Why has there been a perpetual debureaucratization failure in post-dictatorial Greece and why have all prescriptions for rational administrative reform failed to date? This paper addresses these questions from a sociopolitical control perspective, examining the organized efforts of the post-dictatorial political forces in Greece to acquire, maintain, and reproduce their established interests in the state apparatus and the wider public sector. Utilizing a comparative analysis of the attempts at administrative reform and exposing the similarities of the clientelistic politics of both governing parties, i.e., Néa Dimokratía and PASOK, the paper argues that the overall performance of the Greek public administration is not pathological but rather functional for the established sociopolitical control system of Greek bureaucratism—i.e., the particular organization and operation of the entire state apparatus—imposed and perpetuated by the Greek ruling forces to serve their politicoeconomic interests. Debureaucratization goes against party interests; it is pursued and implemented only to the extent that it does not inhibit—indeed, that it enhances—party control of the state and of patronage.


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pp. 187-217
Launched on MUSE
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