Moroland, 1899-1906: America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society (review)

Robert Fulton declares that the Philippines were "destined by history" to become a principal flashpoint "between the two largest religions in the world and the conflicting political ideologies that have come from them" (p. 30). His book surveys the United States's efforts to extend central government control into the predominantly Muslim islands of the Philippine archipelago between 1899 and 1906. Fulton divides these years into three periods. In the first period, he describes the furtive American encounters with the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago from 1899 until the end of the Philippine War in 1901. Fulton then portrays the years between 1901 and 1906 as a time of deliberate engagement by the U.S. that begins with a period of relative accommodation and ends with a period of brutal subjugation. He concludes that the U.S. failed in pacifying and transforming Moro society largely because Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood aborted a strategy of accommodation with the indigenous leadership personified by Fulton in the person of Capt. John J. Pershing.

Moroland provides a useful tool for researchers interested in the development of U.S. governance in the Philippines. The bibliography includes a wealth of primary sources and indicates a determined effort to understand the events from the perspective of the time. The historiography of American policy on the Moro islands currently lacks a comprehensive survey that synthesizes the narrative threads found in relevant biographies and monographs. However, because of its flaws, Fulton's book does not meet this historiographical need.

Moroland's author does not make the best use of his source material. Fulton has a proclivity to adopt the perspective of a chosen first-hand observer. The chapters are thematically and chronologically consistent, but they lack well-defined arguments. Too frequently, Fulton steps outside of the narrative only to conjecture about the intentions of leaders, suggest counterfactuals, or offer anachronistic observations. The latter flaw is symptomatic of his pedantic writing style. In one passage, Fulton uses half a paragraph to explain the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty (p. 51). The problem is compounded as Fulton repeatedly errs in treating points of evidence that are merely suggestive as if they are themselves conclusive. Collectively, these flaws give the book a frustratingly ad hoc feel.

Despite the depth of his research, Fulton's documentation of sources in the text is sparse. The author substantiates few of his assertions with the scholarship he cites in the bibliography. He devotes substantial attention to the character and policies of Pershing and Wood, yet does not reference Pershing's biographers at all in his endnotes and only cites from Wood's biographers three times. Additionally, Fulton makes no use of relevant works, such as Glenn May's Social Engineering in the Philippines, which should have informed his analysis and his evaluation of the historical actors he discusses.

The author presumes that meaningful lessons should be drawn from "America's first attempt to transform an Islamic society" for the U.S. today. However, he never clearly defines what those lessons might be. He faults the leaders of the time for not reflecting on the substance of their success against the Muslim tribesmen but stops short of giving his own conclusions as to what American military and civilian leaders ought to have done. Fulton argues that the pacification of the Moro tribesmen was ultimately a failure but never establishes what would have constituted success. He criticizes the policy of extending authority from Manila into the southern islands and retaining them as part of the Philippines, but he offers no alternative. Unfortunately, Moroland is only suggestive of a great story that needs to be told rather than providing its telling.