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Reviews 269 persuade the Turks to commit themselves on the Allied side) they were discouraged to find that no such step had yet been taken. Papágos, however, insisted (then and after the war) that it had been clearly understood at the 22 February meeting that the withdrawal of Greek forces from northern Greece to the Aliakmon line would be dependent on the Yugoslav attitude (which the British had undertaken to investigate), and since there had been no Yugoslav answer, he had made no move. To the British, this seemed to question the feasibility of the whole enterprise, but it was nevertheless decided to go ahead with the plan. On this controversial issue, Bitzes supports the Greek version of events (as does Robin Higham in his more detailed and better documented study published in 1986, Diary of a Duaster). Bitzes makes no use of C. M. Woodhouse 's very detailed study of the problem published in 1985 ("The Aliakmon Line: An Anglo-Greek Misunderstanding in 1941," Balkan Studies 26: 159193 ), which shows that both sides were probably acting in good faith and that it was a genuine misunderstanding. It is worrying that Bitzes supports his viewpoint with a quotation from the British documents that is taken out of its proper context (p. 122). Bitzes seems to conclude that the Greek campaign was badly mismanaged by the British, who came in too late and with too small a force, whereas more determined British assistance in the autumn of 1940 when the Greeks were winning might have produced spectacular results. This assessment may well be correct. It also seems to me that he is right in saying (p. 164) that "the Greco-British effort was remarkably successful in spite of the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Greco-British relationship." In fact, the landing of British troops in Greece in 1941, however calamitous in the short run, probably had the strategic effect it was intended to have. Bitzes' book commendably presents the Greek issue as one part of a large and complex world situation. Political and military issues are often well described; unfortunately, the evidence is nowhere sufficiendy presented. Lars Baerentzen University of Florida Jon V. Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1989. Pp. xii + 215. $24.95. Jon Kofas' argument is that at the end of World War II and in the early Cold War, the United States was confronted by a situation in which, for economic, strategic, and military reasons, it was compelled to act, He downplays the last two reasons for U.S. intervention in Greece, asserting that President Truman's "intransigent and confrontational" style in dealing with 270 Reviews the Soviet Union was a general reaction to social revolutionary movements that left a legacy of intervention directed against "structural societal change in the Third World." Greece, the author acknowledges, was in dire need of systemic socioeconomic changes. What the United States did, he argues, was to rely on the indigenous oligarchy (the capitalist class, rich industrialists, and the military) to restore the prewar economy, instead of restructuring the economy, as it should have done. This stacked the cards against "reformist" forces (communists , socialists, and some centrists), reducing Greece to economic dependency . The author wishes that there had been a willingness to gamble with the uncertainty of a democratic coalition more independent of the West, and with a strengthening of the state, which in turn could have taken initiatives in agricultural reform, have undertaken a public works program, developed a capital-goods sector, protected existing industries and markets, reformed a regressive income tax structure, and increased the spending power of the lower classes. Such a model, he argues, can be seen in the case of Greece's Balkan neighbors where savings gained by low wages were invested in industrial development under state direction, thereby justifying the sacrifices of the working class and building a firm foundation for long-term development. In Greece, on the contrary, capital flight, speculative investment, and luxury imports did not leave much room for productive investment. It is Kofas' belief that the private sector should have been compelled to reinvest in productive enterprises. The...

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