borders of New France proved to be a critical and enduring feature in the evolution of North American territoriality well beyond the eighteenth century. In its various forms, territorial limits were employed both to advance claims and to limit those of rivals. This analysis also reveals the complex forms of cross-cultural interaction between groups residing in or administering the borderlands. For much of the period of study, borders remained zones of shifting imperial influence. Community declarations of neutrality became a vehicle for asserting autonomy and independence and a foundation for new social identities. Consequently, these also brought communities into conflict with imperial powers. Increased reliance on oath-taking, and ultimately the expulsions in the eighteenth century, reflected imperial attempts to minimize this autonomy.

The strategy of employing buffer zones became a hallmark of the demarcation and competition stage. These could be used as a “no-man’s land,” a demilitarized zone, or as a human barrier to a rival’s geographical aspirations. Native American land claims, allegiances, treaties, and cessions all carried great import in subsequent Euro-American land claims and testimonials. Many proposed “red-line” routes were based on the above webs of interaction, whether these were real, imagined, or otherwise. Ironically, old claims for territorial limits were sometimes recycled by rivals to promote new agendas. For example, the British used the French definition of the ancient limits to keep Canada as a base, while the United States initially used the British “Nipissing Line” claim against the French to negotiate additional British territory north of the St. Lawrence River. Ultimately, the “Middle of the Lakes” was adopted for the British North American–United States border, incorporating several versions of the original borders of New France.

Finally, this work departs from many traditional border studies in that it focuses on the long-term evolution of borders while deemphasizing the military conflicts themselves. This diachronic approach affords the opportunity to trace the interplay between imperial policy and local agenda without relying solely on military-centered or conflict-oriented perspectives. In addition, this approach fosters a greater appreciation of the cultural permeability of borders and attempts to regulate such contact, as well as the ever-changing nature of political and social identities along borders.

NOTES

1. Examples of these approaches include Jeremy Adelman and Stephan Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 814–41; Daniel P. Barr, ed., *The Boundaries between Us: Natives and Newcomers along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750–1850* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006); Andrew Cayton and Fredrika Teute, eds., *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750–1830* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); David Demeritt, “Representing the ‘True’ St. Croix: Knowledge and Power in the Partition of the Northeast,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., 54, no. 3 (July 1997), 515–48; Sterling Evans, ed., *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays*

- on *Regional History of the Forty-Ninth Parallel* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604–1755* (Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press for the Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy and Public Administration, University of Moncton, 2005); A.J.B. Johnston, *Control and Order in French Colonial Louisbourg, 1713–1758* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001); David R. Jones, "From Frontier to Borderland: The Acadian Community in a Comparative Context, 1605–1710," *Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society* 7 (2004): 15–37; Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); John G. Reid, Maurice Basque, Elizabeth Mancke, Barry Moody, Geoffrey Plank, and William Wicken, *The "Conquest" of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Alfred J. Rieber, "Changing Concepts and Constructions of Frontiers: A Comparative Historical Approach," *Ab Imperio* 1 (2003): 23–46; Owen Stanwood, "Unlikely Imperialist: The Baron of Saint-Castin and the Transformation of the Northeastern Borderlands," *French Colonial History* 5 (2004): 43–62; Cornelis A. van Minnen and Sylvia L. Hilton, eds., *Frontiers and Boundaries in U.S. History* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2004).
2. The four-stage model presented here was originally inspired by the works of Oscar J. Martinez, including *Troublesome Border* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988); *Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994); Oscar J. Martinez, ed., *U.S. Mexico Borderlands: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996).
 3. These definitions are discussed at length in Paul A. Demers, "The Formation and Maintenance of the Canada–United States Border in the St. Mary's River and Lake Huron Borderlands, 1780–1860," Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 2001, 5–9, 15–33.
 4. Detailed discussions of the borderlands concept can be found in Stephen Hornsby, Victor Konrad, and James J. Hernan, eds., *The Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction* (Fredericton, N.B.: Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, and Acadiensis Press, 1989); Dennis Rumley and Julian V. Minghi, eds., *The Geography of Border Landscapes* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
 5. Raimondo Strassoldo, G. Zelli Doti, and Franco Angeli, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in Border Areas* (Milan: Franco Angeli Editore, 1982).
 6. This definition of frontier combines elements derived from Donald L. Hardesty, "Foreword," in *The American Frontier*, by Kenneth E. Lewis (New York: Academic Press,

- 1984), xix–xx; and Kenneth E. Lewis, *West to Far Michigan: Settling the Lower Peninsula, 1815–1860* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 3–5.
7. Frances Gardiner Davenport, *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, 4 vols. (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967), 1:1–9.
8. Davenport, *European Treaties*, 139.
9. Cornelius Jaenen, *The French Regime in the Upper Country of Canada during the Seventeenth Century* (Toronto: The Champlain Society and the Government of Ontario, 1996). This volume contains many such claims translated from seventeenth-century texts.
10. Jaenen, *French Regime*, 324–27.
11. Davenport, *European Treaties*, 2:319–22.
12. Max Savelle, *Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica, 1492–1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 108.
13. Stanwood, “Unlikely Imperialist,” 49–51.
14. W. J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier: 1534–1760* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), 141.
15. Davenport, *European Treaties*, 2:357; Nelson to Duke of Shrewsbury, February 1696, quoted in Richard R. Johnson, *John Nelson, Merchant Adventurer: A Life between Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 90–91.
16. Richard R. Johnson, *John Nelson, Merchant Adventurer: A Life between Two Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102–3, 132.
17. John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); A.J.B. Johnston, *Control and Order in French Colonial Louisbourg, 1713–1758* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001).
18. Demers, “The Formation and Maintenance of the Canada–United States Border,” 44. This map was originally derived from W. J. Eccles, *France in America*, rev. ed. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1990), 122.
19. W. J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier*, 142.
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 35. Originally, this border description was entered only in the Secret Journal, Foreign Affairs. This description was added as a footnote for United States Congress, *Journals of the Continental Congress* 13 (1779): 341.
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