Jovan Marinović, Serbia’s Outstanding European Diplomat, 1821–93

1. Early Life and Career

Jovan Marinović, dubbed “the Bosnian,” played an important role in the affairs of 19th century Serbia, both at home an abroad. Widely respected and esteemed in Europe as Serbia’s cooperative gentleman-diplomat, he was a key leader in Serbia’s painful transition towards constitutional liberalism, independence, and a recognized place as a leading Balkan country. As chief adviser to Serbian princes Mihailo and Milan Obrenović, he contributed much to Serbia’s emergence from vassaldom and isolation, This article will focus on Marinović’s key role as premier and foreign minister of Serbia, 1873–74.

Born of impoverished and soon deceased parents in Sarajevo, Bosnia, in 1821, little Jovan at age four was taken by his uncle on horseback to the city of Kragujevac, autonomous Serbia’s first capital, during the reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović. In 1838, after completing secondary education in Kragujevac, Jovan at age seventeen entered Serbian state service in Prince Miloš’s office. Then in 1842 he was sent on a state stipend to Paris for advanced study where he became fluent in spoken and written French, an invaluable asset during his subsequent diplomatic career. Upon his return to Serbia, Marinović became a junior secretary in the powerful State Council (Državni savet). Serving there until 1847, he was regarded as a diligent, highly intelligent worker who utilized his superb knowledge of French to maximum advantage. Soon he was named second secretary of the Council. During that service Marinović married the daughter of Belgrade’s richest man, merchant Miša Anastasijević. Soon Marinović and his bride were living on an exalted financial level in a luxurious Belgrade residence, quite an amazing rise for an impoverished Bosnian orphan! Through his wife Marinović became acquainted with the outstanding Serbian statesman, Ilija Garašanin, who became a lifelong friend and close colleague; they conducted an extensive correspondence. ² Making frequent trips abroad, Marinović became addicted to European gambling and spoke Serbian with a somewhat foreign accent. He now looked like a great European gentleman: tall, slender, rather weak in his legs, with his Bosnian eyes, long eyelashes, rather soft and vulnerable.³

In August 1847 Marinović received a two year leave of absence to complete his graduate studies in Paris. That became the first of his numerous political and diplomatic missions during which he acted in Paris as Serbia’s unofficial diplomatic envoy. As a semi-autonomous Turkish vassal state, Serbia had no official envoys abroad except at its suzerain court in Constantinople. Ilija Garašanin, Serbia’s interior minister, wanted Marinović to remain indefinitely in Paris where the July Monarchy collapsed in 1848. Marinović thus served Serbia as a diplomatic pioneer before it secured the right under the Treaty of Paris (1856) to maintain regular envoys abroad.

After his return to Serbia, Marinović in 1850 became head of the chancellery of ruling Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević and of the Foreign Ministry. In September 1852 Marinović followed his mentor Ilija Garašanin into power serving as foreign minister, 1852–53, until removed at the demand of Russia which alleged that he was a revolutionary nationalist (actually, he was deeply Conservative). By late 1853 Marinović realized he must find a new positioln, if possible outside of Serbia. He proposed that a secret Serbian diplomatic agency be established in Paris under his direction; Prince Aleksandar agreed. In March 1854 he left for Paris with his family as unofficial envoy. During the Crimean War (1853–55) Marinović represented Serbia to the Western powers allied with the Turks against Russia while Serbia remained neutral. In 1858 Garašanin led a movement which removed Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević and restored the Obrenović dynasty under the aged Prince Miloš.

The Obrenovićes’ return enhanced Marinović’s career prospect. Both Obrenović princes provided him with much more opportunity to utilize his diplomatic skills for Serbia. In 1860 he was named a state councilor continuing as Garašanin’s assistant and confidant. In February 1861, no longer in the cabinet, Marinović was sent as Serbian special envoy to Paris and St. Petersburg to seek the protection of the French and Russian rulers and to ascertain the Powers’ reaction to Serbia’s changing the restrictive 1838 Turkish constitution on its own and to adopt an independent foreign policy. From his conversations with European statesmen, he learned that Serbia could count on their support in establishing its jurisdiction over Muslims in Serbia.⁴ All during Prince Mihailo’s second reign, 1861–67, Marinović served as chairman of the State Council while Garašanin acted as foreign minister. During most of that time, however, Marinović lived in Paris with his family. Throughout Prince Mihailo’s reign Marinović acted as his chief advisor on foreign policy questions and was utilized on various diplomatic missions spending most of 1865 in Paris and London. Garašanin wrote his firend on June 14, 1865, that Prince Mihailo’s chief goal in foreign policy remained a Balkan war with Turkey to unite all Serbs.⁵ In july 1865 a world exhibition was held in Paris, and Marinović wrote Garašanin that Serbia should participate and apparently was authorized to represent Serbia there. On May 9, 1866, Garašanin wrote Marinović: “The Prince and I agree wholly with your view that we should halt on what has already been done [to create a new Balkan alliance] … We feel that you defined very well our further attitude…”⁶

In October 1866 Marinović was sent to St. Petersburg, Russia, on a mission related to the marrieage of Russia’s Heir—later Tsar Alexander II. Garašanin wrote him on November 9th: “We are also pleased that you have been well received everywhere.”⁷ That was followed by another Marinović’s mission to European capitals to explain Serbia’s aims and actions, especially in the Balkans, on the eve of the Austro-Prussian War. After that war, Mihailo sought to build Balkan alliances prior to his planned war with Turkey, but it became evident that Serbia could achieve nothing without Russia’s support.⁸ Garašanin’s abrupt removal in November 1867 by Prince Mihailo as foreign minister undermined Marinović’s position fundamentally. Prince Mihailo’s murder in Topčider Park outside Belgrade in May 1868 threw Serbia and Marinović’s position into deep crisis inasmuch as he did not participate actively in Serbian political party struggles and intrigues.

After Mihailo’s murder a three-man Temporary Regency was set up under Marinović as first regent. However, he promptly revealed his lack of courage in enforcing the law of 1859 on succession to the Serbian throne. He remained a formalist at a time of great Serbian internal crisis. The day after its creation, the Temporary Regency proclaimed it was exercising princely authority until a Great Skupština (enlarged legislature) elected a new prince. However, War Minister Milivoje Blaznavac tore up that decree, then in his army’s name proclaimed Milan Obrenović, a fourteen year old student in Paris, but the sole male Obrenović successor, as hereditary prince of Serbia. Marinović failed to uphold the Temporary Regency’s decision to have a Great Skupština choose a successor to Prince Mihailo and submitted meekly to the formidable war minister serving virtually as his secretary.⁹

Blaznavac decided the question of the future of the Serbian throne by himself. Hi order naming young Milan as prince contradicted the Temporary Regency’s proclamation. To uphold his authority the Temporary Regency would have had to remove and imprison War Minister Blaznavac which Marinović lacked courage to attempt. That left Blaznavac as master of Serbia.¹⁰ A regular regency was then created to rule during the remaining fourf years of Prince Milan’s minority composed of Blaznavac, statesman Jovan Ristić, and colorless Jovan Gavrilović. For the dissolving Temporary Regency, Marinović accepted young Prince Milan and the new regency declaring:

May God bless our new government of Prince Milan. May God bless Serbia and the present work of the valuable Great Skupština. Long live Serbia and Obrenović IV!¹¹

Prince Milan then telegraphed Marinović in Bucharest asking whether he would agree to form a cabinet. However, Marinović declined his offer preferring to remain abroad. In September 1869 Marinović was confirmed as chairman of the State Council, an influential position. In July 1872 Nikola Krstić, a professor and judge, reported:

I spoke about the Prince’s impending majority with Marinović, chairman of the Council. He contends that people are mistaken who expect important changes from this event. Perhaps, in his view, one or two ministers will be changed, but basically all will remain as before.¹²

After Regent Blaznavac’s sudden death in June 1873, young Prince Milan had to turn to a well-known statesman, either Ristić or Marinović. Reluctantly, he selected Ristić. For Prince Milan, Marinović—who remained his favorite— was much more sympathetic, but Ristić had acquired the right to rule through his regency. Milan rejected Ristić’s proposed cabinet, then called upon Marinović to form a new government provided he included Ristić in it. Ristić and Marinović negotiated, but Ristić then dissuaded the Prince from forming a Marinović cabinet. The Serbian public and foreign envoys believed that Ristić had become impossibly arrogant and should be and should be replaced by Marinović, who with his well-known skill could repair Serbia’s relations with Turkey and Austro-Hungary. However, Ristić’s trip to Vienna undermined that view.¹³ When the Blaznavac cabinet resigned, Prince Milan asked Ristić to form a new government which he did on April 2, 1873, with himself as premier and foreign minister.

On October 18, 1873, Prince Milan returned to Belgrade from a foreign trip to find the Ristić government increasingly unpopular. Three days later Ristić and his cabinet resigned. Milan then asked Marinović to form a new cabinet, mostly Conservative, with himself as premier and foreign minister. However, Austrian Concul Benjamin Kallay doubted that that cabinet would remain popular very long. Nonetheless, Marinović—then highly valued in Serbia and abroad—had finally achieved power he was reluctant to assume. Foreigners spoke about no other Serbian politician with so much sympathy and respect; for them, he was the only true European.

2. Marinović as Premier and Foreign Minister, 1873–74

During his year as premier, Marinović worked honorably and openly seeking to introduce into Serbian political life more decency than had existed there previously. Actually, for Serbian political conditions then Marinović was too much the European gentleman, lacking essential courage and decisiveness. However, despite an insufficiently political temperament, he possessed great political intelligence. No one else in Serbia could analyze and describe a political situation as he could. Whoever did not see him in action, but knew him mainly from conversations, had to consider him a great statesman. Lacking true ambition, he preferred respectable positions at home and abroad to actual power and disturbing responsibility. The compliments of rulers and prominent foreign diplomats were normally sufficient for him. His refusal to seek power gave Marinović a more dignified appearance than other Serbian politicians.¹⁴ With the formation of his October 1873 cabinet, Marinović faced the most responsible and onerous leadership position of his career.

Prince Milan had offered to make Marinović as the Conservatives’ leader, Ristić’s successor, because he was the only Serbian politician who could measure up to Ristić. Also Milan preferred him to other Serbian leaders partly because he did not seek to impose his views and politics on the young, inexperienced prince. When he came in power in 1873, Marinović at age fifty two was ten years older than the departing Ristić. By then, as we have seen, he had behind him a long and successful career as administrator and diplomat but never as premier.¹⁵ In Marinović’s cabinet Filip Hristić, who had helped secure Ristić’s resignation, was named Minister of Culture. Đorđe Cenić became Justice Minister. Those two and Marinović gave the cabinet a Conservative coloration. Construction Minister Kosta Magazinović was a relative of Marinović who had served repeatedly as a Serbian envoy abroad. War Minister Kosta Protić was a confidant of Prince Milan. Marinović’s choices as Interior and Finance Ministers evoked great surprise. Finance Minister Čedomilj Mijatović, having held that position in the Ristić cabiner, soon became a passionate Conservative and Ristić opponent. Interior Minister Aćim Čumić was an apparent reactionary demagogue. Explained Premier Marinović:

… He is a person of knowledge who possesses the skill to talk with the people and officials. Čumić comes from the village and is an academic person. He has the gift of speech and ties with various types of people from every class.¹⁶

Marinović needed Čumić to deal with the peasant Skupština (parliament).

Marinović did not seek to run a narrow Conservative party cabinet, like Ristić’s Liberal one. Instead, he aimed to preside over an administration “without party aspirations or personal pretentions.” Thus he named two Liberals to the State Council and the two surprises to his cabinet. Marinović, to be sure, hated Ristić’s liberal 1869 Constitution, but believing in moderation, compromise, and the rule of law, his administration was notable for its restraint. Had Marinović’s style been more widely accepted, affirmed America historia Gale Stokes, Serbian politics would have developed more calmly. ¹⁷ Marinović sought to pursue the policy of reconciliation of political parties recommended by Prince Mihailo at the beginning of his reign. An early government circular of Marinović’s stated:

The government has no party aspirations, ne exclusive political pretensions. All of its wishes, all of its positions will be directed to gather around the Prince all forces and all loyalties in common useful work.

Wrote the official Serbian newspaper Srpske Novine: “In the eyes of Mr. Marinović do not have the importance either the imagination of political parties or the arbitrary shouts of Conservatives and Liberals.”¹⁸

Deeds soon confirmed those declarations. A Liberal Radivoje Milojković was named vice-chairman of the State Council. The new government did not dismiss Ristić’s Liberal-dominated Skupština which still had another session to hold. Convened in November 1873, that Skupština revealed the frewe interaction of a largely Conservative government and a Liberal parliament. The government’s first action, a circular by Interior Minister Čumić, gave broad freedom to the Serbian press:

Every view instilled with a desire for general welfare, every legitimate action will be given an open field. Freedom of thought, freedom to evaluate laws and state actions is the reliable promoter of any serious and genuine progress, and in this His Excellency’s government will place no obstacles.¹⁹

The police were instructed to let newspapers write whatever they wished. Thanks to the Marinović government, Serbia received de facto press freedom.

During the Skupština debate on its address to the throne, Liberal Ljubomir Kaljević sought inclusion of a law on communities to greatly increase their self-government; a new law to increase ministerial responsibility, and a new liberal press law. Marinović’s government did not oppose having those Liberal desires enter the Skuypština address. It seemed as if Marinović had become much more liberal that the supposedly liberal Ristić. Actually, Conservatives wanted community self-government, ministerial responsibility, and press freedom. Therefore, Marinović’s goverment revealed itself as liberal spirited.²⁰

From November 1873 to January 1874 many important laws were passed by the Skupština in one of the most fruitful legislative periods in Serbian history. The law completely revoking corporal punishment of December 1st was a humane measure with political significance. The Regency police had beaten opponents purely for being in opposition. The total abolition of corporal punishment marked a major step forward for human rights in Serbia.

Another positive step was a legal decision of December 31st to create a fund to improve conditions for prison inmates. Marinović’s Justice Minister stated that Serbian jails were seriously outdated and overcrowded where inmates were ruined. The Skupština gladly approved the plan of December 12th to erect more modern prisons.

A law on reorganizing secondary schools and reconstructing Velika Škola (later Belgrade University) increased class years from six to seven, introduced an examination for entry into secondary schools, and a final examination. The autonomy of Velika Škola was also strengthened.

A December 1st law introduced the metric system into Serbia replacing the old imprecise Turkish measurement system. On November 30th Serbia’s first national silver currency was introduced, based on European standards. On December 31st a law was passed to promote industrial growth.

The most important law enacted by that Skupština expanded the amount of land of a farmstead, as demanded by the peasantry, but it was designed to defend smallholders and hamper the creation of large estates.²¹

Facing an unsatisfactory financial situation with a state deficit from reduced revenues, the Skupština achieved a balanced budget by reducing expenditures. Thus the 1873–74 budget ended up with a surplus. The Marinović government’s financial policy was based on savings and belt tightening.²²

The Marinović government found it difficult to work with a chiefly Liberal Skupština controlled by Ristić and Radivoje Milojković, but the peacable Marinović left it a free hand. Ristić never ceased working against Marinović, seeking to create the conviction that Prince Milan was dissatisfied with his government. Marinović avoided open conflict with the Skupština by yielding to it. The government was hampered by the violent behavior and lack of tact in the Skupština by Ačim Čumić.

Instead it was Premier Marinović who had to explain matters to the Skupština. He measured his words and remained reserved, taciturn, and dignified. His speeches, laced with abstract words and Gallicisms, resembled an artivle in France’s Le Journal des Débats translated into Serbian. The confused peasant delegates queried one another: “Is he speaking for or against that proposal?” Poor at leading peasants, he had to repeat his words several times and beg the Skupština to accept his views. Demaining with questions of form, he utilized precise solutions to defend his views.²³

In and out of the Skupština, Marinović remained a formalist. Not feeling wholly secure with a legislature not composed of likeminded gentlemen, he constantly checked the Skupština’s attitude towards his government. Once he posed directly the question of its confidence in his government:

If we do not enjoy the Skupština’s full confidence, we cannot positively and usefully work with it as an organ of the government. We would not wish to be for one hour in action between the Skupština and the Prince.

Marinović disliked parliamentarism and mass rule through the Skupština, but he had a passion for order and correctness, even of a parliamentary nature.²⁴ His government thus sought hard to reinforce its initial weak political position, whose main support was provided by Prince Milan, and to strengthen itself. With popular measures and by presenting his program as progressive, dispassionate, and non-party, it began by ruling more liberally than had Ristić’s Liberals.²⁵

The Marinović cabinet’s position was rather insecure. It lacked a majority in the Skupština. Officialdom, composed mostly of supporters of Ristić and Milojković, did not believe it would last long. In the police liberal chiefs retained their positions and did not much trust their minister Čumić, who appeared young and inexperienced. Public opinion sympathized generally with the Marinović government, but the Serbian press opposed it. The opposition controlled four newspapers while the government had none. Freedom of the press, which the government had granted, allowed opposition newspapers to attack the government arrogantly. Promoting fermentation was the freer movements of supporters of the ousted Karađorđević dynasty than under the Regency.²⁶ Marinović admitted that the Karađorđevićes were utilizing freedoms his cabinet had granted them and considered seeking the Skupština’s authorization to expel all relatives of deposed Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević.²⁷

The Marinović cabinet most feared Jovan Ristić and the young socialist, Svetozar Marković. Government leaders blamed their troubles mainly on Ristić’s intrigues. Many Serbs believed a government without Ristić could not conduct state affairs properly and would be only temporary. Rumors spread among the public about Ristić’s imminent return to power. The Marinović cabinet complained that such reports were preventing it from consolidating its position. To end such rumors the cabinet in February 1874 pensioned off Ristić as Marinović wrote him: “It is velieved that we are here only from one day to another, and that you will soon be summoned to direct affairs.” With great satisfaction, Prince Milan signed the decree pensioning Ristić.

Against Svetozar Marković, Serbia’s socialist founding father, the Marinović cabinet conducted a long fight. As soon as the Marinović government permitted freer publication, Marković founded the political newspaper, Javnost, in Kragujevac whose many workers supported Marković’s socialism. Marković’s articles especially worried Prince Milan and the Marinović cabinet when the advocated full popular sovereignty which could lead eventually to a republic. In January 1874 the Interior Minister ordered Marković imprisoned for nine months for his newspaper articles. Soon after his release, Marković died of tuberculosis; Javnost was soon wholly forbidden.²⁸ Thanks to Aćim Čumić’s arbitrary actions, the Marinović government more and more resembled a hardline, conservative regime. Many feared that Čumić would force Marinović too far to the right.²⁹

Marinović’s cabinet took power during the existence of the League of Three Emperors (Dreikaiserbund), composed of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, a European alliance aiming to preserve peace in the Balkans and pursue conservative policies there. St. Petersburg and Vienna informed Prince Milan that the Marinović cabinet corresponded better with Dreikaiserbund than had Ristić’s regime. European diplomats knew from experience that Marinović was much more willing to follow their advice than Ristić had been. Thus Marinović came to power with the Dreikaiserbund’s blessing. Austri-Hungary, and especially Russia, pressured Marinović to settle quickly Serbia’s outstanding problems. Marinović was informed that Prince Milan could not be received in the Dreikaiserbund capitalsunless he first made a vassal’s visit to Constantinople. The route to Europe’s imperial capitals thus passed through Constantinople. Marinović wished to arrange a possible visit by Prince Milan to St. Petersburg because he had a plan to marry him to a Russian princess and thus consolidate Serbo-Russian relations. Such a marriage would require Milan to first visit the Sultan in Constantinople. Thus Marinović hastened to organize a visit by him and the Prince to the Porte (Turkey).³⁰

The Marinović government shifted Serbia’s foreign policy, adapting its aims and actions to the Powers’ demand. Marinović and Prince Milan showed a readiness to follow the Powers’ desires and advice. With Milan that readiness was based more on fear and insecurity, but with Marinović it comprised his aim in foreign policy. Knowing him from earlier, the Powers therefore unanimously greeted his achievement of power.

As foreign minister, Marinović from the beginning sought to improve and normalize Serbia’s relations with its suzerain, Turkey, and thus prove to the world his cabinet’s peaceful and loyal intentions and demonstrate that diplomatic successes could be achieved best by moderation, elasticity, and attentiveness. To prove his cabinet’s status quo aims, Marinović promptly began holding talks with the Powers’ consuls while complaining against Ristić for pursuing a risky, nationalistic foreign policy.³¹

However, Marinović’s foreign policy approach did not resolve any of the disputed problems with the Porte until spring 1874, despite envoy Filip Hristić’s pressure on the Porte and the Powers’ envoys in Constantinople, but it quieted polemics and promoted commercial relations of Serbia and Romania with Austria-Hungary. Rejecting Ristić’s reservations on regulating Serbia’s commercial relations, Marinović revealed his readiness for negotiations. At the end of 1873 the issue of independent commercial agreement by Serbia and Romania with foreign powers was placed on the agenda of European diplomacy. The Porte reacted with a note by Foreign Minister Rashid-Pasha to the Powers categorically rejecting the right of its vassals to conclude independent international agreements.

In the fall of 1874 on the eve of his fateful trip with Prince Milan to Constantinople, Marinović could look back on the year of considerable achievements. His regime had begun to transform Serbia into a freer, more liberal country, aligned with key European powers. Under his leadership, Serbia was moving somewhat hesitantly along the path European countries had taken earlier. Ilija Garašanin, his retired friend, wrote him in March 1874 that if good things occurred now in Serbia, the country should thank not the Skupština but Marinović and Prince Milan. Serbia’s liberalization had been achieved by a non-party cabinet and a premier with an accommodating style displaying cautious moderation.

While Serbia remained a vassal principality of the Ottoman Empire—to 1878—its princes went four times to Constantinople to pay homage to their suzerain, the Sultan: Prince Miloš in 1835, Prince Mihailo in 1840 an 1867, and now Prince Milan in 1874. Except for young Mihailo’s 1840 trip, the other three visits had real practical significance. Thus Prince Mihailo’s 1867 visit was connected with the evacuation of Turkish fortresses in Serbia, a major step toward Serbia’s independence. Prince Milan’s 1874 trip was decided upon to obtain concessions from the Porte on a railway link and to acquire disputed Mali Zvornik.

The Porte had expected Prince Milan to pay homage to the Sultan right after his 1872 majority. The Turks believed that a vassal Prince Milan should begin visits to foreign courts with Constantinople. During his minority Milan had visited Tsar Alexander II of Russia in the Crimea which the Porte considered a highly incorrect action which he could remedy only by the initial visit of his majority to the Sultan. Of the concessions sought by Marinović in return, the railway link was of far greater practical significance for Serbia because it could become a link with European railways greatly benefiting both Serbia and Turkey. The Porte did not object seriously to such a link but sought to attach various conditions and restrictions. Les important was the question of Mali Zvornik, a small Muslim area on the Drina river’s right bank claimed by Belgrade as a rightful part of Serbia. Since 1830’s the Mali Zvornik question, a matter of prestige for both sides, could if left unresolved lead to a Serbo-Turkish conflict.

After Marinović achieved power, the Dreikaiserbund’s leaders urged him and Prince Milan to visit Constantinople before going to its capitals. To be able to send Prince Milan to St. Petersburg, Marinović had to arrange his visit first to Constantinople, seeking to resolve the railway and Mali Zvornik questions raised by Ristić. After the apparently successful solution of the railway question, Prince Milan and Marinović left for Constantinople confident they would return with the railway link and Mali Zvornik.³²

The Russian government believed it had guaranteed Prince Milan’s favorable reception in Constantinople. The Serbian leaders indeed were pleased at Turkish hospitality. However, speaking with Turkish leaders about Mali Zvornik, they encountered unexpected difficulties. Marinović insisted to the Turkish Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister that the Mali Zvornik question be resolved during their stay in Constantinople. But the Turkish ministers countered that Serbia should leave an envoy in Constantinople to negotiate about the question after the Prince’s return.

Milan and Marinović both spoke decisively to Turkish leaders. Without a solution over Mali Zvornik, warned Marinović, Serbo-Turkish relations could not be repaired. Prince Milan warned that if Marinović failed to resolve the Mali Zvornik question during their stay, he might lose the premiership which would cause a breach in Serbo-Ottoman relations. The Turkish ministers declared they could not mention the cession of Mali Zvornik to the Sultan who was very sensitive about ceding any Ottoman territory to a vassal principality. Prince Milan then requested that Turkish leaders arrange an audience for him with the Sultan to discuss Mali Zvornik. They replied that the Sultan was too busy for such a special audience, but that Milan would be received by him when he departed Constantinople. This was a typical Turkish delaying tactic utilized not only with vassals but also with the Powers. The Turks calculated that Milan would not dare raise the Mali Zvornik question at a final audience. When Milan did raise that question at that formal audience, the Sultan replied vaguely that the Porte would consider what action to take. However, that same day the Sultan fired his foreign minister for being too conciliatory towards the Serbs. That comprised his true negative reply to the Serbian leaders. Prince Milan and Marinović left the Turkish capital very dissatisfied, almost insulted. A disgruntled Marinović returned to Belgrade with only “two sheep and a horse,” as a contemporary expressed it.³³ There is probably nothing the well-intentioned Marinović could have done in Constantinople to induce the stubborn Turks to cede inconsequential Mali Zvornik.

Serbian public opinion was greatly angered concluding that the Porte had swindled its leaders. Feeling the need to provide Prince Milan with some satisfaction when he arrived in Belgrade, he was greeted in a sudden and spontaneous demonstration more enthusiastically than when he had achieved his majority.

After that abortive Constantinople trip, the Porte acted even more hostilely towards Serbia, as its envoy there was humiliated on various occasions. Claiming that Serbia intended to seize Mali Zvornik by force, the Porte reinforced its army units in Bosnia near the Serbian frontier. The Turks also sought to revoke their earlier promise to Belgrade over railway links informing the Serbs that link would not be granted until the Porte’s Bosnian line had been completed. Why was the Porte acting so unyielding towards Serbia? The Turks recently had acquired new weapons which enhanced their selfconfidence. The Porte also knew that with the creation of the peacelovind Dreikaiserbund in 1873, there was no longer any need to bribe Serbia. Its three emperors surely would not permit the destruction of Balkan peace, so Serbia would have to remain at peace. The Porte’s general rule was to yield nothing unless compelled to. Fearing no violent action by Serbia, the Turks refused to make the least concession to its vassal.³⁴

The impact of the abortive Constantinople trip was felt immediately in Serbian party politics. The Ristić press, led by Istok, directed its fire at Premier Marinović for returning emptyhanded. Ristić’s newspapers described Marinović as too obedient towards the Dreikaiserbund. As soon as Europe had declared that Prince Milan must pay homage in Constantinople, Marinović had obeyed without inquiring whether Serbia would receive any tangible benefits, claimed Ristić. However, that was wholly untrue. Marinović, claimed the Ristić press, embodied the traditional Serbian policy of courting the Powers without recognizing that a new era had dawned of awakening Serbian national strength and dignity.

These attacks by a political opponent were exaggerated, but nonetheless they began undermining Marinović’s position in Serbia. Before leaving for Constantinople, he had instructed Interior Minister Čumić to complete necessary preparations for elections for the next Skupština. However, Čumić attacked those who had reopened accusations against controversial Colonel Jovan Balimarković at the 1873 Skupština discrediting the Marinović cabinet.³⁵ Meanwhile, Ristić’s Istok called for an aggressive Serbian foreign policy. Knowing Serbia’s military weakness, Marinović, as an experienced diplomat, could not accept such a policy.³⁶

Prince Milan and Marinović arrived back in Serbia on September 30, 1874, after a leisurely twelve week European trip. Marinović promptly called for new Skupština elections for November 20th, the first relatively open election thanks to previous reforms of the Marinović government. Even before the elections were concluded, the Liberals were predicting that the Marinović government would fall. Istok described the election as a complete victory for “the liberal national freethinking party.” But the government’s right to select one fourth of the Skupština deputies gave Premier Marinović a chance to overcome his electoral losses, but he still sought to create a government “without party aspirations.” He outraged his supporters proposing that Ristić enter his cabinet’s delegation declaring: “Ristić represents a force that cannot be ignored… The most important thing is to protect the Crown and get things moving.” Prevented by cabinet colleagues from giving Ristić a government post, Marinović sought a deal with the 1858 Liberals of Jevrem Grujić, whom he appointed to the Skupština.³⁷

Ehen the Skupština session opened November 20th, excitement ran high, fostered by Marinović’s decision to convene it in Belgrade instead of in more conservative Kragujevac. Prince Milan attempted to defuse the Skupština’s electric mood with a calm, dull address apologizing that the cabinet would not present a new law on miniserial responsibility.³⁸ The rstless legislature reacted negatively to that speech as signs mounted of its possible serious confrontation with Marinović’s cabinet. The choice of four left wing liberals as Skupština’s secretaries showed the cabinet could not control matters.³⁹ The proposed Skupština address to the throne was written by the radical Omladinist, Milan Kujundžić, in a nationalist style. Premier Marinović could not accept the part on foreign policy criticizing the Constantinople trip and advocating Serbia’s cooperation with brother Balkan peoples to achieve aggressive national goals.⁴⁰ The Marinovićgovernment rejected a formal Skupština statement expressed in a tone of insulted nationalism.

To Marinović’s assertion that their throne address was unconstitutional, the Liberals noted that parliaments in all constitutional countries made similar proposals, so why not in Serbia? They viewed the address as part of their plan to turn Serbia into a true constitutional country. Conservatives, though, viewed Serbia as a vassal dependent on the Porte and the Powers, so the Skupština had to avoid letting them exploit Serbia’s weakness. Declared Milutin Garašanin, Ilija’s son: “We can never forget that we are always … before the eyes of powerful countries who follow and evaluate carefully every move we make.”⁴¹

Premier Marinović won out over the Skupština’s address to the throne, but he soon lost the war. On December 3rd the Skupština rejected the committee proposal for the Liberal throne address, 61 to 58, instead adopting the government’s mild minority report as the throne address.⁴² Satisfied, Marinović then presented parts of his overall program. “Marinović was really inclined to continue his work as premier.” In fact, Krstić was working on press law changes for Marinović.

Marinović had realized it would be difficult to rule with that 1874 Skupština unless he reached some agreement with Liberals divided between those of 1858 and 1868, but he hoped to utilize their disagreement. Marinović’s Conservatives were closer to the 1868 Liberals with whom they had supported Prince Mihailo’s regime. But 1868 leader Ristić was more dangerous for the Conservatives than anyone else. To prevent his return to power, the Conservatives considered friendship with the 1858 Liberals. Marinović hoped with Jevrem Grujić’s supporters to win over Liberal Skupština members, isolate Ristić, and secure his government’s survival. Čumić disapproved, but when Prince Milan agreed wholly with Marinović, Čumić yielded. Between the Conservatives and the Grujić Liberals agreement was reached. Grujić and some other Liberals were named government Skupština delegates. Đorđe Topuzović became Skupština chairman with Grujić as vice-chairman calling on the deputies to forget party differences and work together for Serbia’s good. That marked the beginning of party reconciliation, another Marinović achievement.⁴³

But MArinović’s ministers were dissatisfied with this Skupština outcome. After the 61–58 vote, fellow ministers jointed with a disgruntled Čumić. That evening the ministers, including an accepting Marinović, went to Prince Milan and handed over their resignations. Not coveting power, Marinović made no real effort to retain it. To general surprise, the Prince asked the intriguer, Čumić, to remain when the other ministers departed. Marinović believed that Čumić had devised a plot against him.⁴⁴ Early next morning Prince Milan asked Čumić to form a new cabinet.⁴⁵ Marinović’s resignation, ending his positive reforms, brought the unstable Čumić to power. Marinović had been unable to accept the Liberal throne address because it had openly criticized his peaceful foreign policy. But Marinović, avoiding any open discussion, did not defend his course before a nationalistic Skupština.⁴⁶

Marinović’s fall caused unanimous regret by the major Powers. They praised him openly and bitterly criticized the Skupština and public whose combined pressure had caused Marinović’s resignation. Prince Milan was urged to retain Marinović as premier.⁴⁷ A special Russian note stated St. Petersburg’s regret at Marinović’s resignation fearing that the Ristić Liberals with their dangerous nationalistic policies would prevail. Austrian diplomacy was even sharper in condemning Marinović’s fall. Later, after Čumić fell, the Dreikaiserbund urged Prince Milan to again offer the government to Marinović. As premier Marinović had won Dreikaiserbund approval by his November 1874 statement: “Serbia cannot be the hinge of Serbdom, or the refuge of revolutionary activities.”⁴⁸

Marinović and Čumić claimed Prince Milan as the true architect of the short-lived Čumić cabinet. To be sure, the Prince did not wish to remove the Marinović Conservatives from power greatly preferring them to Ristić’s Liberals. But he had grown dissatisfied with Marinović during their Constantinople trip and its unsatisfactory results humiliating for him. The Prince believed Čumić could better control the unruly 1874 Skupština with his dynamic energy.⁴⁹ To Milan, Marinović did not appear energetic and courageous enough to handle the unstable situation.

However, Marinović remained the only political leader Prince Milan still trusted, but he repeatedly refused to take on responsibility for a government under unstable conditions. However, Marinović agreed to become the Prince’s secret advisor and was chiefly responsible for resolving the political crisis after Premier Čumić’s fall, advising Milan to form a colorless business cabinet to neutralize the Skupština and dissolve it if necessary. Apparently, Marinović anticipated that such a temporary government would soon be succeeded by a new Marinović cabinet.⁵⁰ When that did not accur and the dangerous Balkan crisis erupted, Marinović left the handling of that to Ristić. While remaining Prince Milan’s confidant, Marinović preferred generally to live abroad with his family and never served again as Serbia’s premier.

Jovan Marinović was one one of the most dedicated and honest of Serbia’s political leaders of the Obrenović era. His outstanding diplomatic career was based on his unique mastery of French, then the lingua franca of diplomacy. Europe’s profound respect and liking for Marinović increased during his numerous foreign missions. However, that was not shared by a largely illiterate Serbian peasantry making it difficult to play a popular political role in Serbia. Thus he preferred to remain a bureaucrat in the State Council and Foreign Ministry. He was deeply trusted by Princes Mihailo and Milan Obrenović for whom he played key roles as mentor and advisor. They assigned him difficult and important missions abroad and to decide key political matters at home. Consistently peaceloving and moderate, he always aimed to avoid war and to resolve disputes by diplomacy. Marinović displayed almost unparalleled excellence in writing memoranda and reports in Serbia and abroad. He often composed letters which Princes Mihailo and Milan wished to send to foreign leaders. Marinović’s regime of 1873–74 made Serbia freer and more liberal, aligned with the key Dreikaiserbund powers. He spent the last years of his life and career in Paris with his family. Marinović played a significant part in Serbia’s painful transition towards constitutional liberalism, independence, and a leading role in the Balkans.