The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (review)

The past few years have seen an increasing interest in the study of the various concepts of self and personality. Gill offers a thorough analysis of Stoic and Epicurean theories with detailed reference to their Platonic preliminaries, most notably those in Timaeus and Alcibiades I. As he thinks that the terms “self,” “personality,” “personhood,” and “personal identity” partially overlap, he mentions at the outset (xiv) two common connotations, individual distinctiveness on the one hand and psychological (or psychophysical) structure or what is fundamental to our nature on the other. He examines the second set of ideas. The main thesis is that the self is not an individual subject of experience, as in a Cartesian conception, but rather it is shaped by the public sphere, thus implying social roles. This emphasis was shifted towards a more subjectivist stance, exemplified in Plutarch and Galen. Stoic and Epicurean theories show a psychophysical holism contrasted with Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. Accordingly, soul and body form a unified whole. This is why the activities attached to the self are not just psychical, but physiological as well. Such a move is understandable if we have in mind that both schools considered soul a corporeal being. Unlike Plato’s views in the Phaedo and the Republic, the relation of soul to body is not conceived in dualistic terms, that is, as something existing between two entities of radically different nature and value. Instead, all psychic phenomena such as motivations, virtues, as well as happiness, are regarded as psychophysical states. For instance, in describing stable (καταστηματική) pleasures the Epicureans claim that they are properties of the whole human being, not only of his soul. Similarly, the Stoics insist that motivation involves the whole person, not just a rational core. The holistic approach characterizes Posidonius’ thought as well. Gill shows that he shared the early Stoic conception with the qualification that he tied it to Plato’s psychology in the Timaeus. The literary reception in Virgil and Seneca shows to what extent these Hellenistic themes pervaded the intellectual milieu more broadly.

Gill represents Aristotle as holding the view that humans are composed of two ingredients that are ontologically different. It is certainly true that matter (such as human body) and form (soul) have a different status in human beings, but it may be equally true that their relation cannot be described in dualistic terms and, what is more, soul is nothing but the structure and proper force of the body. All bodily functions are triggered by the soul. It is the first ἐντελέχεια of a natural body that has life potentially (De anima 412a27). This is not to deny their difference, but it is not a difference between potentially separate entities. This concept of the soul differs from what we find in the Phaedo considerably. Furthermore, even if Aristotle endorsed a part-based model, one has to clarify in what sense we speak about part concerning this matter, for both Hellenistic schools admitted that the soul is a part of the human being. Holistic approach can only be pursued within such limits. The description of the Epicurean theory of stable pleasures as properties of the whole human being might also be qualified. One might say that as pleasures they are states of the soul primarily, possibly caused by states of the flesh. Since soul-atoms are throughout the body, the distinction between mental and bodily pleasures may not amount to the statement that the latter belong to the flesh as its functions (117).

To sum up, Gill’s analysis of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic theories is insightful and convincing, my only concern being that the contrast he draws between these currents of thought and the Platonic-Aristotelian antecedents may be unnecessarily sharp. The book is furnished with an adequate bibliography and two indices. This is a fine work which will no doubt become a basic tool for all students of Hellenistic philosophy and intellectual history.