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Pragmatist Aesthetics and Confucianism

RICHARD SHUSTERMAN

I

I am grateful to Scott Stroud for organizing this symposium and inviting me to discuss pragmatist aesthetics and Confucianism. Neither field formed part of my university education, so my interest in them is essentially a product of fascination, devoid of professorial or professional pressure, though it was surely shaped by other contingencies and needs. Trained as an analytic philosopher in Jerusalem and Oxford, I first came to appreciate the power of pragmatism only in the mid-1980s when I moved to America. My awakening to the philosophical richness of Confucianism is much more recent. It began with my desire to get acquainted enough with classical Chinese philosophy in order to write prefaces for the Chinese translations (published in 2002) of *Pragmatist Aesthetics* and *Practicing Philosophy*. I very quickly became deeply impressed with the significant resonances between Chinese philosophy and the pragmatist themes that most appealed to me, so I continued my study of Chinese thought. There remains so much to learn.¹

Chinese philosophy is vast and diverse, but the pragmatist tradition, while far more limited, is also far from monolithic and resists essentialist, homogenous definition. Its roots include elements of older British and German philosophies that were creatively brewed in the crucible of the New World, where they could be more fruitfully mixed with greater freedom because they could function free from the constraints imposed by their old national cultural fields. The multiple roots of pragmatism also extend to Asian thought. Emerson, widely recognized as a prophet of pragmatism before the movement's official beginning with C. S. Peirce, was deeply inspired by the

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Upanishads and the doctrines of the Buddha. William James's explorations of religious experience likewise drew significantly from yoga, Vedanta, and Buddhism. John Dewey spent a year in Japan and was later especially influenced by what he learned from his experiences of living in the volatile culture of China between 1919 and 1921. As his daughter Jane confirmed, this experience "was so great as to act as a rebirth of [Dewey's] intellectual enthusiasms," and he henceforth held China as "the country nearest his heart after his own."²

The promising convergence between pragmatism and classical Chinese philosophy could perhaps generate a new transcultural global philosophy. In an earlier essay my explorations of this possibility through the convergence of pragmatism and East-Asian thought were more general.³ Here I shall concentrate mainly on the aesthetic dimension in pragmatism and Confucianism, since the second essay in this symposium will deal extensively with Daoism. But I should begin by noting the fundamentally practice-oriented stance of pragmatism and Confucianism that underlies their general approaches to aesthetics.

Pragmatism shares with Confucianism an insistence that philosophy be primarily directed to the aims of preserving, cultivating, and perfecting human life, and thus that philosophy should be closely connected with ethics and politics. In other words, philosophy is aimed primarily at human benefits and improving our humanism, not at describing reality for the mere sake of producing true sentences. The concern with improving the human condition through philosophy is evidence of the practical orientation that pragmatism shares with Confucianism. Even if we wish to ascribe it some special intrinsic value of its own (such as the pure pleasures of contemplative thought), philosophy's prime value is the instrumental value of improving human life. But in making it a means to this highest end, one is not degrading philosophy as deficient in value. For if we value and wish to achieve the end, then we must equally respect the best means that can secure that end (provided, of course, that there is nothing immoral about those means).

This general pragmatic stance has the aesthetic corollary that the highest function of aesthetics is to improve our experience of art and beauty rather than to produce precise verbal definitions of these concepts, which *Pragmatist Aesthetics* critically describes as "wrapper definitions" since their aim is to perfectly cover the logical extension of these concepts rather than to illuminate their value or importance. The value of aesthetic discourse, including definitions, is in its pragmatic guiding toward an improved experience of art; hence, Dewey claims "a definition is good when it points in the direction in which we can move expeditiously" to such experience.⁴

Confucian aesthetics seems similarly pragmatic. While Confucius speaks often and passionately about music (noting its varieties, uses, and values), he does not try to offer a formal definition of this art. Suspicious of mere

verbal solutions (and more generally wary of linguistic glibness), Confucius instead provides guidance of how to realize musical value in experience by noting examples of musical excellence (and failure), by offering brief but illuminating critical commentary, and by proposing exemplary methods of musical practice. "The Master said of the *shao* music that it is both superbly beautiful (*mei*) and superbly effective (*shan*). Of the *wu* music he said that it is superbly beautiful but not superbly efficacious." "The Master said 'The Cry of the Osprey' is pleasing without being excessive, is mournful without being injurious." In contrast, Confucius claimed, "the Zheng music is lewd" (3.25, 3.20, 15.11). Besides these evaluative examples, he suggests some concrete methods to heighten the quality of our musical experience: "The Master talked to the Grand Music master of Lu about music, and said: 'Much can be realized with music if one begins by playing in unison, and then goes on to improvise with purity of tone and distinctness and flow [or sincerity], thereby bringing all to completion'" (3.23). And, "When the Master was with others who were singing and they sang well, he would invariably ask them to sing the piece again before joining the harmony" (7.32). Though these pragmatic ways of improving our understanding of music may seem rather fragmentary, thin, or partial, we must not forget that they are meant to be filled in by the rich concrete contextuality of experience, whose enhancement in practice is also the purpose of musical theory.

Moreover, to improve our experience of art does not simply mean increasing our personal enjoyment and understanding of artworks. For art is not only a source of inner pleasure (important a value as that is); art is also a practical way of giving grace and beauty to the social functions of everyday life. Music, for Confucius (as we can see from the examples above), clearly has this social function, providing both a means and an example of harmonizing one's voice, feelings, and words with others in creatively expressive rather than oppressively dictated ways. The Confucian understanding of art, it must be emphasized, is not at all like the compartmentalized "museum conception of art" that evolved in Western modernity and that Dewey rightly criticized not only for its aesthetic limitations but for the broader social, ideological, and cultural problems that help shape and sustain it.

Art, for Confucian and pragmatist aesthetics (as I understand them), is a crucial means of ethical education that can improve both the individual and society. The Confucian insistence on the importance of music (*yue*) and ritual (*li*) makes this aesthetic model of education clear. These aesthetic practices are not merely aesthetic in the compartmentalized, formalist, Kantian sense. As Confucius insists: "In referring time and again to observing ritual propriety (*li*) how could I just be talking about gifts of jade and silk? And in referring time and again to making music (*yue*), how could I just be talking about bells and drums?" (17.11). He likewise urges the study of the *Songs* for their cognitive, moral, and social efficacy—to "arouse your

sensibilities, strengthen your powers of observation, enhance your ability to get on with others, and sharpen your critical skills" (17.9). The aesthetic value of harmony and grace is essential both to self-government and broader social government. It is better to govern through an aesthetic of harmony and attraction than by rigid rules and commandments. "The exemplary person (*junzi*) attracts friends through refinement (*wen*), and thereby promotes virtuous conduct (*ren*)" (12.24). Virtue thus includes an essential aesthetic dimension. Appearances are essential for expressing the proper feelings—hence the Confucian emphasis that virtuous conduct must include "the proper countenance" or "demeanor," and that aesthetic practices like ritual and music (including the recitation of the *Songs*) are crucial for cultivating this proper demeanor of virtue (1.12, 2.8, 4.1, 4.17, 8.4, 12.24, 13.6).

The aesthetic and ethical are so closely connected in Confucianism (much like the Greek *kalon-kai-agathon*) that it would be wrongheaded to contrast them sharply. So while the basic meaning of *mei* 美 is "beauty," the meaning of the Confucian notion of the five *mei* in *Analects* 20.2 is just as reasonably translated (by Ames and Rosemont) as "the five virtues" as it is by Waley's more literal rendering as "the Five Lovely Things."⁵ Similarly for pragmatism, as I construe it, aesthetic education, in the truest and widest sense, is an indispensable key to ethical education and to social and political reconstruction. I offer arguments for this in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (where I explore contemporary ethics in terms of the art of living) and in *Practicing Philosophy*, where I also elaborate an "aesthetic justification of democracy" as a participatory practice.⁶

While pragmatism is focused on human improvement, it does so by recognizing that human nature is inextricably and usefully situated in the larger arena of nature in which human beings productively participate. In the terms I have learned from Chinese philosophy, *ren* belongs to a more encompassing *dao*. Wider natural forces need to be discerned and utilized to advance our human projects, including the global project of perfecting our humanity. In aesthetics, this means understanding how art's rhythms and energies emerge from and fruitfully build on those of the environing natural world. To say that art is rooted in and shaped by larger natural forces does not mean that it is just doing what comes naturally as an innate ability with no need for cultural conventions and rigorous training. Art is clearly shaped by human history and conventions, but since human history and culture are themselves partly structured by the natural world they help re-shape, pragmatism can see art as a cultural product while equally recognizing the formative power of art's natural roots and energies. Confucianism makes the same point about the aesthetic blending of nature and culture in ritual and artistic practices. As Confucius insists that an exemplary person requires the right harmonious balance of natural disposition and refinement (6.18), so for Xunzi ritual is a (naturally rooted) cultural supplement that is

needed to perfect imperfect human nature and that eventually (by leading us toward sagehood) can bring the perfection or “completion” of Nature’s (or Heaven’s, that is, *tian*’s 天) work.⁷

As a philosophy that takes means seriously, pragmatism also appreciates the importance of finding the most useful mean that lies between various extremes, recognizing that this proper mean is also a changing function of the pluralities of changing contexts. Confucianism also appreciates the importance of the flexible mean. “Perfect is the Mean,” declares Confucius in *The Doctrine of the Mean*, and Xunzi celebrates ritual for being “the mean course” that harmonizes between excessive form and excessive emotion while recognizing that its techniques must be adapted according to the changing circumstances. “Rites trim what is too long, stretch out what is too short, eliminate excess, remedy deficiency, and extend cultivated forms that express love and respect so that they increase and complete the beauty of conduct according to one’s duty.” Though the elements of ritual are stable, their proper use in achieving a harmonious mean involves “substituting and changing them as the occasion requires.”⁸

II

If philosophy seeks primarily to preserve, cultivate, and perfect human life, this quest for improvement has at least two parallel dimensions: First, there is the person’s own inner self-realization, a desire to achieve a certain unity and integrity of character, expressed in harmony with oneself and with others. But a purely personal inner state is not enough for pragmatist philosophy. It requires some external expression in the realm of action, a certain excellence in the conduct of life, the ability to dignify and improve the world through one’s practical efforts and exemplary life, which implies a concern for the lives of others in the larger social and natural fabric that inevitably shapes any individual. In Chinese thought this double ideal of inner and outer perfection—of self and social fulfillment—is nicely conveyed through the notion of “sageliness within and kingliness without,” though pragmatism might prefer to dispense with the metaphor of royalty.⁹

The philosophical life of self-cultivation and self-perfection is sometimes criticized as an isolating narcissism. Should we not devote philosophy to larger public concerns and to the universe as a whole? Isn’t the individual self a product of far wider social and natural forces that should instead form the true focus of all our philosophical efforts? Pragmatism does not deny that individuals are shaped by social institutions and natural forces that are far greater than any individual. But individuals, as the expression of these larger powers, are also instruments through which these powers are in turn animated and reshaped. We can best work on the wider social and natural world only by mastering our primary instrument of action, which is our

self. Even if the higher end is the good of society or the universe as a whole, the improvement of the self is a crucial means to this end. And pragmatism is a philosophy that argues that if we value certain ends, we must also respect the means needed to achieve them.

This attitude resonates with Chinese thought. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius says: "The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives."¹⁰ Many evils in human life result from harmful external conditions, but by abandoning our care for the self (that is, by failing to perfect our perception, knowledge, virtue, health, and humanity), we will be less capable of overcoming and transforming those conditions. Caring for oneself does not entail selfishness since it is the very condition for caring for others—a simple truth that is repeatedly emphasized in airline safety instructions that a parent must first take care to guarantee his own oxygen supply before attending to his child's (precisely in order to attend effectively to the child's needs).

If philosophy aims at self-cultivation, how should this goal be understood? While recognizing that Western philosophy has often construed the idea of self-cultivation or self-care on the model of spiritual therapy, I argue, in *Practicing Philosophy*, for a pragmatist aesthetic model of self-cultivation through philosophical living. The philosopher works to make her life aesthetically attractive by thoughtfully sculpting her thoughts and actions, her mind and body, her character, and her personal history into an aesthetically integrated whole. In pragmatism, as I see it, the aesthetic dimension is not separated from the ethical, the social, and the cognitive (even if for certain purposes it may be distinguishable from them), so the most beautiful lives cannot be lived in evil, isolation, or ignorance. Confucian thought, I believe, affirms a similarly close linkage of the cognitive, ethical, social, aesthetic, and affective dimensions. Let me offer a short passage from the recently excavated (1993) Guodian text of "The Five Aspects of Conduct" that exemplifies this intimate linkage:

Humane (*ren*) thoughts are clear; being clear you will have keen insight; having keen insight you will be at ease; being at ease you will be gentle; being gentle you will be happy; being happy your demeanor will be pleasant; having a pleasant demeanor you will be intimate; being intimate you will be loving; being loving your countenance will be a jade-like countenance; having a jade-like countenance you will be formed (𠄎 *xíng*), being formed you will be humane.¹¹

The work of sculpting the self not only gives direction and fulfillment to the particular philosopher but also serves as an inspiring exemplar to others in their own quest to realize beauty in their lives and their envolving social world. Legend tells us that Socrates was the son of a sculptor and

that he wondered why artists spent so much care and effort shaping wood and marble but let their own selves remain as misshapen objects, haphazard products of chance, blind habit, and neglect. The Greek aesthetic model of ethical self-perfection (in terms of *kalon-kai-agathon*) seems to have an important counterpart in Chinese philosophy, and especially in Confucianism. Not only can we see this aesthetic-ethical ideal in Confucian texts, but we can also infer it from the Mohist critique of Confucianism for excessive aestheticism: "They bedeck themselves with elaborate dress to poison the world. They strum and sing and beat out dance rhythms to gather disciples. They proliferate *li* of ascending and descending to display their manners. They labor over the niceties of ceremonial gaits and wing-like gestures to impress the multitudes."¹² There is evidence that Confucius himself was a musician, and some even claim he edited the *Book of Songs*. Because the Confucian tradition urged intense and continued education in the so-called six arts—ritual, music (including poetry and dance), and writing (including calligraphy) along with archery, riding, and arithmetic—one must recognize the strongly aesthetic dimension of self-cultivation. To argue that such aesthetic education is simply a means to a higher ethical end would be to forget that certain aesthetic qualities or sensibilities are indeed part of that ethical end of superior character, of *ren*, or of the exemplary person (*junzi*).

Confucius, who insists that the exemplary person requires the right aesthetic blend of natural substance and ornament, likewise urges an aesthetic model of perfecting both self and society through education. "The only way for the true exemplary person to civilize the people and establish good customs is through education. A piece of jade cannot become a work of art without chiseling, and a man cannot come to know the moral law without education."¹³ A person, he argued, must be shaped through aesthetic education: "inspired by poetry, established by ritual (*li*) and perfected by music" (8.8).¹⁴ Virtue and "the way" (*dao*) are not merely things to know, to will, and to perform but rather things we should delight in so that we can love and fully embody them. "To truly love [the way] is better than just to understand it, and to enjoy it is better than simply to love it" (6.20).

In affirming an aesthetic model of philosophical living, pragmatism should insist that this model not only include crucial ethical, cognitive, and social dimensions but that it also admit of different yet useful versions. Such pluralism is required because there are different and competing visions of what qualities are most important for being "aesthetic." If some visions emphasize unity and harmony, others stress novelty or complexity. While *Practicing Philosophy* explores some of the different ways that pragmatists and other Western philosophers have portrayed and practiced the aesthetic life, there is also comparable variety in Chinese thought. With Confucius, for example, the ideal of aesthetic life tends more toward complexity and sophistication, where ritual and music are advocated as crucial tools of self-regulation and self-development to perfect one's *ren*. In contrast, Laozi urges an

aesthetic life of greater simplicity through basic harmony with nature, with less striving to regulate the self through the measures of formalized ritual and art.

Pragmatist pluralism recognizes another reason why there cannot be only one model of philosophy's art of living. One's life cannot be isolated from the environment in which it is lived and from which it draws energies and occasions for action. Different environments provide very different tools and possibilities for making one's life into a work of art, and pragmatism is a philosophy that is very appreciative of changing contexts and the need to adapt our thinking and behavior according to the context. There must be a certain amount of pluralism with respect to the aesthetic life, since different individuals have been differently shaped by the different conditions in which they live. This deep appreciation of pluralism and contextualization is another point where pragmatism converges with Chinese philosophy. Though we can learn much from great exemplars of beautiful living (and by contrast also from the mistakes of aesthetic failures of life), one must work out the aesthetical-ethical integrity of one's own life for oneself, given one's basic nature and environing circumstances. As the contemporary Confucian Tu Weiming remarks, despite Confucianism's reverence for its founder, it never took his person as "a rigid model for human flourishing"; it rejected the idea of imitating Confucius while insisting on "the relevance of his example for emulation."¹⁵

III

In advocating philosophy as an aesthetically shaped life practice, I have given considerable emphasis to the cultivation of the body as a central tool of self-cultivation, a key to better perception, action, virtue, and happiness. I treat this bodily dimension of philosophy in terms of a discipline called "somaesthetics."¹⁶ Briefly defined, somaesthetics is the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one's sentient body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic perception (*aesthesis*) and creative self-fashioning. The "soma" of somaesthetics designates that we are dealing here with an intentional, purposive, perceptive body—a body-mind (to use Dewey's expression) rather than a hunk of unintelligent flesh and bones. As a discipline not only of theory but also of concrete practice, somaesthetics aims at the realization of some of philosophy's oldest and most central goals: knowledge, self-knowledge, virtue, happiness, and justice.

When challenged by Western philosophical colleagues for paying so much attention to the body (which is seen as a necessarily narrow and narcissistic interest that interferes with the wider and nobler concerns of ethics and politics), I find support from Chinese philosophy, which realizes that virtue, care for others, and even the political practice of good government cannot be achieved without bodily means. As Mencius says, "I have heard

of those who, having kept their bodies inviolate, could serve their parents, but not of those who failing to do so, still served their parents. Whichever duty I fail to perform, it must not be my duty to my parents, for that is the duty from which all others spring. Whichever trust I fail to fulfill, it must not be that of keeping my body inviolate, for that is the trust from which all others arise." He elsewhere claims, "The functions of the body are the endowment of Heaven. But it is only a Sage who can properly manipulate them."¹⁷

There are two principal terms for body in classical Chinese thought—*shen* (身) and *ti* (體). When the *Analects* 1.3 speaks of daily efforts in self-examination (concerning three crucial ethical, social, and practical responsibilities), the term used to denote the self is *shen*, or body. This essentially emphasizes that self-examination implies bodily examination since our bodies are our indispensable, inalienable means for any ethical, social, or practical act we perform. This should be especially obvious for acts of ritual, where the aesthetics of body comportment is so significant, and indeed the link between ritual and embodiment is highlighted linguistically by the fact that body (*ti*) and ritual (*li*) share a common character (豐) in the second of the two characters that make up each word: *ti* is 體 and *li* is 禮.

Political government cannot be achieved without self-government, whose most basic dimension is somatic control. How can one properly govern a state if one cannot properly care for one's body? As Laozi declares, "He who loves his body more than the empire can be given the custody of the empire."¹⁸ Chinese philosophy further realizes that the most persuasive lessons in the art of living can be conveyed without theoretical texts but rather through the wordless power of bodily bearing and graceful action of the outstanding teacher, who instructs by the exemplarity of his person that complements and interprets the words of his teaching. As Mencius says, "His every limb bears wordless testimony." Consider the exemplarity of wordless teaching exhibited in the bodily behavior of Confucius as recorded in *Analects* 10:4:

On passing through the entrance way to the Duke's court, he would bow forward from the waist, as though the gateway were not high enough. While in attendance, he would not stand in the middle of the entranceway; in passing through, he would not step on the raised threshold. On passing by the empty throne, his countenance would change visibly, his legs would bend, and in his speech he would seem to be breathless. He would lift the hem of his skirts in ascending the hall, bow forward from the waist, and hold in his breath as though ceasing to breathe. On leaving and descending the first steps, he would relax his expression and regain his composure. He would glide briskly from the bottom of the steps, and returning to his place, he would resume a reverent posture.

Classical Chinese philosophy (Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist) combines the theoretical affirmation of the body with the development of practical somaesthetic disciplines (such as meditation and martial arts) that improve our powers of movement and mental concentration, while giving greater grace to our actions and greater pleasure and acuteness to our consciousness. In classical pragmatism, John Dewey likewise demonstrates both a theoretical and practical commitment to somaesthetic training in his advocacy and practice of the Alexander Technique.¹⁹

There is an area of somaesthetic theory and practice where the Chinese tradition far exceeds pragmatism or any other Western branch of thought. I refer to the erotic arts. While classical and contemporary pragmatism have neglected this dimension of the quest for meliorism (and William James even argued for an antisexual instinct), classical Chinese thought has dedicated considerable study to improving one's love-making practices, not only for the greater pleasure of oneself and one's partners but for improving health, energy, powers of self-mastery, the harmony of one's household and relations with others, and, of course, the successful generation of healthy offspring for the further flourishing of society. Though Daoism generally devoted more attention to these matters than did Confucianism (which had a reputation for greater prudishness), the classic Confucian *Book of Rites (Liji)* insists on the erotic, prescribing the frequency and *mis-en-scène* of sexual intercourse between a husband and his wives and concubines.²⁰ With respect to the erotic arts, pragmatist aesthetics and somaesthetics have much to learn from Chinese thought, but even more, I believe, from classical Indian culture.²¹

NOTES

1. Since my knowledge of the Chinese language is very rudimentary, I am still only an *amateur* (in the French sense that connotes a lover) of Chinese culture rather than a true expert. I must thank Prof. Roger Ames of the University of Hawaii, who, from the outset, has guided my study of Chinese philosophy, and Prof. Peng Feng of Peking University, whose initiative to translate my books first prompted me to undertake that study and who has also provided me with expert instruction. *Pragmatist Aesthetics* was published by Commercial Press (which in 2005 published the first Chinese translation of Dewey's *Art as Experience*). *Practicing Philosophy* was published in Chinese by Peking University Press, as was (in 2007) my more recent book *Performing Live*. My citations from the Confucian *Analects* are based on the translation of Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine, 1998). All references to the *Analects* are cited parenthetically in the text. I also follow these translators and the new Chinese scholarship in using pinyin transliteration for Chinese terms rather than the older Wade-Giles system.
2. See Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, 2nd ed. (New York: Tudor, 1951), 42.

3. "Pragmatism and East-Asian Thought," in *The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy*, ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
4. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 40-44.
5. Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Random House, 1938), 232. In the context of this paper relating Chinese aesthetics to American pragmatism, it may be worth noting that *mei* 美 forms the root of the Chinese word for America—*Meiguo* 美国, which literally means "beautiful country" (denoting the U.S.A.) while *Meizhou* 美洲 designates the American continent.
6. Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, chap. 6; Richard Shusterman, *Practicing Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1997), chaps. 1-3. The aesthetic justification of democracy (which is neither democracy's only nor most important justification) can be briefly summarized in terms of three arguments based on the aesthetic value of shared experiential enrichment and communicative unity in diversity that Dewey highlighted. First, an individual's free and active participation in democratic life will make her experience much richer and more interesting (hence more aesthetically rewarding) than if she had no opportunity to participate in the governing of society through public action. Second, if communication and concerted action are the most fulfilling experiences, then because participatory democracy best promotes such richly unified and shared experiences, it should be valued for these aesthetic satisfactions. Third, democracy's free but not identical participation of all different types of people in directing community life can greatly enrich the experience of each, because it not only provides the spice of variety but also gives the individual a more meaningful sense of her own distinct perspective and identity through the contrastive background of different others.
7. See Xunzi's "Discourse on Ritual Principles," in *Xunzi*, trans. John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), vol. 3, 66-67.
8. *The Doctrine of the Mean*, in *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 99. Xunzi, "Discourse on Ritual Principles," 62, 65.
9. The expression is from Zhuangzi. See *The Zhuangzi Index* in the Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series, Supplement 20 (Peking: Harvard-Yenching, 1947), 91 (chapter 31, line 14).
10. See *The Great Learning (Daxue)*, in *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Wing-tsit Chan, vol. 3, 86-87.
11. Kenneth Holloway, "'The Five Aspects of Conduct': Introduction and Translation," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Series 3.15.2 (2005): 179-98, quotation from 193. The word translated as "formed" is 形 (*xíng*) which also means "shape" or "shaped" and also denotes body.
12. See Mozi, "Feiru" 9.40-41, cited in Robert Eno, *The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 53.
13. From *The Book of Rites (Liji)*, trans. Lin Yutang, in *The Wisdom of Confucius* (New York: Modern Library, 1938), 241.
14. I here slightly amend the Ames and Rosemont translation by rendering some words in the manner of Wing-tsit Chan's translation, in *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, 33.
15. Tu Weiming, "Self-Cultivation in Chinese Philosophy," in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998), 8:615.
16. Readers of the *Journal of Aesthetic Education (JAE)* should already be familiar with somaesthetics through a number of articles published in this journal, including Martin Jay, "Somaesthetics and Democracy: Dewey and Contemporary Body Art," *JAE* 36 (2002): 55-69; Gustavo Guerra, "Practicing Pragmatism: Richard Shusterman's Unbound Philosophy," *JAE* 36 (2002): 70-83; P. Arnold,

- "Somaesthetics, Education, and the Art of Dance," *JAE* 39 (2005): 48-64; Eric Mullis, "Performative Somaesthetics," *JAE* 40 (2006): 104-17; my own essay, "Thinking Through the Body, Educating for the Humanities: A Plea for Somaesthetics," *JAE* 40 (2006): 1-21; and the discussions of somaesthetics by Kathleen Higgins and Casey Haskins in the symposium on my book *Performing Live* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) that appeared in *JAE* 36 (2002): 84-102. My treatment of somaesthetics in that book is in chaps. 7-8. For a more complete and updated study of somaesthetics see Richard Shusterman, *Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
17. *Mencius*, trans. W. A. C. H. Dobson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 138, 144, 181 (4A.20; 6A.14; 7A.21).
 18. *Tao Te Ching*, trans. D.C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 69 (chap. 13).
 19. The same double commitment led to my training as a professional Feldenkrais practitioner. The theories and techniques of Feldenkrais Method and Alexander Technique are compared in *Performing Live*, chap. 8. I explore the lessons that Dewey learned from Alexander in chapter 6 of *Body Consciousness*.
 20. See, for example, Robert H. Van Gulik's pathbreaking study (first published in 1961), *Sexual Life in Ancient China: A Preliminary Survey of Chinese Sex and Society from ca. 1500 B.C. till 1644 A.D.* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
 21. See Richard Shusterman, "Asian *Ars Erotica* and the Question of Sexual Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65, no. 1 (2007): 55-68.